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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore the empirical relevance of the theory of 
financial liberalisation in the Mauritian context. After confronting the conflicting views 
in the literature, the changes that have taken place in the financial sector in terms of 
monetary policy and the institutional developments are examined. The study shows that 
government has played a role in boosting financial intermediation before liberalisation 
and that it has still a role to play after liberalisation. It also explains the measures taken 
to improve financial stability. The high concentration in both the banking and insurance 
sectors are also discussed. 
The thesis finds no evidence of an increase in real interest rate after 
liberalisation or any consequential improvement in domestic savings as suggested by 
the liberalisation theories. Further external liberalisation has not led to a drop in real 
interest rate and increased savings. Some minor episodes of banking and stock market 
crises have been identified. The research also examines the links between interest 
spread after liberalisation, fund cost and market share and the results tend to support the 
proposition that there is unidirectional causality from market share to interest spread. 
No significant change in share market size, liquidity and activity has been 
observed after liberalisation and the collective investment schemes have not yet 
indicated signs of ability to considerably mobilize savings and hence to boost the 
security market. 
There is evidence of a slow down of the financial deepening process as the 
liquidity ratio 
M2 
exceeds 65%. Financial deepening is not found to be positively Y 
i 
related to real interest rate. This applies not only to Mauritius but equally to some other 
countries of the region. 
Although the evidence does not support the McKinnon and Shaw predictions 
concerning interest rate and mobilization of savings, yet there has been freer access to 
credit after liberalisation and the study has shown that private sector credit as a share of 
GDP is positively related to economic growth and that there is bidirectional causality 
between them. 
With respect to corporate financing the study shows that the behaviour of listed 
firins is consistent with the pecking order theory of finance and that the listed 
companies are now more sensitive to external financing for the acquisition of physical 
investment, in relation to their internal growth strategy. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Country 
The Republic of Mauritius is a small island economy located at 800 Krn east 
of Madagascar. Apart from the island of Mauritius of area 1865 KM2 and a 
population of around 1.2 million, the Republic also includes Rodrigues island with 
an area of 104 KM2 and a population of 36.1 thousands, Agalega island with area 
70Km 2 and population of 285, the Carcados Carajos shoals (St Brandon) having an 
area of I Krn 2 and the Chagos Archipelago', 60kM2. Because of its various islands 
scattered in the Indian Ocean the Republic of Mauritius has a relatively large 200 
nautical mile area of economic exclusive zone covering 1,700,000 km 2. The island 
of Mauritius remains by far the main part of the republic in terms of population and 
economic activity 
The population has no indigenous component and is composed of 
descendants of immigrants from India, Africa, China and Europe. In terms of 
religious faith, 52% are of Hindu faith, 28% are Christians, 17% Muslims and 3% 
othe?. Adult literaCY3 rate is at around 85%, life expectancy at birth is 72 years and 
the population, grows at around 0.8% per year. 47% of the population (Le 560,000 
people) constitutes the labour force around 10% of which is unemployed. 
1 Diego Garcia, the largest of the islands forming the archipelago, contains ajoint UK-US naval 
support facility. The Archipelago was excised from the Mauritian territory at the time of 
Independence and is still the subject of a dispute between the Mauritian and the British governments. 2 These are approximate proportions since people no longer have to declare their religion/ethnic 
roup in population census. 
People aged above 15 and who can read and write. 
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Mauritius became an independent sovereign state in March 1968 after more 
than 150 years of British rule that followed 95 years of French colonialiSM4 . The 
political system is a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminister model. 
The democratic process is exercised through a national assembly on the island of 
Mauritius, a regional assembly sitting at Rodrigues and local government. There is 
separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary and the 
legal system benefits from enrichment from two past colonial powers for being a 
hybrid one combining both French Civil law (Code Napoleon) and English common 
law. The enonomy is now classified as an upper middle incomes one with a national 
'income of $4000 per head and government expects that the current modernization 
process will allow a 100% increase in national income in ten years. 
1.2 From a Monocrop Economy to Financial Liberalisation 
Prior to independence, Mauritius, just like many other British colonies, was 
a low-income plantation economy based to a great extent on sugar6 and to a much 
lesser extent on tea plantation for regular supply to Great Britain. Sugar milling and 
tea blending therefore largely dominated the few manufacturing activities. Around 
two third of the jobs available were either in the agricultural sector or in the public 
sector. On the road to independence during the 1960s, Mauritius adopted the import 
substitution strategy, consistent with the prevailing mainstream economic thinking 
4 1715-1810: French; 1810-1968: British. 
5 The World Bank classifies countries having a national income between $ 3,036 and $9,385 as 
upper middle-income economies. 
6 Basically monocrop. 
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from amongst the newly independent countries. Trade protectionist measures were 
applied in line with the infant-industry argument and appropriate fiscal measures 
were designed to support that economic strategy. A development bank was also 
created in 1964 to ensure a regular flow of subsidized credit to new investment 
projects. These measures gave a boost to the weak non-sugar and non-tea secondary 
industry activities in new areas such as edible oil refinery, soap, toothpaste, 
footwear, margarine and paint manufacturing. However, in these manufacturing 
activities it was unthinkable to consider competing with the big brands in overseas 
markets and so output was to be restricted to satisfy the domestic market. 
Within a couple of years after independence, the political leaders realized 
that the inward looking strategy set up some years before independence was not 
able to deliver to expectations. It did not create the amount of jobs needed and 
unemployment had reached close to 20% in 1970. The capacity of the country to 
generate income and to import the basic commodities as well as capital goods 
continued to be over-dependent on sugar, which is exposed to regular adverse 
supply shocks from cyclones. The import substitution strategy was largely 
constrained by a narrow domestic market size and this probably constituted one 
important factor that pushed Mauritius to eventually seek an outward looking 
strategy much earlier than other third world countries. 
The foundations for a mixed strategy combining import substitution with an 
export led growth strategy were laid down with the adoption of a legal framework 
for the creation of the export-processing zone (EPZ) in 1970, a set of fiscal 
incentives and a policy in favour of generous leasing of state land to hotel 
-3- 
promoters. Labour intensive production in the EPZ for the wider market would 
make it possible to deal with the unemployment problem. Unfortunately EPZ and 
tourism activity did not pick up and employment was slightly below 9000 in the 
EPZ in 1976. The only macroeconomic objective that was being satisfied in the 
early days of independence was economic growth and this was still driven by sugar. 
Non-sugar manufacturing and tourism activity did not contribute much to the GDP 
and the high income earned from the 1973-75 sugar boom 7 although transitory in 
nature was interpreted as permanent. The positive side of such misreading is that it 
facilitated the transfer of funds from the sugar industry to the newly created EPZ 
and Tourism industry. On the negative side it led to an increased propensity to 
import and from the higher tax collected by government, in a situation of a low 
standard of living, a policy of redistribution of a transitory benefit through wages, 
transfer payments and subsidies was introduced rather than consolidating productive 
capacity. These expenditure items, once in, became very difficult to be curbed for 
equity and political reasons. When the world sugar price dipped to a lower level and 
this was followed by the 1979 oil shock, the Mauritian economy headed for a crisis. 
It faced high inflation, high unemployment, chronic balance of payment deficit and 
a high fiscal deficit. Mauritius had no choice but to adopt the Bretton Woods 
institutions programme of stabilization and structural adjustment. The stabilization 
programme failed initially partly due to the J- curve effect on trade but more 
importantly because of exogenous factors namely (i) the country was hit by a severe 
7 Mauritius had a record sugar output level (above 700000 tons) and price of sugar increased three- 
fold. 
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cyclone in 1980 and (ii) the world economy was riding the downswing of the trade 
cycle. Although devaluations in 1979 and 19818 to correct currency misalignment 
were very painful to the people with inflation being 42% in calendar year 1980, it 
addressed the competitiveness issue and when a holistic approach was subsequently 
adopted by bundling it with a repackaging of fiscal incentives, a clear signal from a 
newly elected government about the future of the EPZ sector9, a forceful promotion 
of the export led growth strategy to attract FDI, expansion of hotel room capacity 
and air flights frequency as well as favourable exogenous factors, Mauritius 
managed to add two new pillars, Tourism and Textile and Clothing to the previously 
sugar-based economy. In the process internal and external imbalances were 
corrected and the public deficit brought to a sustainable level. 
Having successfully completed the stabilisation programme, Mauritius 
pursued the structural adjustment programme towards a more market-based 
economy. It completely dropped the idea of self-sufficiency in favour of increased 
openness to trade and investment and during the 1990s it embarked on a 
liberalisation path via a series of measures such as privatization, relaxing price 
control, abolition of exchange control and adoption of Public-Private Partnerships 
as a new way of providing services and physical infrastructure to the population. 
These coupled with supply side tax reforms were aimed at enhancing the role of the 
private sector in the economy. 
8 30% in October 1979 and a fiirther 20% in September 198 1. 
9 Before 1982, the harsh working conditions in the EPZ sector created a cultural clash leading to a 
permanent debate about choice of strategy and the future of the EPZ. The private sector then 
preferred playing the waiting game to taking initiatives. 
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The sugar industry which was employing 52,600 peoplelo in 1976 had to 
move to more mechanisation during the 1980s as young people preferred to work in 
the manufacturing sector rather than in the sugar cane fields as labourers. The level 
of employment in sugar activity dropped consistently and reached 40,000 in 1990. 
That had no adverse impact on unemployment, which was at its lowest figure of 3% 
in 1991. From then onwards discussions about agriculture coming under the 
purview of GATT started sending signals to the industry about the need to 
modernize and reduce costs. Ad hoc measures were initially adopted but it 
ultimately culminated with a comprehensive centralization plan to benefit from 
economies of scale and lower production cost for ensuring the survival of the sugar 
industry which has to face both a phasing out of support pricing policy in Europe 
and also the entry of sugar from Least Developed Countries (LDCS) duty free and 
quota free into the European market. The centralization plan has been accompanied 
by a voluntary retirement scheme causing employment to drop to 17,770 in 
December 2003. 
On the manufacturing front, employment reached its peak level of 89,000 in 
the EPZ in1992. Upward wage pressure due to labour shortage in early 1990s, 
increased competition from new Asian and African producers of basic garments, 
relocation of some production activities to Madagascar and modernization of some 
firms that were moving up market all combined into a job destruction process. 
Discussions about the phasing out of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) also led to a 
wait and see attitude hindering initiatives in the textile and garment industry. 
10 This figure dropped to 48700 in 1979 following two isolated cases of centralisation of sugar mills. 
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Because the unemployment level started rising again by mid 1990s with job 
contraction in sugar and textile, the country identified a new phase of growth and 
job expansion powered by the services sector ". More recently focus has been on 
the consolidation of information and communication technology (ICT) in order to 
penetrate the pure ICT product markets, to take full advantage of our potential in the 
global business process outsourcing (BPO) market and to improve productivity in 
all sectors. Additionally, efforts are being made to channel resources towards 
turning the economy into a fishing hub and a regional knowledge hub. The 
economic agenda also comprises a rigorous expansion of the small and medium 
enterprises, which have a higher labour-capital ratio than large firms. Although the 
financial services sector is not expected to contribute intensively to the creation of 
direct jobs much attention is devoted to that sector with a view to improve the 
financial intermediation process for higher overall economic performance. With that 
in mind, a financial liberalisation policy was adopted at the beginning of the1990s. 
1.3 Rationale for the Research and Objectives 
The standard view worldwide at the moment is that economic growth in 
developing countries has been stagnant partly due to repressed financial systems. 
The empirical literature in the field of financial liberalisation is adequately 
documented but the evidence has been mixed in various fields such as financial 
sector crises and direction of causation between the financial superstructure and 
economic growth. 
Freeport services, financial services, professional services. 
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Mauritius embarked on a continuous programme of financial reforms in the 
early 1990s and because of secondary effects no adequate evaluation of such 
reforms was undertaken prior to the end of the I 990s. In June 1999, when the choice 
of the research topic was made for application as a registered research student 12 , no 
in depth analysis had been carried out on the financial liberalisation process in 
Mauritius. The aim of the research was to investigate a variety of issues related to 
the financial liberalisation process in Mauritius. Given the broad coverage of this 
study, not all issues have received the same in-depth treatment. This thesis is only a 
modest contribution in a process of further filling the gap in the literature by 
attempting to answer the research questions set out below. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What is the path followed by the Mauritian authorities in monetary policy 
reform and what are the outcomes in terms of performance, interest spread and 
banking crises? 
2. What were the changes undertaken at banking regulatory and supervisory level 
and to what extent do banks satisfy the new requirements? 
3. What have been the developments in the stock market and what changes have 
been observed after liberalisation? 
4. What has been the effect of liberalisation on the random walk of stock prices, 
the beta of companies and the stock market? 
12 Registration as part-time Whil/PhD student was in November 1999. 
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5. What are the changes in financial development and to what extent has financial 
liberalisation led to higher demand for bank assets as per the McKinnon and Shaw 
paradigm? What comparison with other Southern and Eastern African countries can 
be usefully made? 
6. What causal impact, if any, has there been between financial development and 
growth? 
7. Is there a link between interest rate liberalisation and corporate financial 
strategy in Mauritius? 
8. Has liberalisation led to lower cost of intermediation and if so, what are the 
causes thereoP 
1.5 Research Method 
This research is a desk-based one. It is partly qualitative to the extent that it 
critically analyses the literature and makes use of some descriptive statistics in 
examining the Mauritian reality. A second part of the research is quantitative and 
involves economic modeling using secondary data published by various 
international and domestic financial and corporate institutions. All the regressions 
were run using the EVIEWS software, version 11. 
Some of the weaknesses concerning the data used are listed below: 
1. Whenever the analysis mentions the region, reference is to countries in Southern 
and Eastern Africa. However, some countries like Mozambique had to be left out 
because of missing data for several years and for several variables for the sample 
period under consideration. 
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2. Some data, such as the real exchange rate index are not available for all countries 
from the IFS. Neither are available the data 13 that could facilitate the construction of 
the index for such countries. Such a constraint has therefore imposed the use of the 
real exchange rate against the US dollar. This variable has been calculated by 
adjusting the nominal exchange rate for relative consumer prices. Data constraint 
has also influenced the choice of the sample period. While the period under 
consideration for Mauritius separately is 1979 to 2002, for the pooled series the 
period is only 1986 to 2000 due to missing figures from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 14 for the various cross section identifiers. 
3. Some domestic financial data (e. g. non-performing loans) have been compiled by 
the appropriate authorities only in recent years. This has prevented the use of such 
data as an explanatory variable. 
4. In the case of the financial corporate strategy model in Chapter 8 some 
companies had to be dropped from the sample because of missing annual reports 
from the office of the registrar of companies despite submission of such documents 
being mandatory. In such cases efforts to get the infonnation directly from the 
companies concerned were fruitless. Private firms in Mauritius are generally not 
very collaborative in so far as providing information that one expects to have been 
archived. Absence of a research culture in the country probably explains why firms 
see only the associated cost and not the potential benefits. The problem concerning 
corporate data is that pre and post liberalisation comparison of corporate behaviour 
13 Trade weights with respect to the respective trading partners. 
14 Published by the INIT. 
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had to be limited to a sample of only eleven companies since many others were not 
yet listed on the stock exchange before liberalisation. Because of un-uniformed 
accounting requirements in the early days, for some years, certain companies' profit 
and loss accounts start with the gross profit item rather than with turnover. Such 
companies also had to be excluded from the sample. From the forty listed 
companies, the eleven companies that have been retained for the study of corporate 
financial behaviour are listed in Appendix 1. 
A possible approach to the data analysis is the application of Box-Jenkins 
ARIMA models. This was considered at an earlier stage and ruled out for the 
following reasons: 
- The data available is too low frequency for ARIMA. Most of the data is 
annual and stock market data, although more frequent, is still not frequent enough 
(for example hourly or daily) - it is only by trading session. 
- Preliminary tests revealed no positive or negative serial correlation hence 
none of the data is auto-regressive thus ruling out ARIMA analysis (Newbold, 1983 
and Stellwagen and Goodrich, 1997) 
Therefore the OLS, SUR and GMM regression methods were selected for the 
type of data and for the causal analysis required and implied by the McKinnon and 
Shaw paradigm. 
-II- 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter I the changes in the Mauritian economy leading to financial 
liberalisation and the rationale for the research are discussed. The key research 
questions are listed and the difficulties encountered mentioned. A brief presentation 
of the research method is also included. More details about methodology are 
contained in later Chapters. 
In Chapter 2 of the thesis the financial system is introduced and the early arguments 
about the financial intermediation and growth nexus considered. The Chapter then 
considers the rationale for low interest rate policy and highlights the Keynesian 
arguments in favour of government intervention in the financial markets. It then 
refocuses on the debate in the 1950s about the financial capacity of an economy. 
This is followed by an analysis of the debate on the "demand-following" and 
"supply- leading" approaches. 
Finally the Chapter considers the McKinnon and Shaw Hypothesis of financial 
liberalisation and the development of I st generation models explaining how the size 
of the banking sector affects capital accumulation, how financial repression favours 
the traditional sector in a context of financial dualism and how capital mobility 
improves access to debt and equity instruments but necessitates coordination 
between internal and external policy reforms. 
Chapter 3 chapter deals with the second-generation models about the role of banks 
in improving the informational frictions, the shifting of savings from unproductive 
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assets (money) to productive illiquid assets and the reduction in the cost of 
innovation when the financial system is improved. 
The Chapter also considers the refinements (macroeconomic stability, sequencing, 
prudential regulation and supervision) brought to the financial liberalisation 
argument following empirical evidence in the 1980s and 1990s of banking cum 
currency crises. 
In Chapter 4 new emerging bodies of literature questioning the financial 
liberalisation tenet are presented. The schools of thoughts examined are: 
1. The New Structuralist School emphasing the role of the unofficial money 
market in developing countries and arguing that a programme of financial 
liberalisation reduces the supply of loanable funds and hinders growth. 
2. The New Keynesian arguments about informational market imperfection. 
The connections with adverse selection, moral hazard and credit rationing by 
banks and warranting some government intervention (mild repression) in the 
financial markets of developing countries are examined. Intervention on the 
external front to reduce the volatility of capital flows and associated 
domestic financial fragility is also discussed. 
3. The Post-Keynesian arguments are presented as being in opposition to the 
financial liberalisation philosophy. This body of literature highlights the 
transformation of ownership into tradable claims in a context of 
liberalisation causing an improvement in liquidity but at the cost of short- 
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sighted speculation-led economic development characterized by risky 
investment practice and causing resources to be diverted away from 
productive use. Emphasis is on uncertainty with endogeneous expectations 
and endogenous instability that need to be interrupted by some institutional 
intervention. The idea of market makers is proposed to provide an anchor 
for market psychology and hence prevent any bandwagon tide leading to 
disruptive speculation. 
Chapter 5 is a descriptive chapter presenting the banking sector, the insurance 
sector, the security market and the offshore sector in Mauritius. 
The changes at regulation and supervision level with a view to improve the 
protection of both financial investors and consumers of financial services are 
examined. 
Chapter 6 discusses domestic banking issues in Mauritius. It reviews the shift from 
direct to indirect control of money supply considering both internal and external 
reforms, banking spread and banking crises. 
Chapter 7 measures financial development in terms of stock market indicators. 
Some cross country comparisons are made. It also contains a pre and post 
liberalisation examination of the volatility of share prices, return, and non- 
diversifiable risk. 
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Chapter 8 presents an econometric analysis of financial deepening, the causality 
between finance and growth, corporate financial strategy before and after financial 
liberalisation and also the analysis regarding interest rate spread. 
Chapter 9 presents a discussion, conclusions, policy implications and future 
directions for research. 
- 15 - 
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION: BASIC THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
2.1. Introduction to the Debate 
In this chapter, it is proposed to examine changes operating in the financial 
markets in developing and emerging countries. The changes relating to financial 
liberalisation are being examined from a historical perspective but at the same time, 
different views are critically discussed. Certain reservations are expressed about the 
New Classical approach which is the current dominating view influencing the 
policies of the major international financial institutions. Some alternative schools of 
thought will also be reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Every country's financial system consists of the various financial institutions 
and their corresponding arrangements. In an Arrow-Debreu world, markets are 
complete and frictionless with symmetric information and no transaction costs 
(Arrow and Debreu, 1954). In such a perfect environment, there is no role for 
financial intermediaries since surplus units15 and deficit units' 6 can easily achieve 
risk allocation on their own. Funding is provided through two types of market 
contracts, equity and bonds and economic decisions are independent of financial 
structures, (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However in the real world, financial 
markets provide various channels for the transfer of funds from surplus units to 
15 Economic units whose savings exceed their planned investment. 16 Economic units whose savings are not enough to satisfy their desired investment. 
-16- 
deficit parties. Direct financing takes place when surplus units transfer funds to 
deficit units in exchange for primary securities. Additionally, and more importantly, 
financial intermediaries provide indirect financing by acquiring surplus funds from 
surplus units in exchange for indirect security and transferring funds to deficit units 
in exchange for primary securities. Empirical studies show that in most countries, a 
small proportion of firms' capital structure is financed by equity and bonds (Mayer, 
1990). 
Financial intermediaries then have a major influence on the economy as they 
carry out two basic functions, namely: 
(i) Providing an efficient mechanism for making payments, and 
(ii) Facilitating the flow of funds in the economy by making it feasible for 
certain classes of borrowers to obtain greater quantities of credit and better credit 
terms than they would otherwise get from direct issuing of securities to lenders 
(Gertler, 1988) 
These functions of the financial system contribute to economic growth in 
various ways: 
(a) They facilitate trade and hence specialization, both resulting in economies 
of scale and welfare gains. 
(b) They favour increases in aggregate expenditure and hence a higher level 
of economic activity. 
The financial intermediation process involves the institutions in creating 
liquidity to the lender 17 as well as in maturity transformation by aggregating small 
17 Liquid securities - deposits. 
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amounts of funds and lending large parcels. Liquidity risk is thus reduced (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). Diamond, (1984) further explains that deposit-taking institutions 
also provide risk pooling and monitoring servicesig and hence idiosyncratic risk is 
reduced. Regarding the delegated monitoring function, Townsend, (1978), Gale and 
Hellwig, (1985) and Williamson, (1986) point out that transfer of this function from 
individuals to specialised institutions can reduce cost as the latter benefit from 
economies of scale. This allows borrowers to get funds at lower cost than via direct 
lending. Additional resources can then be freed for productive use. Financial 
intermediation then results in a more efficient allocation of resources. 
The debate concerning the link between financial intermediation and growth 
was initiated long before the arguments about financial liberalisation emerged. 
Hamilton19, (1791) pointed out that banks were the "happiest engine" that ever were 
invented for creating economic growth. With government encouragement the number 
of banks in the U. S. A rapidly rose from three in 1791 to above 800 in half of a 
century. However, Hamilton does not provide any academic rationale in support of 
his ideas. Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter, (1912) underscore the causal role of 
intermediaries on spurring growth. Bagehot highlights the role of banks in providing 
liquidity to firms and the need for the former to get access to a public sector provider 
of liquidity, the central bank. Schumpeter on his part focused on the contribution of 
financial institutions in both evaluating and financing entrepreneurs in the initiation 
of innovative activity as well as in bringing new products and new processes to the 
" Monitoring of borrowers by lenders. 19 Hamilton was the person to act as "Secretary of the Treasury" in the USA and he made important 
recommendations to government to promote the manufacturing sector. The development of banks 
was part of his recommendations. 
-18- 
market. The crux of his argument is that while technological innovation is a major 
determinant of long-run economic growth, it actually depends on the ability of the 
financial sector to extend credit and to provide other serviceS20 to the entrepreneur. It 
was very much later that historical economists like Cameron (1967) and Sylla (1969) 
examined the historical experiences of England 21 and the U. S. A 22 just before and 
during industrialization and gave empirical content to the idea of a link between 
financial development and growth. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) examined the cash nexus in early bank crises 
in the U. S. A. During the 1907 crisis banks mutually agreed not to convert deposits to 
currency for a while to avoid a crash. Restrictions on conversion from deposits to 
currency were to become unnecessary with the establishment of the central bank as a 
lender of last resort. However, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) observe that after the 
stock market crash in 1929 the US Federal Reserve Bank was passive23 and failed to 
provide sufficient liquidity. The weak expansionary or tight monetary policy after the 
stock market crash in 1929 could not offset the movement towards a reduction of 
credit and money supply and made the depression deep and long. 
The collapse of the financial system and of the real economy at the time of 
the Great Depression led Fisher (1933) to argue that the economic downturn of the 
Great Depression resulted from poorly performing financial markets. The prosperity 
period preceding 1929 was characterised by high leverage. Fisher argues that debts 
20 Evaluating projects, managing risks and monitoring managers. 
21 England 1730-1844 
22 USA 1863-1913 
23 Because it lost the leadership of B. Strong who passed away. 
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were great enough to not only 'rock the boat' but to start it capsizing and so the 
triggered downturn inevitably precipitated a series of bankruptcies, which in turn 
reinforced the downturn itself. While accepting Friedman and Schwartz' analysis 
about sharp reductions in money supply causing a fall in output, Bernanke (1983) 
argues that the non-neutrality of money over such a long period had no theoretical 
foundation. He therefore investigated the role of finance in a depression and argued 
that during the early 1930s, the collapse of the banking sector following large loan 
losses choked off financial flows to the real economy. As banks substantially 
withdrew from their credit intermediary role, both consumer and investor demand 
were reduced and this was a more important factor influencing the depth and 
persistence of the depression than monetary forces. Bernanke's approach revives the 
Keynesian tradition but enriches it with the role of the financial system. Financial 
considerations Played an important part in the theory of investment behaviour as per 
Keynes'general theory (Keynes, 1936). Keynes viewed the collapse of either 
borrowers or lenders as being sufficient to induce a downturn and that a return to 
prosperity required both borrowers and lenders to be confident. However, the 
financial system as such did not play a key role in Keynes' theory of output 
determination. 
In a financial accelerator model, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) explain the 
interaction between macroeconomics and finance. They argue that with the decline in 
net worth following deflation, collateral value falls and that such a weakening of the 
balance sheet forces borrowers to cut back on current expenditure and future 
commitments. Banks on their part are faced with a riskier position as collateral are 
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eroded with deflation. They therefore shift to government bonds and other safe liquid 
assets. These two factors combined to amplify a downturn and have an adverse 
impact on output and employment. 
2.2 Pre-Liberalisation Period: Low-Interest Policy 
In his analysis of the Great Depression Keynes (1936) argues that investment 
is determined by business confidence, animal spirit and expected demand. Although 
interest rate matters to him, the demand factors are more important. According to the 
Keynesian theory of money (Keynes, 1936), after the interest rate has fallen to a 
certain level, almost every economic unit wishes to hold money rather than financial 
assets because they expect the next move to be a rise in interest rates leading to a 
capital loss for bond holders. Speculative gains will arise only from holdings of cash. 
This liquidity preference to holding productive capital causes an insufficient level of 
investment. The liquidity trap creates a floor to interest rates preventing the latter 
from falling to a lower level until a full employment level of investment is reached. 
After Keynes Keynesians have build-up from his theoretical framework to 
propose a standard policy of low-interest rate to favour economic growth 
Tobin, (1965,1967) provides a justification for what is to-day called financial 
repression policies by extending the Solow Growth mode124 so as to include money 
and the effect of monetary policy on growth. In this model of a two-asset portfolio 
choice, economic units allocate their wealth between real money balances and 
24 Robert Solow (1965) neoclassical growth model 
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productive (physical) capital. The higher the return on capital relative to the yield on 
money, the greater is the amount of capital that will be in every individual's 
portfolio. So, capital deepening 25 leads to higher economic growth since a higher 
capital-labour ratio creates greater income per capita. Capital deepening can be 
obtained by reducing the deposit rates of interest thereby encouraging asset holders 
to prefer physical capital to money. 
Tobin's central thesis is that in a non-monetary economy all savings are held 
in the form of physical capital. Tobin then introduces money in the economy as 
government fiat only. This new asset has the effect of reducing the level of physical 
capital since some savings will be held as real money balances for precautionary and 
speculative demand. Precautionary balances are still more important in developing 
countries where income and output are more vulnerable to shocks. In order to 
neutralise the resulting contractionary effect, government has to provide new money 
to satisfy the precautionary and transaction demand. This is done by government 
continuously running a deficit financed by the issue of new money. The resulting 
increase in money supply lowers the rate of return on real balances and leads to 
capital deepening, albeit provoking inflationary pressures. 
Tobin's model largely dominated the economic debate in the 1960's and 
1970's on account of two largely accepted views, namely: - 
(i) Fiscal expansion stimulates investment and hence favours growth. 
(ii) For investment to occur the return on money must be rendered lower than 
the marginal productivity of capital. 
25 A process of accumulating capital at a faster rate than at which labour grows. 
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However, today notes and coins in circulation forms only a small part of the 
money supply 26 . The model is therefore limited in the sense that it considers only 
government fiat money and ignores inside money created through credit via the 
fractional reserve banking principle 27 . 
Keynes's liquidity trap argument, as well as Tobin's two-asset portfolio 
allocation model, constituted the rationale for an inflation tax, low interest rate policy 
and high banking reserves requirement throughout the world for several decades so 
as to prevent the allocation of savings to unproductive money balances. Additionally, 
just after the widespread bank failures in the early 1930's, many commentators 
argued that without interest rate ceilings, banks would engage in ruinous competition 
for funds by bidding up deposit rates and then try to cover the increased cost by 
acquiring risky assets for higher potential returns. 
Levahri and Patinkin (1968) launched the first attacks on the Keynes-Tobin 
model that they consider to disregard money. These scholars argue that in a 
monetized economy output depends not only on physical capital but also on working 
capital and so money is actually a productive function of output f(LKE 
28 [Y= 
PI 
However the Keynes-Tobin model remained the mainstream and during the 1960's 
and early 1970's, market failure/imperfection and infant industry arguments provided 
additional support to the policy of imposing artificially low interest rates. On these 
26 Currency today represents 6% of broad money in Mauritius. 27 The fact that banks keep only a fraction of their asset in liquid form allows a process of deposit 
expansion with a credit multiplier. 
28 Y represents Output, L represents Labour, K represents physical capital, 
M 
represents real 
P 
money balance. 
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two fronts government intervention was seen as a powerftil answer and the newly 
independent countries adopted interventionist policies. 
(i) Market imnerfection/fai lure: Stem (1991) developed a taxonomy of 
reasons 29 for market failures in developing countries. As for the financial sector, in 
the early post independence era, it was largely dominated by commercial banks and 
there was very little presence of non-bank financial institutions. The banks 
themselves were in most cases foreign-owned, with branches in the main towns only, 
and they supplied only short-term commercial and trade credit. They provided long- 
term credit almost exclusively to foreign-owned natural resources industries and 
failed to support the modernisation of agriculture and industrialisation. Further, 
because of the oligopolistic structure of the banking industry, the market determined 
rates tended to be rather high. Markets were also deficient in the provision of 
information and access to credit by local enterprises. This favoured the existence of 
an indigenous money market 30 providing basically short-term loans to farmers and 
small businesses. Wai (1977) also observes that while in the 1950s the unorganised 
money markets in most developing countries were larger than the organised ones this 
pattern had changed in the 1970s. Wai reported that 55-60% of demand for non- 
institutional credit was for purely productive purposes. The role of the unofficial 
money market in developing countries will be examined in Chapter 3 when 
considering the arguments of the "New Structural ists". 
29 e-g externalities, monopolistic/oligopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, acute 
informational problems , concern about improving the allocation of resources. 30 Made up of money lenders, traders, pawnbrokers. 
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High interest rates were charged because of high rates of default, difficulties 
in enforcing contracts and the high cost of screening borrowers. Intervention in 
favour of low interest rates was thus considered as fullyjustified. 
The lack of provision of long-term credit constraining output and growth in 
developing countries constituted another market failure and motivated a role for 
government. Government intervention in the credit market was considered as fully 
justified on account of its impact on growth and also on income distribution in so 
much as it allowed credit to reach individuals short of collateral and earning below- 
average income. Information imperfections in credit markets also created problems 
that could be moderated only by government intervention. This will be further 
examined in chapter 3 where New-Keynesian ideas are discussed. 
Cho, and Khatkhate (1989) suggest that still another rationale for a low 
interest rate policy was the severe limits to fiscal expansion in many countries 
because of a narrow tax base, low limits on income tax due to low real wages, 
inefficiency and high cost of tax collection in these countries. This argument is 
indirectly associated with the market failure one in the sense that tax revenue allows 
government to play its allocative role as regards public goods and merit goods as 
well as its redistributive role with respect to income inequality. These constraints on 
fiscal expansion were seen as almost binding and therefore the policy of low interest 
rates was designed to provide an environment in which access to cheap finance was 
possible for both individuals and government. This policy was considered as 
especially important where Government deficits were primarily being financed by 
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financial institutions that play a key role in supplying finance by having to 
compulsorily buy government debt at a predetermined rate. 
(ii) Infant Indusla: Hamilton (1791), in his report on manufactures3l in the 
U. S. A, suggested high tariff walls to encourage the production of textiles, ferrous 
metals and other industries that were less competitive than Britain. In line with the 
prevailing import substitution strategy it was widely accepted that some production 
activities could not initially face foreign competition but could subsequently develop 
a competitive advantage, if only they could get started and be given the necessary 
breathing space. The U. S. A actually adopted extensive import barriers in its first 100 
years to shelter its manufacturing sector from world competition. The infant industry 
argument was adopted equally by Germany against British competition in the 19 th 
century and by Japan in the automobile industry just after World War 1132. Various 
writers, Prebish (1950), Myrdal (1960), contributed to the flourishing of the infant 
industry argument amongst the developing countries' political leaders in the 
aftermath of independence after World War 11. These authors claimed that 
developing countries face two problems, (1) as exporters of primary commodities 
they are exposed to world swings in commodity prices (2) the primary sector cannot 
absorb the abundant supply of Idbour available in developing countries and rather 
than waiting passively for comparative advantage to direct resources to labour 
intensive manufacturing, industrialization should be forced by import substitution 
industrialization. Apart from tariff protection the infant industry argument also 
31 Just after the civil war in USA. 32 Before Japan became a tough competitor. 
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pushed towards government intervention in the allocation of credit with a view to 
boost economic development. Directed credit programmes with interest rate ceilings 
were adopted by the newly independent developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s 
in view of providing a subsidy to firms undertaking projects in the priority sectors as 
per government economic strategy. Such projects may have been unprofitable at the 
market interest rate and would have been excluded from the process of allocation of 
resources. Governments also imposed controls on international capital flows, 
especially to restrict outflows. Such restriction coupled with an excessively 
overvalued currency fitted well the import substitution strategy by making 
technology available at artificially lower cost. Unfortunately, an overvalued currency 
has its anti-exports bias and renders domestic agricultural and manufacturing 
products uncompetitive in world markets. Governments then had to resort to import 
controls to correct balance of payments difficulties. 
After Keynes much of the economic debate was over the transmission 
mechanism linking money to real activity. Early Keynesians emphasised the role of 
real factors such as multiplier/accelerator effects and fiscal policy while monetarists 
put emphasis on the key role of money and its direct transmission to the real 
economy. Both the followers of Keynes and the monetarists have for long ignored 
other aspects of the financial system and the debate about the finance-growth nexus 
had been minimal. 
Gurley and Shaw (1955,1967) tried to focus the debate towards the 
interaction between financial structure and the real economy highlighting the role of 
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financial intermediaries in transmitting loanable funds between spending units. The 
argument put forward by Gurley and Shaw is as follows: 
"Economic development is retarded if only self-finance 33 and direct 
finance 34 are accessible ... ... ... but total debt, including both the debt that 
intermediaries buy and the indirect debt of their own that they issue, rises at afaster 
pace relative to income and wealth than when finance is either direct or arranged 
internally. " 
[Gurley and Shaw, 1955, pp. 518 & 519]. 
Gurley and Shaw also argued that as the intermediary system evolves, the 
exclusive focus on money becomes less justified for two reasons, namely: 
(i) The money stock becomes a less exact measure of the flow of credit. 
(ii) The liability of non-bank financial intennediaries (NBFIs) provides an 
alternative form of holding liquid balances. But NBFls whose developments in 
recent decades have diversified indirect finance are actually ignored in the Keynesian 
liquidity preference model. 
With the development of NBFIs in sophisticated economies and their 
increasing role in lending, monetary policy becomes a less efficient measure of 
controlling flows of loanable funds and spending on goods and services. It actually 
exerts control on money, which is only one of the financial assets while it has 
33 Investment out of retained corporate earnings. 34 Deficit units issue direct securities to surplus units in exchange of funds. There is no intermediation. 
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become more appropriate to adopt financial control that regulates the creation of all 
assets. Referring to the Quantity Theory of Money, Gurley and Shaw observe that if 
other indirect financial assets exist increasingly as a substitute for money (narrowly 
defined), the latter asset represents a smaller share of the total financial assets and 
money supply may fall while interest rates decline simultaneously. This does not 
imply that monetary policy is of no influence on real activity. However, more 
important is the economy's overall financial capacity. This is the measure of the 
borrower's ability to absorb debt and is an important determinant of aggregate 
demand. In that perspective, intermediaries have an important role as they expand 
borrowers' financial capacity. 
Gerschenkron (1962) observed from the German industrialization experience 
that banks played a management role in industry and also prevented fratricide 
struggle among industries. He further observed the role of institutions like the 
"Credit Mobilier" for the industrialization of France and the "abortive upswing the 
Italian industrial development in the 1880s mainly because the modern investment 
bank had notyet existed in Italy ". [Gerschenkron, 1962, pp363] 
Gerschenkron therefore argued in favour of "universal banking" style of 
Germany 35 highlighting that in economically backward countries, the setting up of 
banks constitutes the main source for finance and consequently for entrepreneurship. 
Based on evidence from Russia where public mistrust of banks kept small saver's 
35 Where Investment banks channeling fund to firms are not separated from commercial banks 
responsible for the payment system as per the policy of dividing banks by function adopted by the 
USA and some other countries after the great depression. 
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funds outside the banking sector Gerschenkron also suggests that state ownership of 
banks could deepen financial markets. 
Goldsmith (1969) suggests that the financial superstructure of an economy 
accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance to the extent that 
it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i. e. the place in the economic 
system where the funds will yield the highest social return. Goldsmith developed a 
Financial Intermediation Ratio (FIR) of financial assets to national wealth and 
observed that the FIR tends to increase with the real economy. However, this sheds 
no light on the direction of causation between FIR and growth. 
Gurley and Shaw (1955) and Goldsmith (1960) all gave evidence of a 
positive correlation between the performance of the financial and the real sector and 
showed a relationship between financial deepening 36 and the growth rates of real 
output. In fact an important implication of the Gurley and Shaw analysis about 
financial development 37 is that as an economy experiences growth, the rate of growth 
of accumulation of financial assets will be higher than the growth rate of the real 
economy. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant thinking remained nonetheless that of 
Robinson (1952), namely that the financial system responded passively to demand 
for various types of services as a result of economic growth Le enterprises lead and 
finance follows. 
36 Le the size of the intermediary sector relative to nominal income. 
37 Monetisation of the economy and increased intermediation via banks and NBFls. 
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" nen a strong impulse to invest is fettered by lack offinance, devices are 
invented to release it.... And habits and institutions are developed 
[Robinson, 1952, pp. 86-87] 
The arguments on the financial system stimulating growth moved the debate 
towards whether the provision of financial facilities should be demand-following or 
supply-leading, Patrick (1966). Patrick identified two possible patterns in the causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
"Demand-following" is defined as the phenomenon in which the creation and 
expansion of financial institutions, their financial assets and liabilities, and related 
financial services is in response to demand for these services by investors and savers 
in the growing real economy, as per Robinson's hypothesis. Real economic growth 
leads to development of financial markets and this increases the opportunity of 
acquiring liquidity for reducing risk. This in turn has a positive feedback on real 
growth. 
Patrick observes that the demand-fol lowing argument assumes that the supply 
of entrepreneurship in the financial sector is very elastic with respect to the profit 
opportunities. However, in practice the supply of financial services in response to 
demand may not be as flexible and automatic as claimed because of restrictive 
banking legislations 38 and market failures 39. The resulting lack of financial services 
then restricts the growth process. 
38 E. g France in early 19" Century. 
39 Religious barriers preventing the market to respond. 
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"Supply-leading" is where the creation of financial institutions and the supply 
of their financial assets, liabilities and financial services are in advance of demand 
for them. The idea is to create favourable expectational and psychological effects on 
entrepreneurs, enabling them to "think-big". The likely result is the transfer of 
resources from traditional sectors to modem sectors and the stimulating of 
entrepreneurial response in the modem sectors. Hicks (1969) argued that the 
industrial revolution in England in the late 18th and early I 9th centuries was not due 
mainly to technology but to financial reforms. 
The setting up of the Development Bank of Mauritius just after 
independence, the creation of the State Bank of Mauritius, the creation of the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius can be viewed as being in conformity with a partial adoption 
of the "supply-leading" approach as an engine for growth. 
Since the 1950s the World Bank has been a promoter of development banks 
in developing countries as part of its institution building strategy to alleviate some 
form of market failures by meeting certain credit needs not supplied by commercial 
banks, (Fry, 1987). Many projects generating positive externalities would otherwise 
be underfinanced. While in Mauritius the setting up of a development bank in a 
"supply-leading" strategy has been effective, development banks became insolvent in 
many developing countries. Expansion of credit supply does not automatically 
stimulate investment to trigger growth. 
For "supply-leading" to be effective, there should exist an entrepreneurial 
culture as well as an economic background favourable to investment. "Supply- 
leading" then represents an opportunity to induce real growth but not a necessary 
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pre-condition. Intermediaries set up in a context of lack of demand for available 
funds can lead to lending to projects of dubious quality resulting in a mountain of 
non-performing loans. Further, resources having alternative uses, a supply leading 
approach must be able to stimulate the economy to a reasonable extent to justify its 
adoption. Patrick actually argues in favour of a sequential mix of the two approaches 
with the leading pattern in the causality changing over the course of the 
development. That is "as the process of real growth occurs, the supply leading 
impetus gradually becomes less important, and the demand-following financial 
response becomes dominant" 
[Patrick, 1966, p. 174]. 
There are however some well-known scholars like Lucas (1988), Stem 
(1991) and Ireland (1994) who simply deny any causal relationship in whichever 
direction between financial deepening and economic growth. 
2.3 The McKinnon and Shaw Paradigm (Financial Liberalisation) 
Government intervention in the form of credit ceilings, directed credit 
programmes, imposition of high reserve requirements and capital controls were 
common practices in the 1960s and 1970s. However, while the Keynesian approach 
proposed to solve the market failures and imperfections, its implementation (or mis- 
implementation) often led to widespread government obstructionism in the form of 
40 
apparent inefficiencies in the financial system and poor economic performance . 
40 Free marketers would argue that the economic deterioration was actually due to government 
intervention and that there was a case of government failure. 
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The prevailing economic conditions of the 1960's and 1970s then constituted a fertile 
ground for an increasing belief in free market forces and its ability to allocate 
resources in a more efficient manner. 
In this context, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) independently made a 
case for financial liberalisation so as to improve growth in developing economies. 
They introduced the term "financially repressed economy" in the literature to explain 
unintended distortions in the domestic capital market by taX41 , interest ceilings, 
directed credit and exchange control. Their arguments regarding the abolition of 
explicit controls on price and allocation of credit still constitute the core theoretical 
basis for freeing the financial sector from its "regulatory shackles". The argument is 
that at a low, below market rate, interest rate reduces savings and inhibits growth. 
This is obviously based on the assumption that saving is sensitive to interest rate and 
that the two variables are positively related The McKinnon and Shaw paradigm is 
depicted in the dynamic model of savings and investment developed by Fry, (1978) 
as shown below. 
41 Le the financial system being taxed implicitly and explicitly 
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Figure 1.2 
Saving and Investment under Interest Rate Ceilings. 
Interest 
r3 
r-, 
r 
10 10,11 11 Savings(S) Investment (1) 
10 -- 10. 
Source: Fry (1978) 
0 Savings are positively related to the interest rate. 
0 Syo represents savings at income level Yo 
0 r,, represents the administered interest ceiling. 
0 Investment is negatively related to the interest rate. 
At the artificially low interest rate r., actual investment is constrained to 
be at 1,, because of low savings, 
But, if an interest ceiling applies only to deposits (Savings) and not to loans, 
then borrowers would face rate r3. Fry (1978) suggests that if the banking sector is 
competitive, the spread r3-ro would be spent on non-price competition. However, 
financially repressed economies would generally apply a ceiling to both deposit and 
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loan rates. Credit would then be rationed 42 by non-price factors such as quality of the 
collateral, perceived risk of failure, political pressures, name (including nepotism), 
and corruption to loan officers. The investments that are financed are represented by 
the dots on the diagram. There is often a preference for low yielding investment that 
appears simplest and safe. Financial institutions are not keen to take risks since in a 
context of an interest ceiling there is hardly any possibility of a risk premium. 
If interest is allowed to rise from ro to rl, resources available in the financial 
sector increase. Savings that previously remained outside the formal sector now 
become available for intermediation. As savings rise, investment rises to Io,. Higher 
positive interest rates will also discourage lower yielding investment (the dots in the 
grey area) and the efficiency of investment increases. As the rate of economic growth 
and the income level increase, the savings curve shifts to Syl and investment level 
reaches I,. If the interest rate is allowed to reach r2, the same set of events takes place 
with investment ending at 12. Higher domestic investment level then reduces 
excessive dependence on foreign capital flows. 
The specific arguments of McKinnon and of Shaw are now examined 
separately. The McKinnon analysis rests on two assumptions: 
(i) Every economic unit is confined to self-finance. 
(ii) Investment expenditures are indivisible and are much lumpier than 
consumption expenditure. Hence any potential investor must initially accumulate the 
money balances needed for financing their investment projects. Deposits 
accumulated in advance are complementary to physical capital. 
42 Credit rationing will be more extensively debated in Chapter 3. 
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The higher the real deposit rate of interest, the lower will be the opportunity 
cost of saving real balances to invest. Firms thus get an incentive to invest. However, 
when the real yield on the deposit rate is low or negative, firms cannot easily 
accumulate liquid assets in preparation for making discrete investments. Self-finance 
is then improved with the removal of interest ceiling. 
Earlier we saw that in Tobin's portfolio approach money and capital were 
taken to be substitutes. McKinnon for his part considered them to be complements. 
The only thing both analysts have in common in this debate is the assumption of a 
purely fiat money stock in a world without credit. The demand for money function is 
then- - 
f (Y. 11Y, d- 
Where, 
.5 (M /P) 
45 (I/Y ) 
M, is the money stock (time and sight deposits plus currency in circulation) 
P, is the price level. 
I1Y, is the ratio of gross investment to real GNP 
d-; r'is the real deposit rate d, being the nornimal deposit rate and ; r, 
expected inflation. 
Complementarity between real money balances and investment is shown by 
the partial derivative being a positive value (positive relationship). 
Empirical evidence is in fact inconclusive about McKinnon's 
complementarity analysis. While Vogel and Buser (1976) confirmed the analysis in 
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cross-country regressions of some Latin American countries, Fry (1978) obtains a 
negative coefficient for savings in McKinnon's money equation 43 in a cross country 
regression involving 10 Asian countries, especially in those with high inflation. 
Inconclusiveness could be due to certain cross-sectional and time-series differences 
as well as difficulties in specifying the variables and or data quality problems. 
Shaw (1973) held a debt-intermediation view and developed a model in a 
world of credit where financial intermediaries have a role to play. If returns to 
depositors are increased, the financial intermediaries get possession of larger 
volumes of funds for lending and this result in a higher quantity of investment. As 
the banking sector expands, it is possible to reap economies of scale in lending and 
risk diversification. Operational efficiency is increased and information cost is 
lowered to both savers and investors through specialisation and division of labour. 
Consequently, the investor gets a lower cost of borrowing from the banks and the 
average efficiency of investment rises. Shaw's debt-intermediation view can be 
summarised in a money demand equation: 
m= g(m/P) 
7 f(Y, v, d-ir' >o 
Where, 
v is a vector of opportunity costs in real terms. 
The argument is that yields in all forms of wealth, especially money, have a 
positive effect on the savings ratio and hence on investment. 
43 Equation La above 
-38- 
According to the Shaw analysis, when economic units increase savings, 
aggregate demand is not reduced as such but its composition is altered from 
consumption to investment expenditure. Investment is limited by the lack of savings 
received by banks. The policy response then is to increase demand for real money 
balances. Rises in deposits, in investment and in growth will follow. Therefore, 
holding of money balances (savings) is the engine of growth. 
Although Shaw's debt intermediation view coincides with that of McKinnon 
both are different in that one stresses the role of deposits in self-financed investment 
while the other focuses on increased lending of banks with higher deposit rates 
stimulating a flow of real balances to deposits44 . The McKinnon model 
lacks 
consideration for credit money while Shaw's model lacks a mechanism specifying 
the working of the banking system. The two approaches remain however 
complementary since most investment projects are financed partly from own funds 
and partly from borrowings. Also, a reduced flow of loanable funds in financially 
repressed economies forces potential investors to become more dependent on self- 
finance. 
The basic McKinnon and Shaw prescription is then to allow the market to 
determine the price and the allocation of credit. This would increase the 
attractiveness of holding claims on the banking system. The improved saving rate 
will then increase funds available for investment. Further, with real interest adjusting 
to equilibrium, lower investment projects would be eliminated. Economic 
44 Le external indirect financing. 
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development would be enhanced by both increased investment and an increase in the 
average productivity of capital. 
There is some discord on the effectiveness of the financial liberalisation 
policy that remains an empirical question. With regard to the contention that a rise in 
real interest rate would increase savings, Deaton (1989) refers to econometric studies 
of interest-elasticity of savings that show low elasticities and makes the following 
observation: 
"there is no theoretical basis, whatsoever for this presumption. Changes in 
interest rates have both income and substitution effects, and can increase or 
decrease current consumption depending on the halance hetween the two. Higher 
(real) interest rate do indeed increase the incentive to postpone consumption and 
tend to make planned consumption profile grow more rapidly over time, but the 
current starting point of that profile can move either up or down. There is also an 
enormous body of research, mostly but not exclusively in developed economies, that 
has singularly failed to show any empirical relation between interest rates and the 
rate of saving. " 
[Angus Deaton, 1989, pp. 87-89] 
Giovaninni (1985) points out that in LDCs the response to higher interest rate 
policy is either insignificant or too small to be of any policy relevance. Turtleboom 
(1991) on his part observes that real deposit rates did not change significantly in 
several African countries after liberalisation. Concerning an expected fall in interest 
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spread, Brock and Suarez (2000) observe that a high interest spread persisted in some 
latin American countries after liberalisation. In Chapter 7 the situation regarding 
mobilisation of savings in Mauritius will be examined. 
Although the McKinnon and Shaw prescription focuses on improved 
intermediation and self-finance, the champions of the financial liberalisation 
paradigm also expect direct financing to equally improve with the introduction of 
new capital market instruments as the financial market develops. McKinnon and 
Shaw supported their analysis by empirical evidence from reforms made in the 
financial sector in Taiwan in the early 1950's and Korea in the mid-1960's. Financial 
repression is considered to have adverse effects on growth for the following reasons: 
(i) As explained in Fry's graphical model, low (or even negative 45 ) real 
interest rates provoke a disincentive effect on savers and so domestic deposits reach 
a sub-optimal level. Both interest rate ceilings and the oligopolistic nature of the 
banking industry push to create a wide spread between loan and deposit rates. The 
absence of a developed equity market is yet another disincentive to savers. The 
resulting increased current consumption creates demand-pull inflationary pressures. 
(ii) In a financially repressed economy, because of low or even negative real 
deposit rates of interest on monetary assets, the demand for money (saving, term 
deposits and current accounts) falls as a proportion of G. D. P. Financial deepening 
outside the banking system also becomes impossible when firms are illiquid and or 
inflation is high and volatile. Robust open markets in stocks/bonds or intermediation 
by trust and income companies require monetary stability. 
Especially in countries with high inflation. 
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(iii) Fry, (1997) observes that the financially repressed system is actually 
heavily taxed with both explicit taxes and implicit taxes: 
- (a) Taxes on interest income, on bank intermediary profits, on financial 
transactions in the form of stamp duty and VAT (if any) constituted the explicit taxes 
and contributed to widening of interest spread. 
- (b) High reserve and liquidity ratios46 constituted the implicit tax on 
banks 47 . 
These allowed for a ready demand for government securities issued at low 
interest rates and created scope for huge amounts of tax revenue. From a bank's 
perspective the reserve is a taxed asset. Banks are further taxed in the sense that in 
addition their non-reserve assets are made to yield below world market interest rate 
returns. The commercial banks acted as taxpayers and the central bank as tax 
collector but the tax was also being implicitly bome by the depositors earning below 
market interest rates. High reserve/liquidity ratios taxed to credit market by 
weakening the credit multiplier. Implicit taxation on the banking system impacts 
adversely on capital formation. 
(iv) Low administered interest rates also encourage banks to even lend to 
entrepreneurs whose projects would have been excluded if the interest rate was at 
market level because of the low yields of their projects. Investment then suffers in 
quality as banks do not ration the available funds on the basis of the marginal 
46 In 1966 required reserve ratio against sight deposits was 35% in S. Korea. 41 Sometimes referred to as a financial repression tax. 
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productivity of the investment projects. This argument was initially developed by 
Goldsmith (1969). 
(v) Directed credit48 at an artificially low price means easy access to credit 
for firms identified as being in the priority sectors as per government strategy. Such 
easy access finally moves the firms towards a lack of discipline in the efficient use of 
credit and causes misuse of resources. Some firms may also get involved in 
unnecessary capital intensive projects with adverse consequences on the employment 
level 
(vi)Exchange controls restrict access to foreign assets (credit), and prevented 
portfolio diversification. This, together with the interest rate ceiling, reduces the 
ability of banks to properly match demands for borrowers and creditors. 
To-day's policy of removal of restrictions to capital mobility and 
development of an integrated global financial market linked by computer network is 
consistent with the McKinnon and Shaw analysis and facilitates interest arbitrage. 
However, with removal of restrictions on capital flows, the monetary authority loses 
some control over its monetary policy since a simple decision to change the amount 
of money in circulation is offset by inflows/outflows of hot money. Liberalisation 
theories also rejected state ownership of banks and revived some early arguments 
that public ownership leads to credit being allocated on the basis of political rather 
than economical considerations (Kane, 1977). 
Banks are compelled to grant a certain share of their loan portfolio to specific sectors. 
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2.4 Some Empirical Evidence 
The pattern of behaviour in developing countries reveals a very active role of 
government in finance as follows: 
(1) Part of the subsidised loans to priority sectors were often funded by 
government owned Development Banke9 at a negative differential between priority 
loans and deposit rates and financed by a direct budgetary subsidy. Woo and 
Nasution (1989) highlight that in some countries like Indonesia, subsidized credits 
from government-owned financial institutions were easily available and could be 
rolled over. Firms favoured as per the priority sector criteria could acquire large 
debts that were less expensive than issuing and servicing equity. Risk became 
concentrated among some specific groups. In Korea, the main recipients of credit 
were firms from a core of powerful groups (chaebols) that gradually dominated the 
heavy and chemical industries. In Korea as well subsidized credit led to increasing 
financial leverage at the expense of development of the equity market. The high 
leverage situation led to a high level of non-performing loans in periods of recessions 
and repeated bailout of banks encouraged big businesses to rely further on debts, 
(Choi, 1991). A high level of non-performing loans had become a problem in many 
developing countries. 
(2) Both high liquid reserve policy and directed credit pushed many 
financial operators, especially the small and medium firms, into the unofficial money 
49 These credit programmes were usually set up with fiinds obtained from international donor 
agencies such as the World Bank. 
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market50 where "depositors" could get higher yields. For their part, borrowers could 
either get some access to the credit they needed, although without subsidy, or rely on 
self-financing. 
(4) Resources were directed in financing government deficits or flew to 
capital-intensive projects of para-statal bodies and not always necessarily to the most 
productive investment. 
(5) High levels of government intervention in the financial markets rendered 
the banks dependent on government policy and government guaranteeing loans to 
priority sectors. They failed to develop the loan appraisal skills that banks normally 
acquire when being fully exposed to market forces and they were eventually very 
much fragilised by increasing levels of non-performing loans. 
(6) Apart from being financed not only by cheap finance and easy sales of 
Treasury bills, the PSBR was often additionally financed by government having 
recourse to the printing press. Leite and Sundararajan (1991) argue that such central 
bank's accommodative policy of government spending together with credit pressures 
relating to the directed credit program generated high inflationary pressures. 
Inflationary financing then compelled government to have a minimum level of 
monetary control by requesting high reserve asset ratios for banks and this inevitably 
reduced the availability of credit to non-priority sectors. Bailey, (1956) and 
Friedman, (1971) argue that inflation acts as a tax by reducing the wealth and 
purchasing power of currency holders and also by yielding a revenue for government 
through a reduction in the real value of domestic currency denominated debt. In 
50 Money lenders, indigenous banks, extended family and friends, landlords, traders, pawnbrokers. 
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Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana for instance, during the early 1970s the rise in inflation 
was associated with a rising inflation tax and relatively stable real balances, yielding 
total seigniorage 51 of 0.7 percent of G. D. P in all three countries (Adam, Ndulu, and 
Sowa, 1996). In Mexico, revenue from financial repression represented 40% of tax 
revenue and 5.7% of the G. D. P during the period 1984-1987 (Giovannini and De 
Melo, 1993). The inflationary pressure on both prices and incomes yields a higher 
government reserve for a given tax base. To prevent an erosion of the tax base, the 
authorities imposed controls on both inflows and outflows of capital and rendered 
contracts in the unofficial money market unenforceable. 
Roubini and Sala-f-Martin (1992) in a cross section analysis of Latin 
American countries find evidence of negative effects of financial repression on 
economic growth. Much of the above discussion relates to policies regarding price 
and allocation of credit. The impact of policy changes in price and allocation of 
credit on the corporate sector in Mauritius will be examined in Chapter 9 with a 
view to tackling the following research questions: - 
(1) What has been the impact of financial liberalisation on the financial 
deepening? 
(2) What has been the impact of financial liberalisation on economic 
growth? 
(3) What has been the impact on corporate financial strategy? 
51 Net revenue received by the central bank, hence by the government by "turning to the printing 
press". 
-46- 
2.5 Extensions of the McKinnon and Shaw Framework 
McKinnon and Shaw developed the theoretical foundation showing that 
financial repression reduces both the quantity and quality of investment. They 
conclude that financial liberalisation can increase growth through higher 
mobilisation of savings. They did not however develop a formal financial economic 
growth model. The first generation extension of the McKinnon and Shaw models 
were developed later. Kapur (1976a, b) and Galbis (1977) explored the premise that 
financial liberalisation enhances growth by improving the quality of investment 
while Mathieson (1979) examined the pace of the reform and the coordination of 
internal and external reforms affecting the quality of investment. 
2.5.1. Kapur's Model of Liberalisation 
Kapur's model (1976) is based on the postulation that financial liberalisation 
fosters economic growth. That is so because a rise in the interest rate leads to an 
increase in the amount of loanable funds and eventually investment as argued in the 
Shaw debt-intermediation view. Shaw's argument about an expansion of the banking 
sector as a result of interest rate liberalization is actually intuitive in nature. Shaw's 
argument about an expansion of the banking sector as a result of interest rate 
liberalization is actually intuitive in nature. Kapur pushes forward with an in-depth 
analysis by considering the transmission. This is done by building on the insights 
from Levahri and Patinkin regarding working capital as mentioned earlier and 
developing a mathematical equation of the Mc Kinnon and Shaw analysis to provide 
a better understanding of the framework. 
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Considering that there is unused fixed capital in the economy, Kapur focuses 
on working capital, which to him is the obligatory link between finance and output. 
Kapur makes a simplifying assumption that all bank credit is used to finance a 
fraction of working capital while the remaining fraction is self-financed 52 . Another 
simplifying assumption is that there is no currency in circulation and the public holds 
only deposit money. The fraction of working capital financed by bank lending can be 
split into two parts, namely: 
(a) Funding of additions to real working capital. 
(b) Funding increased costs of replacing depleted working capital due to a 
rise in the price level. 
The Kapur model is given as 
y -.: pIM*aq__ ;r0 Growth equation 2.1 P. Y (I -a) 
where, 
Economic growth 
AY 
y 
p Rate of monetary growth 
AM 
M 
M 
=-Money 
Stock Le the reciprocal of income velocity of money 
P. Y Nominal GDP 
or 
Output [From Harrod-Dumar Aggregate Production 
Capital 
Function Y=a. K ] 
52 Le From retained corporate earnings. 
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Ratio of loans to money stock 
inflation AP 
p 
0= Fraction of capital K financed by bank credit. (The remaining being setf- 
financed) 
I-a= Proportion of total capital K which is used as working capital 
Equation (2.1) shows that: 
(i) The rate of economic growth y is positively related to money growth p, 
the capital/output ratio a, the ratio of loans to money stock q and the ratio of 
utilised fixed capital to total utilised capital a, consequently the ratio of utilised fixed 
capital to working capital. 
(ii) A higher required reserve ratio reduces the ratio of loan to money stock q 
and so lowers economic growth. 
(iii)Economic growth is reduced by an increase in the velocity of 
circulation 
53 P-y 
m 
Kapur uses a variant of Cagan's (1956) money demand function, namely: 
d (17) 
= ye a(d-; r' Equation 2.2 
Where 
(. ýý)d 
represents the desired holding of real money balances; P 
53 Measured by the ratio of nominal GDP to money to show how many times money circulates on 
average in one year. 
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z'= expected inflation and 
d =deposit rate. 
Dividing equation (2.2) by Y, 
( 
_ýL = a(d-x') 
P. Y) e 
Equation 2.3 
Adjusting equations (2.1) and (2.3) gives; 
e 
(d -x Equation2.4 
This equation shows that a faster rate of monetary growth p can have 
both a positive and a negative effect on economic growth. The direct effect 
through, u being positive and the indirect effect by a reduction in Ef caused by 
(P. 
Y) 
higher inflation is negative. The presence of an exponential function shows that there 
is a unique value of rate of money growth, p, which maximises the value of 
economic growth r assuming that the deposit rate d is fixed. Kapur argues that in a 
financially repressed economy, p is above this equilibrium and economic growth 
is reduced. In fact, a higher rate of money growth is inflationary. More money goes 
to finance increases in nominal working capital and less real credit is left for 
financing capital stock accumulation. A smaller size of real banking sector leads to a 
lower rate of capital accumulation and a lower rate of growth. The model also shows 
that an increase in the deposit rate d will increase real money demand and hence the 
supply of bank credit. 
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The policy implication is then to raise nominal deposit interest rate towards 
the free market rate. This promotes growth via an increase in the quantity of 
investment. 
2.5.2 The Galbis Model 
Galbis (1977) developed a model of investment efficiency showing that the 
policy of financial liberalisation promotes growth by improving the quality of 
investment. Financial repression allows low yielding investment to become feasible 
and crowds out higher quality investment 
A two-sector model is proposed by Galbis, one being a traditional self- 
financed sector with low yielding investment and the other being a modem 
technologically advanced sector with a higher rate of return on investment. The 
savings of individuals in the traditional sector is channelled to physical capital in the 
same sector but part of it also goes to the modem sector. Investment in the modem 
sector comes from that sector's savings plus some savings from the traditional sector. 
The co-existence of old and modem sectors is very common in developing 
economies. Under financial repression, the interest rate is set at a level below 
equilibrium by the monetary authorities and this is likely to have an adverse impact 
on the modem high yielding sector. This is so because many individuals in the 
traditional and low yielding sector will refrain from saving in the form of bank 
deposits as they can get better returns from their own self financed investment. The 
supply of funds for investment in the modem high yielding sector then contracts 
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creating a financial disequilibrium because demand for loans in the technologically 
advanced sector expands rapidly. In addition to this crowding out of investment in 
the modem sector, the quality of investment suffers. This is because the absence of a 
risk premium caused by the interest ceiling leads to investment that would have been 
undertaken at a higher interest rate to be sacrificed for low yielding investments that 
are safer. 
Investors in both the traditional sector and the modem sector and society at 
large thus incur avoidable opportunity costs: - 
(a) In the traditional sector investors lose because with a low interest rate set 
below the market rate they will invest in ventures generating less return than the 
market equilibrium rate on deposits. 
(b) Investors in the modem sector get less loanable funds and can invest in 
fewer ventures. 
(c) The resulting fidl in producer surplus is lost to the whole society. 
Galbis' prescription is to allow interest rates on deposits to rise freely until 
demand and supply of investment funds are equalized. In Galbis' analysis financial 
liberalisation brings about a transfer of resources from the traditional sector to the 
modem sector. What takes place is a redistribution of savings between the two 
sectors. Savings in the traditional sector will be channelled to investment in physical 
capital and the rest becomes bank deposits. In a competitive banking system, bank 
deposits by the traditional sector will supply resources for investment in the modem 
sector. Investment in the modem sector is thus financed by both its own savings and 
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also by deposits from the traditional sector. Although the arguments from Galbis are 
plausible they somewhat overstate the true outcome for two reasons: 
1. Monetary mismanagement as well as institutional factors can cause 
real interest rigidity and prevent an equilibrium in the supply of and 
demand for investable resources 
2. The economy might not be able to take full advantage of a potential 
increase in physical capital in the technologically advanced sector 
because of a possible mismatch in the labour market due to 
occupational mobility of labour at least in the short run. 
The Galbis model, though relevant to most developing countries, does not 
have a large application to the Mauritian situation and to many small island 
economies where there has historically never existed an indigenous economy in clash 
with an imported and more advanced one. In Mauritius, there existed no indigenous 
population as such before colonisation. The question of a capitalist sector expanding 
and drawing labour and surplus finance from the non-capitalist sector does not arise. 
Nonetheless, Mauritius has been facing some form of financial dualism 
marked by: 
(i) Gaps in interest rates charged to the business sector being significant 
between large and very small enterprises. The small sectors of the economy often 
being choked-off from finance due to lack of collateral. 
(ii) A non-uniform regulatory regime, with some sub sectors like friendly 
societies not being regulated. This question will be considered again in Chapter 5. 
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2.5.3 Open Economy with Capital Mobility: The Mathieson Model 
and Keynesian Reservations. 
Mathieson (1979) examines the influence of capital flows on the financial 
liberalisation process after capital account liberalisation in the context of fixed or 
managed exchanged rates. 
Mathieson links up interest rate liberalisation to the insights from the 
Mundell-Fleming mode154 (Mundell, 1963; Fleming, 1962) and argues that financial 
liberalisation and exchange rate policy are interdependent. Such a relationship exists 
because as the domestic rate of interest rises, not only do domestic savings rise but 
equally national savings rise due to a surge of foreign capital inflows in a process of 
arbitraging. 
Inflows of foreign capital are beneficial to the host country in several ways: 
(a) The increased supply of savings eases any previous or current 
financial constraint and supply of loanable funds is increased. 
Capital inflows go to the private sector in the form of equity capital 
and much less to the public sector as debt. The direct impact is on output growth and 
standard of living. The inflows also contribute to the broadening and deepening of 
domestic financial markets. Present and future consumption are also increased. 
Additional competitive pressure is forced upon domestic firms and financial 
institutions leading to more efficient and profitable allocation of savings and 
54 IS-LM model in a context of open economy with capital mobility. 
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investment. Since a proportion of the inflows is in the form of F. D. I., transfer of 
technology also follows. 
However, capital inflows put an upward pressure on the exchange rate and 
the monetary authorities must supply the domestic currency to maintain the exchange 
rate. The domestic monetary base then expands while output remains unchanged and 
inflation follows rapidly. The monetary base then becomes endogeneous within a 
fixed or managed exchange rate regime. Subsequently, the accompanied upward 
pressure on the exchange rate will affect a country's external competitiveness and 
translate into a deterioration of the current account. Expectations about future 
depreciation will encourage speculative outflows. Clearly then the exchange rate 
becomes a policy instrument and has to be coordinated to offset any adverse effect of 
capital inflows on the balance of trade. Sharp increases in interest rates pushing 
towards a rapid exchange rate appreciation damaging the real sector is a sort of 
conflict which Sachs (1998) refers to as the 'competition of instruments". This 
means that the proposition that the big bang approach to internal and external 
liberalisation is excluded by Mathieson. 
Mathieson then postulates that internal liberalisation and external 
liberalisation policy changes need coordination and that an optimal policy mix is 
obtained through a two-phased programme. Initially the programme comprises the 
following measures: 
(i) Increases in deposit and loan rates, and 
(ii) An over depreciation of the exchange rate55 and also 
-'5 Depreciation over the long-term equilibrium. 
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(iii) A decline in the rate of growth of the domestic component of the 
monetary base. 
An increase in the deposit rate fosters an increase in deposits and a higher 
supply of loans improves the flow of working capital. The initial over-depreciation 
of the exchange rate produces the expectation of subsequent appreciation. Thus the 
yield on foreign assets is reduced and there is a substitution towards domestic assets 
and savings from foreign sources increase. An over-depreciation of a currency will 
also improve domestic competitiveness and create a higher level of aggregate 
demand for domestic goods and hence maintain the rate of growth above its steady 
value. It will however also lead to a higher domestic inflation rate. Further, increases 
in domestic money supply via higher capital inflows associated with increased 
exports will exceed the demand for money in spite of the higher depreciation rate. 
The domestic component of the monetary base must then be reduced to combat 
inflation and sustain balance of payments equilibrium. 
The next phase of the liberalisation programme comprises the following 
elements: 
(i) Gradual appreciation of the exchange rate. 
(ii) Gradual reduction in nominal loan and deposit rates. 
(iii) Gradual increase in the rate of growth of the domestic component of 
base money. 
The transmission is as follows: A trade surplus in the first phase will force 
the exchange rate upwards and move it back to its longrun equilibrium. Increases in 
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output in response to higher international competitiveness in the first phase coupled 
with subsequent reduced demand for imports will reduce domestic inflation and 
inflationary expectations. This then allows a fall in nominal and deposit rates. 
Subsequently foreign savings no longer enter the economy and the domestic 
component of money supply can be allowed to increase to maintain the equilibrium 
deposit-income ratio. The economy then comes to rest at a higher level of growth. 
The Mathieson open-economy model then suggests that financial liberalisation is a 
phase of gradual changes in policy instruments. In the 1980s, in a context of debt 
crisis, the IMF stabilisation and liberalisation of trade and capital policies were built 
upon these ideas. One weakness in the Mathieson model is that just like all other 
neoclassical models is its assumption of exogenous money supply implying that 
interest rate change does not affect money supply. But if money were to be 
considered endogenous then changes in interest rate has a cost-push effect. 
Increased inflation leads to higher demand for credit and a self-reinforcing dynamic 
takes place in future time periods. Keynesians have for long rejected the classical 
belief in a robust efficient free international financial market. Tobin (1972,1978) 
argues that speculation in the international financial markets is a fundamental 
source of destabilization with devastating consequences on the real economy. 
Bhagwati (1998) argues that because of imperfect markets, free capital mobility 
encourage risk taking and can lead to major costly crises. In order to reduce the 
ability of financiers to undermine full employment policies Tobin proposes to bring 
more stability to the financial market by imposing some restrictions on international 
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currency transactions through a 0.5% international currency transaction tax (the 
Tobin Tax). 
This tax on cross border financial transactions can be easily applied on 
transactions registered through the SWIFT 56 international clearing mechanism, (BIS 
Lamfalussy Report, 1990). With electronic technology the logistical hurdles for the 
implementation of the Tobin Tax can easily be overcome (Henderson, 1996). The 
Tax is expected to act as a financial stabilizer that drastically prevents speculative 
build-ups towards financial volatility and crises. The profitability of quick round 
tri PS57 to take advantage of small interest differentials across currencies and to 
speculate on exchange rates would be squeezed" while returns on long round-trips 
like trade and FDI would be hardly affected as an important share of trading between 
branches of transnational corporations does not involve currency conversion. 
Further, reduced uncertainty associated with wild day-to-day fluctuations in 
exchange rates would improve international trade and bring welfare gains. The 
French National Assembly has in February 2001 incorporated the Tobin Tax into a 
law that will not come into force until after its adoption by the other European 
parliaments. The tax has also been voted in Belgium in July 2004. The difficulty 
with the Tobin tax is that it is not effective if implemented by only one or few 
countries. 
56 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, a Belgian company providing 
international bank communication network. It connects around 3000 banks and proceses; more than 2 
million transactions daily. 
57 Buying and quick resell. 58 A tax of 0.1%increases the interest of a 30-day bill will need an additional divergence of 2.5 % 
before interest arbitrage become profitable. 
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It must be observed that while China has not opened its market to short-term 
capital flows it has been able to attract a substantial amount of FD, 59. Such empirical 
evidence supports the reservations to the New Classical argument that countries will 
not be successful at attracting FDI unless their economy is open to portfolio flows. 
It is therefore desirable to differentiate between Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and Portfolio Flows because they behave differently. While FDI is of a long- 
term illiquid nature, short-term capital flows are highly volatile and quick reversal of 
flows can produce devastating effects on the real economy. Worst still, crisis is often 
spread to other economies. The Tequila60 contagion from Mexico to other Latin 
America countries in 1994, the contagion from Thailand to other S. E. Asian 
economies in 1997, the Russian contagion 61 to Latin America and to the ex USSR 
countries and to some eastern European countries in August 1998 show evidence of 
consistent spread of financial crises in emerging economies. With the liberalisation 
of short-term capital flows, banks increasingly invest in foreign assets and also issue 
short-term foreign denominated liabilities. Investors (speculators) shift money 
around the global economy in search of quick profits. Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1996), argue that trade links are the dominant channel for contagion. 
Argentina, Chile, Columbia and Philippines were not important trading partners of 
Mexico but were yet hit by the Tequila effect. Often as currency instability develops 
59 UNCTAD figures reveal that China attracted 86% of the total FD1 to low-income countries in 1995. 
60 The reference to contagion (Tequila effect) in the Mexican crisis is because inflows of large 
amounts of capital without adequately preparing the economic groundwork causes problemsjust like 
drinking Tequila on an empty stomach leads to disastrous results. The drinking as such is not to be 
blamed, but the excess. 
61 The Russian financial crisis was itself partly influenced by the S. E Asian contagion. 
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in one country, investors tend to dump the assets of other emerging economies 
causing the monetary authorities to either raise the domestic interest rate or to spend 
their foreign reserves to preserve their own exchange rate. Van Rijckeghem and 
Weber (2001) find that it is bank lending or "common lender effect" rather than trade 
linkages that explain financial contagion. The effects of contagion following an 
individual crisis are discussed in section 4.4.2 
The table below gives evidence to the speculative and volatile nature of 
portfolio flows as compared to FDI in the S. E Asian countries. While Portfolio flows 
dropped spectacularly in 1998 FDI changes were more modest. 
Table 1.2 
Five Asian Economies: Capital Flows (bnUS 
1994 1995 1996 1997 e 1998 f 1999 f 
Direct Equity, Net 40.7 40.9 50.8 60.5 60.9 70.4 
Portfolio Equity, Net 70.6 11.0 11.6 -6.8 10.1 -0.9 
Equity Investment, Net 12.3 15.9 17.4 -0.3 80.0 60.5 
Source: IP P', e- estimate; I= IP P jorecast. 
Published in Arestis and Demetriades, 1999. Financial Liberalisation: The Fxperience of 
Developing Countries. 
Another counter policy to the Mathieson model is the Chilean tax, which 
shares the same stabilizing goal as the Tobin tax. For some years in the mid-1990s 
anyone bringing capital in Chile had to keep it in the country for at least one year and 
-60- 
to deposit 30% of the loan at the central bank. This unremunerated reserve 
requiremen t62 on capital inflows has not been very effective in increasing Chile's 
monetary independence in a world of capital mobility but it has succeeded to extend 
the maturity of Chile's foreign debt without negative impact on FDI. It also 
dampened the contagion effect of the Mexican crisis. 
However, during a crisis, this form of "market friendly" substitute to direct 
control on capital inflows remains inadequate as a crisis management tool as it can 
not prevent holders of short-term positions from running on the currency whenever 
an incentive is present. In such situations, many Keynesians prefer the adoption of a 
temporary curative control on capital outflows as suggested by Krugman during the 
recent South East Asian crisis, (Krugman, 1999a, b). Malaysia, for example is an 
export-oriented country and uncertainty in the exchange rate was undermining 
business confidence. The decision of the Malaysian government to institute control 
during the crisis (1998-1999) caused an immediate turn around in the stock market 
and the exchange rate stabilised in spite of the disaster predicted by many western 
analysts. This suggests that temporary capital control in a crisis is feasible and should 
not be ignored just because of market ideology. It gives time to government to 
restructure the financial sector and can be easily dismantled once the economy is 
back on track. 
62 Equivalent to a tax. 
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2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the pre-financial liberalisation Keynes-Tobin 
growth models that favour government intervention in price and allocation of credit. 
The first discussions in the literature about the finance-growth nexus have been 
presented. The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis against financial repression policies 
have been discussed and some first generations models showing the positive impact 
on growth following improved financial intermediation after deregulation have also 
been examined. The Kapur model has shown that financial liberalisation enhances 
growth by improving the quantity of investment. The Galbis Model has shown that 
financial liberalisation promotes growth by improving the quality of investment. The 
Mathieson model proposes a rapid phased liberalisation programme where both 
internal and external changes are co-coordinated. The old Keynesian reservations 
concerning destabilizing speculation in the current international financial system, the 
Tobin tax, the Chilean tax and capital control policies have also been examined. The 
next chapter will focus on the nature of financial markets as well as some 
refinements brought to the initial financial liberalisation arguments in the light of 
empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 3 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
AND THEORETICAL REFINEMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, during the 1950s/60s Gurley, Shaw and 
Goldsmiths had argued that financial markets have a key role in economic activity. 
In the 1970s McKinnon and Shaw added the element of financial liberalisation to the 
finance growth-nexus. These models explain how savings, investment and level of 
income are affected by financial development. They do not however examine the 
impact of financial development on self-sustained growth without exogenous 
technical progress. The first generation models (Kapur, 1976) and (Galbis, 1979) 
examined the impact of liberalisation on productivity and growth but lacked focus on 
mobilisation of savings and on the nature of the financial markets per se. Later, some 
macroeconomists developed the "second generation" supply-leading financial 
growth models to show how the development of financial intermediation in well- 
developed financial systems may enhance long-run growth. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 
below specific arguments in relation to this institutional dimension are discussed. 
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3.2 Banking Intermediation 
Boyd and Prescott (1986) highlight the role of banks in weakening 
information frictions and improving resource allocation. Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991) model the effect that intermediaries can have on growth by encouraging a 
shift in savings from unproductive liquid assets to productive illiquid assets. 
In the absence of banks, individuals have to choose between adopting 
investment in a firm or unproductive assets in the form of consumer goods or 
commodity money to maximise their expected utility. A certain amount of 
commodity money is needed against unforeseen liquidity needs. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, every individual normally adopts his own portfolio of productive and 
unproductive assets (money) depending on the extent to which he is a risk taker or 
risk averter, Tobin (1965). Investment in a firm is illiquid but may provide greater 
returns than what is obtainable with a stock of goods or currency. However, there is a 
long delay, referred to as the slow cycle of production (Cameron, 1967) between the 
investment expenditure and the receipt of profits from capital. During these delays 
there is always a risk that capital investors face unpredicted liquidity needs which 
will cause either additional delays to further capital expenditure or liquidation of 
existing investment thereby rendering the past productive investment worthless or 
significantly reduced in value. With the existence of banks, individuals can hold 
deposits and earn interest. The banks will then invest mainly in productive capital but 
also in commodity money. 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) extend the arguments of Gurley and Shaw 
(1955) about the role of financial intermediaries in transforming securities issued by 
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firms (shares and bonds) into liquid securities demanded by investors (deposits) and 
in the process the services of divisibility and risk transformation are provided. 
Because banks have a large number of depositors, the volume of withdrawal demand 
becomes fairly predictable with experience and they need not as such have high 
liquid reserves 63 that make no contribution to capital accumulation. By providing 
liquidity, banks allow every individual to adopt an improved portfolio with less 
unproductive assets since they have now less need to protect themselves from 
unforeseen liquidity need. Additionally banks reduce the need for self-financing of 
capital investment and so drastically reduce the possibility of productive investment 
becoming worthless through unwarranted premature liquidation. A higher level of 
savings is thus channeled to investments as the liquid reserve holding of the 
economy as a whole is substantially reduced. By their dynamic role in providing 
liquidity and promoting capital investment the intermediaries improve information, 
lower transaction costs and foster efficient resource allocation hence influencing 
positively the rate of economic growth. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) specifically stress the role that 
intermediaries play in collecting and analysing information in the process of 
migration of funds described by Gold smith (1969). The two analysts argue that 
financial deepening improves the allocation of savings to productive investment 
projects and highlight the following: 
(1) In a preliminary stage of development, the economy's financial market is 
almost non-existent especially as the setting up of organisational structures is costly. 
63 The principle behind fractional banking. 
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Growth provides the money needed for the financial structure to develop and a 
feedback effect is obtained from the financial structure that in turn enhances growth 
since the savings rate rises and investment is then more effectively undertaken. 
(2) Very poor agents are likely to remain outside the intermediated sector for 
some time. Consequently, Greenwood and Jovanovic argue that initially there will be 
an increase in inequality across the very rich and the very poor segments of the 
population. Subsequently as development matures, more and more people in the low- 
income group participate in the financial intermediation process and income 
inequality declines. 
King and Levine (I 993a, b) developed an endogenous growth model showing 
that better financial systems improve the probability of successful innovation and 
thereby accelerate economic growth. Similarly financial sector distortion reduces the 
rate of innovation. 
King and Levine also argue that if the financial system is heavily taxed, 
explicitly and implicitly, the full cost of innovation is raised. Consequently, 
improved financial sector efficiency following liberalisation will deliver higher 
growth rates. 
Their cross-country study shows evidence of a positive relationship at 1% 
significance level between the banking intermediation variables and growth and that 
countries endowed with a more sizable credit sector experienced faster growth. In 
Chapter 9 the analysis of finance and growth in Mauritius will be based on this 
model. 
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3.3 Stock Market Development 
th 
The first stock market in the world was developed in Holland in the early 17 
century when directors of the United East India Company 64 refused to implement the 
provision about buying back of the shares from holders in need of liquidity once 
every ten years. A secondary market then developed in Amsterdam for company 
members in need of liquidity. Subrahmanyarn (1975) develops theoretical arguments 
in favour of an integration of stock markets from emerging countries with those of 
the developed world showing that international capital market integration is Pareto- 
optimal. By the end of the 1980s, alongside the 'de-repression' measures in the 
banking sector, financial liberalisation policies pushed for the development of stock 
markets and their external liberalisation. There has been a rapid expansion of stock 
markets around the world, especially in developing countries. World Stock markets 
capitalisation has increased from $2trillion in 1982 to $36 trillion in1999 (World 
Stock Market Fact Book 2000). The number of exchanges in Africa increased rapidly 
from eight in 1988 to nineteen in 2000, most of these being in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Emerging markets capitalisation grew from 4% to 14% of total world capitalization 
between 1982 and 1993, (Demirgilc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Singh, 1997). The 
expansion of stock markets in emerging economies has been exceptionally fast in 
recent years. While it took 85 years (1810-1895) for the US capitalization ratio to 
rise from 7% to 71% of GDP, in Taiwan the ratio rose from II% to 74% in only 10 
years (1981-1991). As from the early 1990s both the privatization process and 
"It is through this company, chartered in 1602, that Amsterdam merchants pooled resources to equip 
voyages to the East Indies and to distribute the profits. 
-67- 
financial liberalisation have accelerated the development of the capital markets in 
developing countries. 
With the development of endogeneous growth models discussed in Chapter 2, 
it is generally accepted that stock market activity affects the economy positively by 
raising saving ratios, as well as the quantity and quality of investments. Marone 
(2003) suggests that a higher rate of return from the stock market can reduce pressure 
on the financial system since it is no longer necessary to maintain high domestic 
interest rates to retain savings in the economy. Stock markets then can contribute to 
the lowering of the cost of borrowing. Diamond and Verrechia (1982) link 
managerial compensation to stock prices. They argue that well-developed stock 
markets are expected to enhance corporate control by reducing the principal-agent 
problem, making managers strive to maximise fin-ns' value. The agency problem is 
hence minimized. Errunza (1997), and Henry (2000a, b), basing themselves on the 
CAPM Model , 
65SUggest that stock market liberalisation can lead to a fall in the cost 
of equity for three reasons: 
1. An increase in foreign capital inflows induces a reduction in the risk-free 
rate. 
2. External liberalisation allows foreigners to acquire domestic shares and this 
facilitates risk sharing that reduces the equity premium. 
3. Capital inflows improve the market liquidity and hence reduce the equity 
premium. 
65 Under the CAPM the cost of equity has two elements, the equity premium and the risk-free rate of 
return. 
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Cho (1986) argues that a well-functioning stock market is a crucial 
complement to banks in the credit market for financial liberalisation to be complete 
and successful. This is so because unlike bank borrowing, equity finance is not 
subject to adverse selection and moral hazard. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that stock 
markets migitate the inefficient monopoly power of banks and that their competitive 
nature encourages innovative and growth-enhancing activities as opposed to the 
conservative approach adopted by banks. 
AtJe and Jovanovic (1993) go even further suggesting that whilst stock markets 
positively affect growth, raising it by a huge 2.5% p. a., banks have little influence on 
growth. As regards stock market liberalisation, which is one specific aspect of capital 
account liberalisation, Levine (1996,2001) argues that it will improve stock market 
liquidity66 and channel more savings to corporations and show empirical evidence 
concerning 38 countries that greater stock market liquidity is associated with faster 
rates of capital accumulation and hence faster economic growth. Levine and Zervos 
(1998) found a strong positive correlation between stock market development and 
economic development. 
"stock market liquidity and hanking development are hoth positively correlated with 
contemporaneous andfuture rates ofeconomic growth" 
[Levine and Zervos, 1998, pp. 554] 
This does not however settle the question of causation. Using a cross-country 
regression covering 41 countries in the period 1976-1993, Levine and Zervos found 
that stock market liquidity, measured in various ways, is a robust predictor of real per 
66 Easiness to buy and sell. 
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capita gross domestic product growth, physical capital growth and productivity 
growth. 
Capital accumulation is improved under liberalisation of the stock market via 
reduced cost of equity under certain assumptions (Henry, 2000a, b). Using a panel of 
27 countries Fuch-SchUnde, and Funke (2001) show that growth tends to be higher if 
certain institutional reforms precede the liberalisation of the stock market. Such 
reforms relate to the consolidation of legislations regarding property rights 67 and 
improved contract enforceability. 
However, the virtues of market liquidity are sometimes disputed. Improved 
liquidity advantage allows speculators to adjust their portfolios to changes in moods 
and overbid market assets making them diverge from underlying fundamentals and 
pushing firms to borrow and divert funds from productive activity to gambling for 
quick gains (Keynes, 1936; Minsky 1986). Improved liquidity might not in such a 
situation lead to economic improvement. 
Increased market liquidity may also reduce the incentive for shareholders to 
monitor managers and this may weaken corporate governance and lead to less 
efficient allocation of resources, (Shleifler and Vishny, 1986). Bencivenga and 
Smith, (1991); Japelli and Pagano, (1994) argue that the desire for a higher level of 
liquidity works against the propensity to save. Further, Zhu, Ash and Pollin (2002) 
replicate the Levine and Zervos model but conclude that the findings are not robust 
and that outliers in their model drive their results. 
67 Lower risk of nationalization. 
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Kumar and Tsetsekos (1998) highlight that there are reinforcing feedback 
effects between real output, growth and stock market development and also that for 
the equity market to perform efficiently, legal aspects concerning enforcement of 
contracts, good accounting standards, communication technology and a good 
banking system providing transaction services form the necessary infrastructure. 
In relation to the argument about increased volatility accompanying the 
liberalisation of capital flows Levine considers that: 
"This should not be of much concern in the long run ... .... if policy makers 
have the patience to weather some short-term volatility, liberalisation offers 
expanded opportunitiesfor long-run economic growth ", 
[R. Levine, 1996, p 10]. 
It can be argued that Levine implicitly recognises the short-term costs in 
terms of B. O. P problems, growth and unemployment. Levine however fails to 
consider the effects of short-term volatility on long-term growth. 
Some commentators are quite skeptical about the effective contribution of 
stock exchanges to the economic and financial development of developing countries. 
Singh (1993,1997,1999) considers that stock market development is not a necessary 
natural progression of a country's financial development. Singh observes that in the 
post World War II period, countries such as Germany, Japan, Italy, Korea and 
Taiwan achieved their economic miracle with little assistance from the stock market 
and that in India there has been no significant increase in aggregate savings and 
investment and what actually occurred was a substitution from banks to tradeable 
securities. In these countries, unlike the USA, banks dominate the financial sector. 
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Singh suggests that a negative relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth may be more pronounced in developing countries than in 
industrialised countries. Bhide (1993) argues that stock markets do not actually 
improve the allocation of resources by the same magnitude as banks do. Singh 
(1997) considers that the development of stock markets in African countries at their 
current level of development is costly and irrelevant. He suggests that some African 
countries should preferably use their scarce resources to develop their banking sector 
and that stock market development is likely to undermine the existence of "group- 
banking" systems which have proved useful in several countries. 
Portfolio capital has been recommended to developing countries by the I. M. E 
as it is supposed to be less vulnerable to external interest rates shocks than debt. 
However, as observed by Singh, 
"these inflows have proved to be just as destabilising. As Akyuz (1993) 
points out, external liberalisation through opening stock markets to non-residents 
leads to close links between two inherently unstable markets even when the capital 
account is notfully open - the stock and currency markets. Faced with an economic 
shock the two markets may interact with each other in a negative feedback loop to 
produce even greater instability for the markets and the whole financial system. 
Moreover, the gyrations in these markets may discourage aggregate investment 
through various channels, e. g. depressing business expectations because of greater 
uncertainty; greater instability in aggregate consumption because of wealth effects 
caused by large fluctuations in stock market prices. These factors contribute to the 
instability ofthe real economy and may reduce long-term growth. " 
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[Singh, 1997, pp. 771-782] 
Using data on the U. S. A., U. K, France, Germany and Japan, for the period 
1972 to 1996 to explore the long-run relationship among stockmarket volatility, 
stockmarket development, the banking system and output levels, Arestis, 
Demetriades and Luintel (1999) conclude that bank-based financial systems such as 
Germany, Japan and to some extent France are more capable of promoting long-term 
growth than in the market-based Anglo-Saxon system. 
Responding to the historical debate opposing supporters of bank-based 
financial system to market-based one Laporta et al (1999a, b) suggest that such a 
competing theory debate is not very useful since what really matters is a legal 
environment that supports adequately the right of both equity and debt investors and 
allows efficient enforcement. However, RaJan and Zingales (1998) argue that bank- 
based promotes growth in countries having a weak legal system while market-based 
would be more advantageous when a country's legal system improves. Apart from 
the recent legal-based view the literature is also enriched with a financial services 
view which focus on the provision of better risk management, improved liquidity, 
enhanced capacity to mobilization of savings and these are actually relevant to both 
banks and capital markets. Levine and Zervos (1998) in fact show evidence of the 
joint independent relevance of both banks and capital markets for growth. The 
empirical evidence supports the strong link between financial development and 
economic growth. Improvement in the amount and quality of provision of financial 
services ig thus likely to promote future growth, technological innovation and an 
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improved standard of living. There are also some microeconomic studies that support 
the macroeconomic growth regressions. DemirgOc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) give evidence of faster development of firms and 
industries in conditions where financial systems are well-developed. 
Rousseau (1998) studies the long-run sources of financial deepening by 
examining intermediation and financial deepening in the U. S. A from 1872-1929 
Rousseau argues that technology enhances intermediation and financial deepening. 
King and Levine bring empirical evidence about the US economy with respect to the 
impact of technology on intermediation. 
"Technological improvements in the intermediation sector can affect 
financial depth by influencing interest rate setting decision of lenders and the 
application decision of loan searchers. Specifically, an increased ability to monitor 
loan recipients eases the burden of default for lenders and allows then to lower 
interest rates on loans. " 
[King and Levine, 1998, pp. 420. ] 
The findings of the study are that there is a permanent reduction of 1% in the 
spread of New York banks associated with increases in financial depth that range 
from 1.7 to 4%. 
Such evidence revamps the call for policy towards improvement in the 
provision of financial services in order to promote technological innovation, future 
growth and an improved standard of living. 
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The question of direction of causality as questioned by Robinson, (1952) 
remained unclear as the various studies only revealed that the level of financial 
development could be a leading indicator rather than an underlying cause of growth. 
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) provide a major contribution to the issue of 
causality using the Granger causality framework (Granger, 1969) by adopting two 
methods: 
A pure cross sectional estimator averaging data for 71 countries over the 
period 1960-1995. 
(ii) Panel data exploiting the cross country and time series dimension of the 
data. 
Both methods confirm that the development of financial intermediaries exert 
a large causal impact on economic growth. 
"the estimated coefficient suggests that if Argentina had enjoyed the level of 
financial intermediary development of the average developing country during the 
1960-1995 period they would have experienced about one percentage point faster 
realper capita GDP growth per annum over this period". 
[Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000, pp3l-37. ] 
An interesting approach adopted by Levine et al in the study to ensure that 
the econometric results do not reflect the effect of a third variable, which is not 
included in the "regession", and hence invalidate the findings, is the use of 
conditioning variables such as government size, inflation openness to trade, political 
stability. 
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(Growth), = al * (Finance), + a2 * (conditioning set) + random error 
An amended approach will be used in chapter 9 when dealing with the 
Mauritian case. 
In that same study, apart from the causality issue, Levine et al also examine 
causes. They investigate whether cross country differences in the legal right and 
accounting system standards help explain cross country differences in the level of 
financial intermediary development. Their finding is that: 
"countries that efficiently impose compliance with laws tend to have better 
developed financial intermediaries than countries where enforcement is more lax 
... ... .... Countries where corporations publish relatively comprehensive and accurate 
financial statements have better developedfinancial intermediaries ". 
[Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000, pp3l-37. ] 
In a study covering China and nine OECD countrieS68 Shan, Morris and Sun 
(2001) find no evidence of one way causality from financial development69 to 
economic growth. They find evidence of reverse causality in some countries and 
bidirectional causality in other countries. The mixed evidence is in line with the 
argument that the relation between financial development and economic growth is 
country specific and that the importance of the financial sector has been overstated, 
(Demetriades and Hussein, 1996, Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). 
68 Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, UK and USA 
69 As measured by bank credit to GDP ratio. 
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The McKinnon and Shaw models and the pro-financial liberalisation 
literature that followed are all based on the efficient clearing market classical 
analysis. The literature actually directs an attack on government failure 70 and does 
not provide for any possibility of coexistence of both market and government failures 
in a financially repressed economy as the two are treated as mutually exclusive. In 
Chapter 4 such coexistence will be discussed. 
3.4 New-Classical Refinements 
The ex-ante financial liberalisation thesis rests on some unrealistic 
assumptions. Perfect information, profit-maximising competitive behaviour of 
commercial banks and institution-free analysis actually constitute the implicit 
assumptions behind the thesis and these are unlikely to be met in reality (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1999). 
Various experiences 71 of financial liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s 
ended with widespread banking failures, currency crises and had not produced more 
efficient financial systems. The "New-Classicals" suggest that financial liberalisation 
pitfalls in developing countries were caused by the unfavourable environment in 
which these financial reforms were undertaken. They maintain that the only road to 
successful development for developing countries remains financial liberalisation. 
They nevertheless incorporate some New-Keynesian 72 insights about asymmetric 
information and institutional elements while rejecting any form of government 
70 Government intervention in the financial markets leading to restricted growth prospects. 
71 e. g Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Turkey. 
72 This body of literature will be dealt with later in Chapter 4. 
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intervention in the pricing and distribution of credit considering such policy as 
government obstructionism. Their most important recent recommendations comprise 
the development of transparent and resilient financial systems by strengthening 
regulatory frameworks and by adopting well-specified liberalisation programmes 
with proper timing. 
3.4.1. Macroeconomic Instability 
The new-classicals identify macroeconomic instability, especially large fiscal 
imbalances, as an obstacle for the smooth implementation of financial liberalisation 
reforms (Hanson and Neal, 1985). In many developing countries embarking on the 
reforms, the B. O. P. and fiscal deficit were far from being moneyeable. The early 
1980s were characterised by deteriorating terms of trade, international recessions and 
debt burden all putting pressure on the B. O. P of many developing countries that were 
ultimately forced to devalue their currencies to promote exports. However, after 
devaluation many firms importing inputs for producing final goods for the domestic 
market became unprofitable and had difficulty to repay loans. This is an additional 
factor causing a high level of non-performing loans and contributing to fragilising 
the financial sector of developing countries before liberalisation. Other factors 
influencing the level of non-performing loans will be considered in section 3.4.2. In 
S. E. Asian countries, macroeconomic imbalances had generally been eliminated 
before financial reforms were initiated. This is in pontrast with countries like Sri 
lanka, Ghana, Zambia and other African countries where the financial liberalisation 
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process was initiated in an environment of very high inflation 73 rendering it difficult 
to attain positive real interest rates and was accompanied by considerable loss of 
government revenue. 
"... fiscal problems, including those emergingfirom loss of tax revenues must 
be resolved Liberalisation will not in itself improve the fiscal position of the 
government. In general, no liberalisation scheme is likely to work if it is 
accompanied by increasing inflation rates that results from reduced ability to tax 
financial intermediation" 
[Dooley and Mathieson, 1987,34] 
The fiscal imbalance created high and variable inflation rates in many 
countries (Snowden, 1987). In order that the financial reforms succeed in increasing 
the supply of loanable funds to investors, higher and variable nominal interest rates 
are required and this gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard as explained 
earlier. 
De Grawe (1987) argues that high variable inflation rates encourage high 
debt accumulation in the more inflationary sectors of the economy since inflation 
represents a net transfer of resources from lenders to borrowers and the volume of 
debt increases. With a sudden adverse movement in prices, projects with large debt 
exposures become insolvent. This has spillover effects in the financial sector. 
73 Ghana, above 20%; Zambia, above 100% inflation. 
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Villanueva & Mirakhor, (1990) observe that macroeconomic instability 
creates uncertainty affecting the future cost of funds. This acts as a deterrent to a 
bank's engagement in long-term risk sharing. 
McKinnon (1993) revisiting his initial thesis recognizes that the interest rate 
is more likely to be volatile in a liberalized system and that such volatility is likely to 
be greater if financial liberalisation is adopted before macroeconomic stability. He 
further suggests that full liberalisation of banks during a high and variable inflation is 
not warranted and that problems with prudential regulations over the banking sector 
loans portfolios become magnified when the central bank is trying to impose tight 
monetary control in order to disinflate successfully. 
The new-classicals stress fiscal responsibility as an important pre-condition 
to successful liberalisation. Fiscal discipline as per this analysis implies maintaining 
control over public expenditure so as to keep the budget deficit below 2% or 3% of 
G. D. P. The idea is not only to keep inflation under check and to avoid subsequent 
B. O. P problems. Fiscal discipline also avoids the crowding out of private investment 
whether it be because of subsequent increases in taxation or rises in interest rates. 
The New-Classicals then contend that government should get the fiscal deficit under 
control and establish macro economic stability before scaling down the directed 
credit program and adjusting the level and pattern of interest. The IMF has now 
developed a set of macroeconomic indicators as part of its surveillance work in order 
to promote financial stability. 
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An interesting point to note is that while initially financial liberalisation was 
considered as one component of the IMF prescribed stabilisation policies 74 , the 
arguments about macroeconomic instability contributing to financial distress actually 
show that the McKinnon and Shaw paradigm (1973) of financial liberalisation is 
condemned to failure unless stabilisation has been reasonably achieved. Much later 
McKinnon (1986) looking at financial liberalisation in retrospect suggests that 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies must precede the deregulation of banks and 
other financial institutions. 
3.4.2. Sequencing 
Dooley and Mathieson (1987) argue that goods and financial markets do not 
adjust at the same speed. Trade liberalisation will move the economy from an 
import-substitution orientation to an export oriented one. Both imports and exports 
will increase but because of production lags in the process of resource transfer from 
import substitution to the export sector, the trade balance will initially face a deficit 
and depreciate the currency. If there is no capital inflow depreciation can in fact 
favour the export industries. However, if financial liberalisation is undertaken 
simultaneously, large inflows of capital will offset this effect and cause exchange 
rate appreciation that is harmful to the economy's export competitiveness. 
Additionally, trade liberalisation implies a fall in tariffs meaning reduced 
government revenue. Fiscal problems must be adequately resolved, as de-repression 
74 Policies in favour of opening the economy so as to improve the allocation of resources increase 
competition and productivity so as to obtain sustainable growth. 
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measures in the financial sector will equally cause loss of government revenue. The 
World Development Report 1989 suggests that in the absence of macroeconomic 
stability internal flows can magnify existing domestic instability. Trade liberalisation 
should then precede financial liberalisation. 
Blejer and Sagari (1987) suggest that for reasons related to the potential 
destruction of the domestic banking sector, this sector should be liberalised internally 
before liberalising the capital account of the B. O. P. 
If capital controls are removed, foreign banks do not automatically and 
immediately enter the domestic market. The market structure of the banking sector is 
far from being one of perfect competition. It is then very likely that a few large 
borrowers (probably the banks only) will get access to the international loan market 
while the majority of the borrowers are excluded from carrying out transactions at 
international interest rates because of costly and imperfect information (Blejer and 
Sagari, 1987). Because of the monopolistic nature of the domestic banking industry 
and the absence of arbitrage, the spread between domestic deposit and lending rates 
as well as between domestic and international lending rates remains high. Financial 
liberalisation then fails to bring about financial deepening since the attractiveness of 
deposits is not improved. Further, different aspects of economic liberalisation may 
work at cross-Purposes. Abrupt changes in interest rates may cause rapid 
appreciation of exchange rates and cause disruption to the real economy. 
Blejer and Sagari suggest that liberalisation could begin from the internal side 
by eliminating entry barriers for new domestic players and encouraging competition 
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so as to weaken the market power of banks. The immediate entry of foreign banks 
could have an impact on the level of competition; however this move should be 
delayed as domestic banks would lose substantial market share due to the superior 
technology and the lower costs of operation of the foreign competitors. To maintain a 
large and profitable domestic banking sector it is necessary to begin with liberalising 
the banking system internally first so as to allow the domestic banks 75 to start 
adopting competitive behaviours, develop new instruments and new banking 
practices. 
Once the banking sector has been reformed, the second step would be to give 
freedom of entry to foreign banks so as to render the banking sector still more 
competitive and to give an impetus to arbitrage pressures and hence supply the 
market with cheaper credit. 
Mehrans and Laurens (1997) suggest that to achieve a better allocation of 
credit, policy makers need to decide when to start the liberalisation of interest rates 
and how fast to move. It is premature to consider financial liberalisation in countries 
with serious macroeconomic imbalances and lacking regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks or interest controls need to be re-introduced. Mehrans and Laurens 
propose the following sequence: - 
First, liberalise interest rates on wholesale transactions in the inter-bank 
market. Then liberalise lending rates and lastly deposit rates. 
Wholesale transactions in the inter-bank market do not affect the public 
directly and so do not represent a very disruptive starting process. Sequencing 
75 Prior to liberalisation, they operate in a protected and restricted environment. 
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liberalisation of lending rates before deposit rates prevents too fierce competition 
that could affect the profitability of commercial banks and also gives them time to 
strengthen their operations and financial structure. This also gives government 
enough time to debate and pass solid legislation concerning collateral and 
bankruptcy. It is also pointed out that if liberalisation of deposit rates is delayed 
completely until all lending rates have been fully liberalised, this could lead to some 
unstable deposit flows between banks. Therefore, once the lending rates have been 
partially liberalised, the liberalisation of some deposits, especially wholesale deposits 
by large firms, may be started and liberalisation of retail deposit rates would come 
last. An earlier liberalisation of wholesale deposits by large firms is also useful as it 
facilitates the development of an inter-bank market and competition with Treasury 
bills or repurchase agreements. This is particularly useful if the size of the secondary 
market is small compared to the central bank's open market operations and 
requirements. 
Fisher (1993) suggests that before opening to international markets, reforms 
in favour of competition among banks and consolidation of prudential regulation and 
supervision should be completed. Excessive level of non-performing loans remains a 
third area to be addressed by liquidation or by recapitalization before external 
liberalisation. Otherwise, domestic interest rate will fail to converge with world 
interest rates. 
A study (Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson, 1994) covering many developing 
countries concludes in favour of- 
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(1) Managing the reform rather than adopting a laissez-faire stance. 
(2) Gradual sequencing with attention paid to the initial macroeconomic 
stability conditions. 
The steps followed in Mauritius with respect to liberalisation of interest rates 
will be considered in Chapter 6. 
3.4.3 Institutional Legacy, Regulation and Supervision 
Several institutional arrangements inherited from past financially repressed 
systems constitute a fertile ground for financial distress. Past policies of directed 
credit in a protected environment had undermined financial development. Banks 
were not able to develop the skills of assessing credit risk and monitoring borrowers 
efficiently. Poor lending decisions in terms of pricing of loans affected the 
profitability of banks adversely. Such poor decisions also come from substantial joint 
ownership of financial, industrial and commercial firms. In such cases, after 
liberalisation, banks found it difficult to adjust rapidly to market rates especially if 
the "connected" borrowers had for a long time been receiving favourable treatment 
under the previous interest ceiling policy, Dooley and Mathieson (1987). Financial 
liberalisation then created opportunities for banks to make poor lending decisions. 
Deregulation pushed banks towards assuming greater risk and increased their 
vulnerability. Interest rates had then been set free to rise towards market equilibrium 
and deposits increased in an environment where borrowers had greater information 
about their own default risk than do bankers (Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990). 
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Severe asymmetric informational problems gave rise to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Improvement of the risk evaluation capability of bankers through training 
then becomes a priority in the newly liberalized economy. 
Another inherited factor is that just prior to the reform regulators were 
confined to only ensure that the banks are not engaged in fraud, and that they 
conform to government's guidelines on credit expansion (Dooley and Mathieson, 
1987). Under the pre-liberalisation directed credit programme, government-owned 
banks were forced to lend to public enterprise and priority regions/sectors even when 
the borrowers were consistently unprofitable. Earlier in section 3.4.1 it was reported 
that devaluation had contributed to the build-up of non-performing loans. The World 
Development Report 1989 highlights that when liberalisation started in developing 
countries some private banks got into the dilemma of continued lending to bad 
76 borrowers to avoid their own bankruptcy . When liberalisation started, many banks 
were already overburdened with non-performing loans inherited from the directed 
credit programme policy. In many countries, for financial and political reasons these 
loans were not written-off in a process of balance sheet restructuration and banks 
remained dependent on subsidized credit from the central bank after liberalisation. In 
such conditions, banks' lending decisions remain largely subject to some form of 
government discretion and there is only little improvement in the allocation of 
resources. 
76 This is discussed in chapter 4 under Minsky's financial instability hypothesis 
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Equally inherited in many African countrieS77 is the monopolistic power of 
banks. Such market imperfection has been exploited by banks. In a context of 
abolition of interest rate control, the market power of banks allowed them to widen 
their interest spread. Domestic savers have not really found bank deposits more 
attractive and financial deepening has been very weak. 
The early liberalisation thesis before the disasters in latin America ignored 
several institutional aspects such as the legal system, the enforcement of contracts 
and bankruptcy procedures. Reference in the literature to banking prudential 
regulation and supervision was rather scarce and not comprehensive. Benston and 
Marlin (1974) analyse the usefulness of substandard loan data. Gutentag and Herring 
(1984) examine the regulatory disposition in cases on insolvency of financial 
institutions. 
According to recent literature, abolition of direct government intervention in 
banking credit decisions should not be interpreted as free or unregulated banking but 
as a change in the financial system architecture which is the set of standards, rules 
and regulations governing the various interactions in the financial system. 
Intervention should continue in the form of a comprehensive set of prudential 
regulation coupled with supervision to achieve the goal of stabilizing the banking 
system. Unfortunately it has been observed that in many developing countries 
because of high level of corruption and poor institutional quality, regulation does not 
work satisfactorily (Demirgilc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
77 E. g Kenya, Malawi. 
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The fact that banks provide liquidity services within a system of fractional 
reserve banking exposes them to runs that are very costly to the economy. A bank 
run is triggered either by (i) actual poor performance or (ii) by panic caused when 
some depositors observe a large withdrawal and they do not know whether this is for 
early consumption or due to the action of informed depositors who hold information 
about poor performance (Chari and Jaganathan, 1988). Further a run on one bank 
may trigger contagion runs on other banks via the interbank market (Calomiris, C 
and Gorton, (1991). The risk of systemic crisis and the inability of depositors in 
general to monitor banks warrant the regulation of the banking sector. The dangers of 
overly leveraged insufficiently regulated banks and bad loans have been brought to 
light again in the last South East Asian crisis. Access to credit reflected "crony 
capitaliSM08 and banks were weakened by increasing the level of non-performing 
loanS79 . The traditional way of minimising potential risks to financial institutions and 
promoting financial stability has been through both regulation of capital and through 
prudential supervision. In the absence of adequate regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms, various market failures such as adverse risk selection promoted by 
deposit insurance and moral hazard8o, oligopolistic pricing8l, interlocking ownership 
and lending exacerbate the problems associated with structural deregulation Diaz- 
Ale . andro(1985) and Velasco, (1996). Supervision aims, interalia, at detecting a 
weakening of the portfolio of the financial institutions and at limiting banks' 
78 The favouring of enterprises controlled by friends or relatives of people holding political power 
79 The favoured borrowers knew that they would not be sanctioned in case of default because of 
political ties. 
so Adverse selection and moral hazard will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Sometimes banks associations unofficially fix the interest rates - (cartelized action). 
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commitment of funds to risk concentration. Capital Adequacy Requirements (CARs) 
and prudential supervision protect individual institutions from failure and ultimately 
avoid systemic failure. 
A risk weighted capital ratio is a measure of a bank's capital in relation to its 
credit exposures. When a bank has an adequate capital base it can easier absorb a 
reasonable level of losses before becoming insolvent. This requirement then serves 
as a cushion or front line of defence against bad debts 82 and other risks 83 and 
promotes the stability of the financial system. Depositors then receive a certain 
protection and as confidence is improved, increased intermediation and higher 
efficiency result in the financial system. The Basel84 Accord of 1988, rendered fully 
operational in 1993 (i) defines a bank's capital in three elements, (ii) establishes a 
minimum capital requirement for banks and (iii) proposes a formula to determine the 
amount of capital a bank should have based on the riskiness of its assets 85 . At least 
8% of a bank's asset, weighted for risks, should be held as capital base consisting of 
three elements: tier 186 , tier 2 
87 
, and tier3 
88 capital. The different components of a 
bank's capital have different capacities to absorb losses. Tier I is permanent capital 
2 E. g following the collapse of large corporate clients. 3 Exaggerated by the narrowing of interest spread; increased competition arising from structural 
deregulation and causing loss of market share. 84 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
represents the central banks, regulatory and supervisory authorities of the major industrialized 
countries (G 10). It promotes international standards and ensures supervision of banks on a global 
basis. 
85 - 
Net Capital 
Tisk WeightAsseis- . (The assets in the balance sheets are assigned weights according to the level 
of riskiness and the total weighted balance value of the assets is compared with the bank's capital). 
E-g cash and loans to government are weighted at 0% while mortgage loans are weighted at 50%. 96 At least 50% of a bank's capital must be tierl (core capital - equity plus disclosed reserves) " This supplementary capital includes revaluation revenues, unrealized gain on securities, 
undisclosed reserves, hybrid debt instruments and subordinated long-term (over 5years) debt. 
88 Short-term subordinated debt (over two years) 
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readily available to absorb losses without causing a bank to stop trading. Tier 2 
capital can absorb losses in the event of a winding up and thus provide a lower 
protection to depositors. In tenns of liability in the event of a winding-up, depositors 
fund actually rank in priority before capital in the event of a winding up. The Basel 
Accord constitutes a move towards an international convergence of capital standards 
and reduces competitive inequalities by creating a level international playing field. 
By measuring the amount of a bank's capital expressed as a percentage of its risk 
weighted credit exposures the actual risk weighted capital ratio provides an 
indication of the capacity of the institution to face shocks to its balance and so 
reveals its robustness89. The numerator in the capital ratio measures the absolute 
value of capital and is thus inversely related to failure. The denominator is a proxy 
for the absolute level of risk of the institution. With the risk weighting system, banks 
have to charge more capital for riskier assets and this acts as a disincentive to 
holding risky assets. 
It must be noted that Off-Balance-Sheet contracts such as guarantees, foreign 
exchange and interest contracts also carry credit risks. A credit conversion factor is 
multiplied to the principal value of these contracts to derive a credit exposure 
equivalent, thus extending capital requirement to Off-Balance-Sheet positions. 
However, the capital ratio methodology is not fully accurate since each loan 
is unique and evaluating the credit risk of a bank's assets is not simple. It reveals 
nothing about the quality of assets, which can be hampered by a high level of non- 
performing loans. This can adversely influence the solvency of financial institutions. 
89 Stability and capacity to absorb losses; i. e. resilience. 
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Further by classifying assets in four different weightings for calculating riskiness, a 
"one-size-fits-all" approach is being adopted. This does not provide a strong 
incentive for banks to improve on risk management in order to save on capital. The 
New Basel Capital Accord9o (BIS, 2002) proposed by the Basel Supervision 
Committee suggests rewarding stronger and more accurate risk management9l. Still 
another weakness to be highlighted is that when an institution's situation starts 
deteriorating, this is reflected in the capital ratio only with a time lag. 
The performance of weighted capital adequacy ratio as a predictor of bank 
failure is less good over the long run and empirical evidence92 suggests that banks 
that were adequately capitalised have failed some years later. However, generally 
failing banks begin to show signs of weaknesses two to three years before they are 
being closed by supervisors (Estrella, Park and Peristiani, 2000). Capital adequacy 
ratio remains only one element in measuring the strength of a bank and if taken in 
isolation can be a misleading indicator of strength. 
Chiuri, Ferri and Madjoni (2001) underscore the credit crunch effect of 
stricter enforcement and stiffening of CARs on intermediation in less developed 
financial systems. This is an illustration of the fallacy of composition. On studying 
the situation of 16 emerging economieS93 in which increases in capital requirements 
were enforced during the 1990s, Chuiri et al observed three main results: 
90 Also called Base I II. 
91 The New Accord will be finalized by mid-year 2004 and will be implemented year-end 2006. It 
also puts emphasis on supervisory review and the efficient use of market discipline. 
92 E. g. the New England banking crisis, 1989-93. 
93 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland, 
Slovania, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
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(i) Enforcement of capital adequacy requirement as per the 1988 Basel 
standard dramatically curtailed the credit supply over a multi-year horizon. 
(ii) Such adverse impact is not limited to countries enforcing CARs in the 
aftermath of a currency/financial crisis. 
(iii) Foreign-owned banks suffer less such adverse impact. This, according to 
Chuiri et al, suggests that the opening up to foreign investors may be an effective 
way to partly protect the domestic banking sector from negative shocks. 
The conclusion from Chuiri et al's observations is that the phasing in of 
higher capital requirements, especially for countries that mostly rely on bank credit, 
has to be cautiously managed so as to avoid a credit supply retrenchment leading to a 
recession. Actually in countries with weak alternative financial channels to the 
banking system, the curtailing of bank loans has potential long-lasting adverse 
effects on the economy (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). Faced with the Basel 
Committee Consultative paper about the stiffening of CADs, it is indeed legitimate 
to question whether such a proposal actually addresses the needs of developing 
countries or whether the international bodies setting regulatory standards should not 
adopt a differentiated options approach catering for a smoother process of phasing in 
and stiffening of capital regulations in developing countries. The stiffening of capital 
requirements also poses a problem to banks in economies facing a stock market crisis 
in the sense that a dip in stock prices renders it difficult for banks to issue new 
shares, as has been the case in Japan in the 1990s. It must be observed that Capital 
adequacy requirements do not apply to highly leveraged non-bank financial 
institutions like hedge funds and this is a source of concern. 
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In recent years, with structural deregulation, there has been a change in the 
regulatory mix with a move towards more structured official regulation. Over the last 
two decades structural deregulation, more specifically the removal of binding 
portfolio constraints, has allowed financial institutions to engage in specialised 
markets where they have less expertise and also to adopt more risky investment and 
loan portfolios. In many countries banks have been providing an imprudent level of 
credit to the property and equity markets to offset the lower profit margins and 
declining market shares in their traditional activities following increased 
competition. Actually in many countries with developed financial systems, banks 
have lost their predominant role as deposit takers and lenders to companies. A 
broader spectrum of firms (NBFIs and non-financial corporates) is now providing 
such banking services or simply credit card facilities. Competition between banks 
and NBFIs is now asymmetric since the non-financial firms can easier diversify into 
the banking industry (usually in the more profitable segment) than vice versa 94 . 
Further, banks, now being authorised to hold equities in non-financial business, have 
granted loans to fin-ns belonging to the same conglomerate albeit at high leverage 
and high risk of concentration. They have an incentive to do so, just to protect their 
own capital. Even in situations not relating to connected lending there exists the 
Ponzi Finance problem which is elaborated in Chapter 4. 
Traditionally, it has been considered that the financial system can remain in 
good health only by protecting individual institutions from failure through regulation 
94 It is easier for instance for a furniture trader to give consumer loans than for a bank to start selling 
home appliances. 
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of capital and prudential supervision. Innovation in recent years, more specifically 
securitisation 95 , has weakened supervisory efficiency. Banks can now unbundle the 
total risk of an asset into its component parts and transfer combinations of these 
component parts to those willing to bear the risk. This has helped to improve the 
quality of the balance sheet by increasing the liquidity of the assets. However, such 
active portfolio management can, if not properly managed, expose the institution to 
huge losses. Increased trading in fact increases the risk of failures due to volatility of 
asset prices. In addition to credit risk, banks are also exposed to interest rate risk, 
operational risk 96 and reputational risk. Inadequate internal control systems can lead 
to losses due to fraud. Huge losses can also be made on foreign currency trading. 
Clearly, the new environment under financial liberalisation characterised by greater 
diversification both geographically and functionally warrants stronger prudential 
regulation and supervision. 
While liberalisation is expected to lead to higher economic efficiency, over 
the last two decades the stability of the financial sector has often deteriorated and 
several developing economies experiencing financial liberalisation have shown 
evidence of a higher frequency and severity of financial crises (Lindgren, Garcia and 
Saal, 1996). 
Recent history of financial turmoil show evidence that in the days of 
integrated global financial markets, financial instability also comes from abroad and 
95 A process where previously non-tradeable claims are transformed into tradeable ones e. g. 
Mortgage loans being converted into negotiable securities and sold to other depository institution or 
non-bank investors. 
96 This can be due to Fraud, money laundering, legal problems, natural disaster, execution errors, IT 
problems etc. 
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improved information and communication technology allows speedy contagion. An 
IMF study on financial soundness (IMF 1996) raised concern about the large fiscal 
deficit in dealing with crises. This view was further reinforced with the S. E. Asian 
crisis in 1997/98. In 1999 the international community took the initiative to create 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSp97) to discuss an improvement of the international 
financial architecture through both the development of internationally agreed 
standards and improving information exchange among the institutions responsible 
for promotion financial stability in different countries. A compendium of 12 key 
standards internationally accepted as important for sound, stable and well 
functioning financial systems has been developed. To improve the international 
monitoring aspect of standards, the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme 98 (FSAP) was launched jointly by the IMF and the World Bank in May 
1999 to identify strengths and weaknesses in financial systems and propose remedial 
measures to reduce the likelihood and severity of crises. A set of macroprudential 
indicators" (MPIs or FSIs) was therefore developed to monitor the soundness and 
vulnerabilities of financial systems (2000,2001a, b). The FSls to-day are basically 
an adaptation of an initial set of six categories of aggregated microprudential 
97 The FSP groups international regulatory and supervisory groupings, international financial 
institutions and senior representatives of national financial authorities the G7 countries and four 
countries with important financial centres, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and the 
Netherlands. 
98 The FSAP assesses a country's practice on a voluntary basis against five benchmarks: (1) IMF 
code of Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (2) The Basel Core Principles 
of Effective Banking Supervision (3) The Committee for Payment and Settlement System's Core 
Principles for systemically Important Payment Systems (4) The International Organisation of 
Securities Commission's Objective and Principles of Securities Regulation. (5) Ile International 
Association of Insurance Core Principles. Participation in the FSAP is on a voluntary basis for 
countries that are members of the IMF and of the World Bank. Around 60 countries have until now 
participated in the FSAP. 
99 Also called Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs). 
-95- 
indicators within the CAMELS framework (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management soundness, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risks)'00 
combined with some macroeconomic indicators. These initial MPIs are summarized 
in Appendix 2. 
It is recognized that today the source of crises can also come from the equity 
market, the derivatives market and the foreign exchange market and it then impacts 
on pure banking activities. During the S. E. Asian crisis the collapse of nonbank 
financial intermediaries (NBFIs) contributed to the crisis. In Indonesia for instance 
where regulators limited banks' ability to borrow short in foreign currency and to 
lend long to buy non-tradable assets, corporations and non-financial institutions 
borrowed directly in the international markets and two thirds of the external debt was 
owned by the non-bank private sector. Banks and NBFIs often have both ownership 
and investment linkages. The near failure of a large hedge fund (LTCM) in 1998 
highlighted the risk of systemic failure coming from NBFIs. Therefore, a set of 
broader Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), as a key component of the FSAP 
process are currently being examined to take into account the non-bank sectors as 
well but maintaining a core element of banking indicators as banks remain the core 
in financial systems. The FSAP has shown evidence of the need for 
regulatory/supervisory/institutionaI and budgetary independence of the agency 
responsible for regulation and supervision. Das, Quintyn and Taylor (2002) argue 
that avoiding political interference in the supervision process enhances the credibility 
100 The CAMEL Framework is a regulatory rating system as an early-warning system to access the 
health of individual banks and to take actions against banks' management whenever warranted. 
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of the agency and reduces moral hazard. Bankers then know that they cannot 
anymore lobby to keep an insolvent bank open and face a bigger pressure to behave 
prudently than when politicians can interfere. Independence however does not imply 
complete absence from political control and the independent agency should be 
accountable to those who delegated their responsibility to them but also to the public 
at large. 
The "ex-post" financial liberalisation theories advocating macroeconomic 
stability, adequate prudential regulations and independent bank supervision, 
transparency, a better legal framework and an appropriate sequencing were expected 
to put an end to some poor empirical record concerning financial liberalisation in 
developing and emerging countries. Ironically, only a few months before the recent 
South East Asian financial turmoil, these countries were being quoted by the I. M. F 
as possessing strong institutional frameworks conducive to economic growth and in 
most of them the macroeconomic conditions'01 were actually favourable. Thailand 
was one of the least publicly indebted countries of the world in 1997 according to the 
02 TDRI1 . In its 1997 annual report, the IMF directors strongly praised Thailand's 
remarkable economic performance and the authority's consistent record of sound 
macroeconomic management. They also praised Korea's continued impressive 
macroeconomic performance and praised the authorities for their enviable fiscal 
record. The financial crises that unfolded just after cast serious doubts about the 
101 Macroeconomic variables such as fiscal balance, inflation, savings, investment and growth. 
102 Thailand Development Research Institute. 
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legitimacy of liberalisation of short-term capital in general and not simply in the 
cases of Korea and Thailand. 
Stabilizing measures have accompanied the financial liberalisation process, 
yet growth has not been superior to pre-reforms decades as promised. Further, 
unemployment has not improved in spite of greater labour market flexibility. 
Countries like Chile and China that have adopted the liberalisation policies only 
selectively and at their own pace have been performing relatively well while many 
who adopted the liberalisation path blindly and hastily are still waiting for the 
benefits to come. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the second generation models, showing the 
contribution of the financial system in improving the informational frictions, the 
shifting of savings from unproductive assets (money) to productive illiquid assets 
and the reduction in the cost of innovation. The bank-based versus capital market- 
based debate has been examined as well as the legal-based and the financial services 
views. The empirical literature has been summarized in a table in appendix 3 The 
refinements brought to financial liberalisation cannons in the light of empirical 
evidence following implementation of financial liberalisation policy in various 
developing countries have also been discussed. These concern macroeconomic 
stability, sequencing, prudential regulation and supervision. Initiatives to improve the 
international financial structure have also been discussed. In Chapter 6 and 7 these 
institutional aspects of financial liberalisation policy in Mauritius will be discussed. 
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The unfolding of economic events after liberalisation in many countries 
shows that the "ex-post" financial liberalisation paradigm might not tell the whole 
story and remains subject to further revision. Further attention should therefore be 
given to theoretical insights from other schools of thought. These will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
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Chapter 4 
SOME ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS 
AND SOME RELATED ISSUES 
4.1 Introduction 
By the end of the 1970's, most developing countries were severely affected 
by debt due to the oil crisis, continued weakness of prices of many primary 
commodities, increased interest rates in financial markets and the impact of recession 
on international trade. Private commercial banks engaged in lending to governments 
of developing countries showed concern about credit-worthiness and started getting 
involved in country risk analysis to determine the borrower's ability to generate 
enough foreign exchange to be able to service their debts (Meir, 1995). Soon access 
to world capital markets became difficult and these countries had little choice than to 
contract concessional loans from the I. M. F. Such loans were granted subject to 
adoption of a stabilising programme 103 . The stabilisation package included a 
component of financial liberalisation with a view to improve access to the 
international capital markets. Even countries that were not under the financial 
adjustment regime adopted the policy advocated by the IMF. Unfortunately, in many 
countries (e. g. in Latin America) adopting the financial liberalisation path, non- 
financial corporates as well as banks became insolvent and the financial system in 
these economies faced systemic failure. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) surveyed 96 10 .4 
103 Devaluation of rate of exchange, reductions in growth of wages and money supply, reduction in 
PSBR, freeing of interest rates 104 The list does not include the transitions economies. 
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countries with banking crises since the late 1970s. Higher real interest rates also blew 
up government debt. Disappointing results of the early financial liberalisation 
experiments pushed governments in some developing countries'05 to reintroducing 
the pre-liberalisation policies, (Cho and Khakate, 1989; Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
These events reinforced the development of new emerging bodies of literature on the 
subject of financial liberalisation. 
4.2.1 The New Structuralists 
The New Structuralists consider that financial liberalisation 107 in developing 
countries is growth-impeding rather than growth-promoting. Their opposition to the 
New -Classical thesis of financial liberalisation is based on two arguments. 
The first line of attack concerns availability of loanable funds and the role 
played by the unofficial money market'08 (UMM) as highlighted in the McKinnon 
and Shaw models (see chapter 2). In the 1970s, developing countries were 
characterised by a low level of monetisation'09 and by financial dualism with the 
money market being split into: 
(i) An official organized market"O under the control of the monetary 
authority. 
103 E. g Korea, 1972; Argentina, 1982 
106 Represented by S. Van Wijnbergen, L. Taylor, E. Buffie, A. Kohsaka and others 
107 Both old and new versions. 
log Curb Market is another appellation for unofficial money market in the literature. 
109 much payment was in kind (e. g livestock in rural areas, labour services) 
110 Commercial banks, co-operative banks, development banks, Central banks, insurance companies 
etc., 
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(ii) A fairly large unofficial money market, with money lenders providing 
credit to borrowers without marketable collateral"' and pawn brokers providing 
credit to borrowers with marketable collateral. The market also included indigenous 
financial institutions like rotating savings and other credit associations which satisfy 
not only households as is commonly believed but also small firms' credit needs. The 
curb market operated outside the control of the monetary authority, with flexible 
transactions and higher interest rates than in the official money market (OMM). 
In the Van Winjbergen model (1985) there is a Tobin-type portfolio 
framework. Households allocate their real wealth between currency, time deposits in 
the OMM and direct loans to the business sector in the UMM. Using a 
macroeconomic model with Korean data to estimate the effect of a change in deposit 
rates, Van Wijnbergen observes that time deposits are actually a closer substitute to 
UMM loans than to narrow money, MI. The transmission mechanism is that a rise in 
the deposit rate (rd) in the OMM following liberalisation can cause people to 
substitute from UMM market loans into time deposits. Further, the total supply of 
loanable funds falls because the reserve requirements in the OMM represent a 
leakage from the financial intermediation process and credit availability is reduced. 
Reserve requirements do not exist in the UMM where all savings are efficiently 
intermediated into investment. The supply of credit to firms then contracts and this 
impacts adversely on aggregate supply and growth. There can also be some 
substitution from currency into time deposits giving rise to an increase in the supply 
"'While banks define collateral as real estate, pawnshops accept any object, e-gjewellery, musical 
instruments. 
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of loanable funds. However, this effect is offset by the loan substitution effect, which 
is the dominant effect. Van Winjbergen suggests that aggregate supply will fall by a 
larger extent than aggregate demand and inflation will follow. Erosion in the 
international competitiveness of firms then deteriorates the current account of the 
balance of payments and leads to reduced growth in spite of an increase in the 
savings ratio. It is only in the long term that the savings ratio effect offsets the 
adverse influence of the portfolio substitution from UMM loans to deposits. 
Therefore a liberalisation process where the OMM expands ai the expense of the 
UMM as a result of a rise in the interest rate is a dangerous path. 
The second argument concerns a vicious cycle of stagflation by considering 
the cost-push effect of capital finance in the link between the financial and real 
sectors of the economy as advocated by Taylor (1983). According to Taylor, working 
capital is used for input payments prior to the receipts of inflows from sales. This is 
generally financed by both banks and UMM credit. In fact control of money supply, 
in the context of a Structural Adjustment Programme' 12, Will push many firms into 
the UMM which is taken to be the dominant market. Increased demand for credit in 
the UMM drives the UMM interest rate up, and creates cost-push inflation effects 
with adverse effects on investment and employment. Taylor introduces a cumulative 
effect in the process. In the medium term the reduction in net worth leads to reduced 
aggregate demand and the inflation rate is lowered. However, real wages will rise 
112 Introduced by the World Bank in many countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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because of a time lag in wage responses and high wages will cause a reduction in the 
employment level and lower economic growth. 
Buffie (1984) revisits the ambiguous portfolio substitution behaviour 
following a rise in the deposit rate in the financial sector liberalisation process and 
takes a less categorical position than Van Winjbergen and Taylor. The ambiguous 
behavior is between: 
(i) People substituting from the UMM market loan to time deposits and 
the end result being a fall in total loanable funds because of reserve requirements; 
and 
(ii) People substituting from currency and foreign bonds to deposits. 
Buffie recognises that the net effect will be a reduction in output and 
employment in the short run considering the dynamics of increases in deposit rates. 
The savings effect through greater holdings of UMM loans and deposits will lead to 
a contraction in import expenditure. This is however offset by reduced exports due to 
the working capital cost push effect on international competitiveness. The resulting 
current account deficit leads to a fall in the exchange rate and hence reduces the 
stock of financial wealth. This will reduce actual asset holdings below desired levels 
and drive up interest rates in the UMM. The whole process repeats and the stable 
adjustment path will eventually lead the savings effect to dominate the negative 
output effect. The resulting current account surplus will appreciate the currency and 
the stock of real wealth grows. The UMM interest rate then falls causing positive 
output effects. 
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Buffle points out that increased savings due to financial liberalisation 
will eventually bring economic growth but we should expect a transition period 
marked by a fall in output and a rise in unemployment levels. 
In short, the new-structuralists ideas consider that a program of financial 
liberalisation reduces the supply of loanable funds, creates a vicious circle of 
stagflation and hinders growth. 
4.2.2 Weaknesses of the New-Structuralists Arguments 
On account of important weaknesses undermining their theoretical 
foundations, the new-structuralists failed to impose themselves as a major 
challenging body to the McKinnon and Shaw school. The key weaknesses are 
presented below. 
Owen and Solis-Fallas (1989) exposed what they consider to be a 
misconception of the workings of the UMM. They argue that it is not correct to treat 
the UMM as a perfectly efficient market achieving 100% one-to-one intermediation. 
Lenders in the UMM are quasi-monopolistic occupying small-scale spatial sub- 
markets which prevent maturity transformation of funds, economies of scale and 
risk-pooling activities. It is in fact a segmented market for short-term loans and exists 
because of problems relating to asymmetric information. 
Other weaknesses of the UMM are that it is characterized by poor accounting 
systems, nepotism in financial transactions, absence of intermediation, low financial 
innovation, absence of secondary markets for financial assets and a prevalence of 
hoarding. Given the greater efficiency of the banking system than the UMM, an 
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increase in the deposit rate would be expansionary because of a larger supply of 
loanable funds. 
Upon lending, the UMM does not benefit from redeposits as is the case in the 
banking system. The UMM does not operate on the fractional reserve banking 
principle and the amount of credit never exceeds the amount of initial funds with the 
credit multiplier simply being equal to one. Consequently, when the deposit rate 
rises, any substitution from currency to the OMM will lead to an increase in the 
amount of loanable funds in the economy. 
Kapur (1992) for his part launches an attack on the aspect of reserves 
requirements in the banking system. Kapur argues that the existence of reserves 
allows banks to mobilise a larger amount of resources than the UMM because it 
allows depositors to minimise their holding of money balances for transactions and 
yet be able to meet unexpected contingencies. 
4.3 New-Keynesianism and Financial Liberalisation 
During the 1970s and 80s the dominating Neo-Classical-Keynesian 
synthesis' 13 came under the attack of New Classical criticisms of the absence of a 
convincing microeconornic foundation for the Keynesian price and wage stickiness 
arguments and the fact that these rigidities are due to government interference. New- 
Keynesianism then developed as a body of literature focussing on the consequences 
of information imperfections preventing competitive equilibrium and provided the 
113 IS-LM model is the centerpiece of the Neo-Classical-Keynesian Synthesis. The conclusion of the 
IS-LM model is Keynesian (unemployment equilibrium) in the short-run but Neo-Classical (full 
employment equilibrium) in the long-run. 
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micro foundation of Keynesian macroeconomics to explain why the economy 
amplifies shocks and why there may be unemployment and credit rationing. New- 
Keynesianism challenges the competitive equilibrium analysis and maintains the 
Keynesian tradition concerning support to significant government intervention when 
market failures arising out of externalities, the "public good" nature of some 
commodities and widespread monopoly are considered. 
In the area of financial markets, New-Keynesianism adopts a microeconomic 
analysis of credit market failures. It links the problem of asymmetry of information 
with adverse selection and moral hazard. These are considered to be more acute in a 
context of corporate limited liability and also when the legal framework is weak and 
inadequate with respect to enforcement of contracts and bankruptcy provisions. 
Asymmetry of information is Present in all economies but in LDCs, because small or 
even medium sized firms lack proper accounting records and all the financial 
documentation' 14, the problem is more severe. Banks would find it more difficult and 
costly to assess creditworthiness and would prefer lending to the large established 
firms. 
Stiglitz et al (1993) and Stiglitz (1994) argue that the complete elimination of 
financial repression in developing countries is a fundamentally erroneous policy. 
While admitting that various cross-sectional and time-series studies have confirmed a 
positive relationship between interest rates and growth, he argues that there is a need 
to differentiate between a small and a large financial repression. There is recognition 
that large repressions with high negative interest rates have adverse effects on the 
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economy as shown by empirical evidence and verified through econometric studies. 
However, when the countries with negative real interest rates were excluded from the 
sample of countries in the econometric studies, higher real interest rates seem to be 
associated with lower rates of growth. Regarding the mobilization of savings, Stiglitz 
highlights the following: 
"Japan's postal savings banks paid relatively low interest rates andyet were 
able to raise huge amounts of money, suggesting that other factors (such as 
convenience and safety) mayfar outweigh interest rates in determining the level of 
savings " 
[Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, Park, 1993] 
In a similar vein, Demetriades and Liuntel (1996) show that the imposition of 
a loan interest ceiling had positive effects in India and it successfully addressed 
market failures. It can be argued that it is possible for positive externalities and the 
crowding-in effect to overcompensate the cost of a mild financial repression policy. 
Although financial repression creates a scarcity (since some potential 
borrowers will not get the credit they want at the interest being offered), government 
can intervene by setting up criteria allowing those who perform well (as measured 
by, say exports) to get more access to credit. The Korean economy was able to avoid 
much of the inefficiency problem affecting growth to the extent claimed in the anti- 
repression literature because export performance was the main criterion for bank 
loans. Firms that compete and succeed internationally are likely to be more efficient 
than those that operate in regulated and sheltered domestic markets, and most of the 
114 E. g Bank statement, audited accounts, title deeds of proposed collateral. 
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loanable funds were in fact allocated to these firms, (Park, 1993). More generally, 
some restrictions on certain categories of loans (Le some form of directed credit 
policy) may be desirable as lenders will tend to focus only on their expected private 
returns and might not allocate funds to projects for which social returns are 
sometimes higher. Vittas and Cho (1994) suggest that based on the experience of 
countries like Japan and Korea, directed credit programmes can promote investment 
and growth. To a large extent directed credit influenced the export sector in 
Mauritius although it must be pointed out that the industries concerned have been 
operating in sheltered markets via the Lom6 Convention. 
With respect to the credit rationing debate, New-Keynesians consider that 
lenders can only know about the probability distribution of risk /return of the average 
borrower for different categories of projects and will thus charge an interest rate 115 
that suits the average quality of the loan portfolio. This level of interest inflicts an 
externality on many safe borrowers whose projects then become less viable. These 
' sensible' borrowers who are not prepared to undertake high risk/high yielding 
projects are thus excluded from credit facilities. The higher cost of borrowing 
therefore leads to a deteriorated pool of loan applicants, from which lenders have to 
select randomly. Adverse selection" 6 (Akerlof, 1970) then occurs before a loan 
transaction takes place. Higher interest rates raise the probability of moral hazard' 17 
"' Interest rate is free to move upwards in a context of financial liberalisation as there is no more 
ceiling. 
116 Adverse selection refers to a situation where the individuals that are attracted to the transaction 
arc those that are more likely to produce an adverse outcome for the other party. 1 17 Moral hazard refers to anything that might encourage risky behaviour. 
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as borrowers are encouraged to take more risky projects to pay for the higher cost of 
borrowing. 
Because of adverse selection and moral hazards resulting from imperfections 
in information, banks will not allow interest to rise beyond a critical value & as 
shown in figure 1.4 (panel A) below. They will develop a risk averse position and 
adopt credit rationing (Jaffee and Russel, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Guttentag 
and Herring (1984); Myers and Majluff (1984)). 
Fig 1.4 
Credit Rationing 
A 
Lenders 
Expected 
Return 
Int. 
Rate 
Rc 
Loans 
Therefore, in an attempt to maximise profit the banking system will display 
interest rates below the "Walrasian market clearing" rate. Even if there is excess 
demand (See Figurel. 4, panel B), lenders will not raise interest rates. Equality 
between demand and supply is reached by quantitative rationing rather than by 
interest rate adjustment to equate loan demand (DL) and loan supply (SL). Such 
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Re Lending Rate (r) 
equilibrium is a credit rationing equilibrium rather than a competitive market 
equilibrium. 
Credit rationing causes a number of projects with positive net present values 
to remain unfunded. Lending volume then remains below the social optimum and the 
level of investment is not maximised as advocated by the New -Classical model of 
financial liberalisation. This model of credit rationing illustrates that capital markets 
often do not clear. This is a case of market failure and warrants some form of 
government intervention in the credit market. 
There is a presumption that financial markets will not, in general be 
competitive, especially because of imperfect information and also probably because 
of incompleteness. 
Stiglitz (1993) defines a taxonomy of seven major market failures that 
provide a rationale for properly designed government intervention to make financial 
markets function better and improve the performance of the economy. 
1. Monitoring: Information for monitoring of solvency, managers and board 
of directors is non-rival and almost non-excludable'18 in nature and, like any impure 
public good, is likely to be undersupplied. Because managers know that they are not 
being adequately monitored, they may take inappropriate risks and attempt to divert 
funds to their own use. Because of the principal-agent problem, investors cannot 
fully rely on the financial institutions and are dissuaded from depositing money in 
banks. Fewer resources are then allocated through the institutions. 
2. Extemalitv: The externality argument builds from the bank run rationale. 
118 Or excludable at very high cost. 
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(a) Whenever a bank fails, loss in depositors' confidence can lead to a run on 
other banks as depositors suspect that other banks have similar portfolios as the 
failed bank (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This may lead to a systemic failure. 
(b) Calomiris and Gorton (1991) model a bank run on the basis of 
information problems. Whenever depositors get some information that makes them 
believe that their bank could be insolvent they will attempt to withdraw before the 
possible failure. 
In any case a bank run imposes an important negative externality on the 
payment system and on the flow of credit to firms and households. A financial 
disruption has a cascade of effects on the real economy as witnessed in the great 
depression and in the last S. E. Asian crisis' 19. Lenders do not take into account social 
retums/cost when rating real estate loans and credit is not allocated in a socially 
efficient manner. 
4. Missing and Incomplete Markets: While classical analysis is based on the 
assumption of the existence of a complete set of markets, Akerloff (1970) highlights 
that markets may be thin or absent because of information asymmetries. Even in 
developed countries, the equity market is weak and does not work well. Certain key 
markets (e. g those insuring a variety of risks) are missing and this has an influence 
on the functioning of other markets. In many countries, their existence was the direct 
result of government actions. In Mauritius for instance, the setting up of the Sugar 
Insurance Fund to insure cane growers against losses due to vagaries of climate or 
against pests represents such an example. The role played in Mauritius by the 
119 The last important financial crisis being the S. E Asian one, it is fully discussed in appendix 4 
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Development Bank in the early 1980s towards small enterprises and the recent 
development of micro-credit support the case for government intervention to fill 
credit gaps in incomplete markets. More recently government has set up a one- 
billion rupee equity fund through the Development Bank of Mauritius to invest 
massively in certain priority sectors 120. Government expects that its initiative will be 
followed by the setting up of private equity financing to both listed and non-listed 
companies to facilitate their expansion and restructuring. 
In many LDCs where both economic growth and development are associated 
with higher productivity in agriculture and where women have an important role to 
play, private banks are reluctant to provide credit to small farmers 121 and to women 
because of absence of collateral. Even prior to reforms these countries were affected 
by capital flight. With capital account reforms, rather than being affected by inflows 
of capital as in the case of emerging economies, LCI)s face outflows of capital. A 
contraction in the monetary base further weakens the credit markets. Capital account 
liberalisation might thus be premature. 
5. Imperfect Competition: In most countries competition in the banking 
sector is limited. In the loan market, borrowers face a limited number of suppliers. 
Further, a customer of bank A can be considered as a good borrower due to a good 
track record but is unknown to bank B and his project is judged riskier by bank B 
and bank competition is restricted. 
120 E. g ICT, biotechnology, cotton spinning mills, textile and garments. 
121 This is a paradox if compared to developed countries where agriculture has been subsidized for 
several decades. 
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6. Pareto Inefficiency: There is widespread belief that competitive markets 
lead to a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. However according to the imperfect 
information paradigm, in the credit market, those willing to pay the most might not 
be those whose expected returns are highest and this leads to credit rationing as 
described earlier. 
Further, lenders focus on their expected returns while the social returns on 
certain projects might be higher than the private returns. For instance, the social 
returns from a manufacturing borrower are higher than returns from someone 
borrowing for real estate speculation. 
Credit markets are therefore rarely Pareto efficient. Market failures are 
omnipresent and there is scope for government intervention that can make all 
individuals better off. Cho (1986) suggests that in a credit market with imperfect 
information, the removal of the interest rate ceiling and directed credit would not, in 
the absence of well-developed equity markets in developing countries, lead to full 
allocative efficiency of capital. Government may then be forced to choose a second- 
best approach in which government maintains some controls on the banking sector 
until a well-developed securities market is in place to provide finance to productive 
firms that are excluded because of credit rationing. Intervention may increase 
allocative efficiency by forcing banks to lend to borrowers who would otherwise be 
rationed out and also by taxing borrowers profit and transferring the revenues to 
depositors. Another justification for government intervention towards Pareto 
efficiency is the less pro-cyclical nature of credit from state banks. This has been 
observed in Latin America where state banks benefit from a more stable deposit base 
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because depositors consider that such banks are safer than private bank, Micco and 
Panizza (2004). 
7. Uninformed Investor: Market economies are characterised by a high 
degree of imperfections. Small degrees of information imperfections can have large 
economic consequences. Information disclosed is not always clear and timely and 
investors do not process these properly. Government can impose clear disclosure 
requirements so that financial institutions do not take advantage of uninformed 
customers. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the revised version of the financial liberalisation 
policy has adopted some ideas connected with imperfect information namely the 
strengthening of financial institutions through transparency 122 , market discipline, 
exposure limits, oversight and other stronger prudential regulations and supervision 
to avoid financial crisis. However, these are insufficient and policies bringing private 
risks in line with social risk are needed. 
"Let me be clear. Improved regulation, and increased transparency are 
clearly desirable. But we should not underestimate the difficulties or overestimate 
the effectiveness of these measures. Those who think that regulation and 
transparency are all that are needed are lookingfor cheap and easy solutions to a 
complex and serious international problem. Or alternatively, they seek solutions that 
122 Transparency did not save Scandinavia from banking-cum-currency crisis in the end of 1980s and 
beginning of 1990s. 
-115- 
are ideologically compatible with the belief in 'free markets "- in spite of the 
evidence ofthe importance ofmarketfailures... 
[Stiglitz, 1999 pp. 1514] 
As regards external liberalisation, the New-Keynesian literature highlights 
that countries that actually attract international capital are generally not the low- 
income ones but emerging economies that have reached certain strength and a 
relatively good level of savings. These additional capital flows do not necessarily go 
to productive sectors and the money is misallocated increasing the vulnerability of 
the economy, (Stiglitz, 1999a, b, c). Before succumbing to the doctrine of financial 
liberalisation, Thailand for instance, had imposed limitations on bank lending to the 
real property (speculative) market and credits were directed to productive activities. 
In the case of the S. E Asian crisis (1997-98), Collyns and Senhadji (2002) show 
evidence of a strong relationship between bank lending and real estate bubbles and 
their subsequent bust 123 . Delong and Summers (1990) argue that there is a strong 
positive correlation between investment in machinery and economic growth. This 
suggests that favouring investment in creating factories certainly provides better 
foundations for a growth strategy than building empty office space in a period of 
bubbling 124 of property prices. Potential high externalities are imposed on the 
economy when the real estate markets bubbles collapse just as in the case of the 
Dutch tulip mania (1634-1637), the stock market boom and crash of the 1920s and 
123 The effect is the related with the strength of the banking regulation. 
124 Large upward deviations in prices from fundamental value. This is caused by irrational 
exuberance and is followed by crashes. 
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the recent financial crises in emerging economies. The fact that private decisions of 
firms to channel credit to the property market and to adopt high debt equity ratios in 
periods of growth euphoria make the economy more vulnerable to shocks favours 
massive outflows of international capital. It also suggests that the problem was one 
of too little government rather than one of too much government. Government 
reduced its role by moving away from directed credit programmes but failed to put in 
place the legal regulatory structure required for bubbling capital markets. 
Governments in the USA, Europe and Japan also failed in their role towards the 
creditor firms in their countries from overlending to their S. E. Asian debtor 
counterparts. 
Financial stability can be regarded as a global public good. To improve the 
efficiency of the financial markets, Stiglitz (1989) and Summers, (1989,2000) 
suggest an extension of the concept of the Tobin Tax to the domestic financial 
market. They suggest a small ad-valorem tax on global financial transactions to deter 
short-term speculative transactions and "cool hot money". They consider that such a 
tax will not discourage long-term asset holders who are rational market participants 
and who base their trading on fundamentals and are willing to wait a long time to 
realise a return, (Stiglitz, 1989). A reform to the bankruptcy law to differentiate 
between an individual bankruptcy and a systemic bankruptcy is also proposed 
(Stiglitz 1999 b, c). The idea is to transfer the burden of proof on the creditors who 
have to establish that there was persistent mismanagement of a firm's assets. This 
allows unnecessary stripping of assets and production continues. In the case of 
systemic bankruptcy the management is maintained and the capital is restructured to 
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turn the creditors into equity holders. Bankruptcy law then acts as a circuit breaker 
leading to a standstill. In Mauritius the existing legislation in case of corporate 
insolvency is biased towards liquidation and financial institutions have important 
preferential creditor rights. The New-Keynesian approach aims at reducing the 
volatility of capital flows, reducing the discrepancy between private and social return 
and bringing private risks in line with social risk. 
The market imperfection argument also applies to external liberalisation and 
can, in a context of capital account liberalisation, lead to financial instability. 
Banking crises in recent years have not been on the liability side with bank runs as 
per the Diamond and Dybvig model but on the asset side with deterioration of banks' 
assets. Because of asymmetry of information hot money is likely to continue flowing 
in an economy affected by a high level of non-performing loan and contribute to 
financial fragility. When much later current account deficits are perceived as 
unsustainable 125 with relatively low foreign reserves to defend the exchange rate a 
currency attack is triggered. Massive outflows then weakens the exchange rate 
considerably and banks face an increased foreign currency debt creating a twin crisis, 
banking-cum-currency, a phenomenon that has been found to be very common in 
financially liberalised emerging economies, (Glick and Hutchinson, 1999). 
Stiglitz (1999a) argues that in S. East Asia because of asymmetry of 
information investors could not distinguish between healthy firms and financial 
123 Current account deficit in Thailand rose from 5.7% to 8.4%GDP in 1995. In Korea the change 
was from 1.5% in 1994 to 4.6% in 1996. In Malaysia current account deficit reached 8.8% GDP in 
1995. 
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institutions and those that are not. Consequently healthy firms could not retain access 
to credit. 
Collier and Mayer (1989) argue for a form of sequencing that takes into 
account market failures and their evolution in undeveloped financial systems. At an 
early stage Collier and Mayer argue that government should assist in the creation of 
intermediaries to provide access to a broader set of domestic sources of finance. At 
this stage interest-rate ceilings and capital controls should be imposed. Liberalisation 
is to start when a significant number of firms of high repute have been established. 
Control can then be lifted and competition between financial institutions encouraged. 
Finally when the country has established an international reputation, capital account 
liberalisation can start. Along similar lines, the Tarrapore Committee (1997) 
suggested that capital account convertibility in India needed to be preceded by the 
establishment of a liberalised, well-supervised domestic financial system. Rodrik 
(1998) shows evidence that countries without capital account control do not grow 
faster. 
New-Keynesian economics highlights that in the modem economy 
availability of credit is important as most transaction is by credit. In economic 
downturns as in the S. E. Asian crisis the use of restrictive monetary policy as 
suggested by the IMF to Thailand to attract back hot money or reduce its outflows 
proved to be ineffective. It is unlikely that a depressed economy will attract capital 
inflows through high interest policies. Worse, it pushed highly leveraged firms to 
bankruptcy and plunged the economy into a deep recession. Given that many firms 
get credit from other firms and give credit to still others, a shock to one can lead to a 
-119- 
cascade of bankruptcy leading to bank failure as firms are unable to service their 
loans. Focus should then be on maintaining the level of credit, avoiding higher 
interest rate charges to firms, adopting debt-stills and corporate financial 
restructuration and stimulating the real economy. In the case of S. E. Asia, recovery 
has been facilitated by Japan's Miyszawa initiative providing billions in trade credit. 
Contrary to the McKinnon and Shaw paradigm, the New-Keynesian micro- 
economic based analysis considers that the existence of market failures arising from 
asymmetric information provides a rationale for government intervention in financial 
markets. It is even suggested that in developing countries, a small financial 
repression rather than the traditional large repression can influence growth 
positively, reduce prospects of bankruptcy, volatility and direct more credit to the 
real economy. 
The New-Keynesian literature does not associate instability with the 
existence of a highly uncertain future as in the pure Keynesian tradition. A hybrid 
framework is adopted comprising a Neo-Classical methodology of rational 
expectations but enriched with the concept of asymmetric information and other 
forms of market imperfections. This contributes to erode the belief in the Walrasian 
vision of private markets. The Neo-Classical prescription of reducing the role of the 
state in the financial markets to one of levelling the playing field is also rejected. A 
role is defined for the state in dealing with market failures, to avoid crises since 
capitalist economies without a strong government role are prone to frequent crises, 
(Stiglitz, 1999b). 
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In spite of virulent attacks from some Post-Keynesian quarters labelling new- 
Keynesianism as bastard Keynesianism 126 betraying the true Keynesian thinking, 
there could exist some complementarity between the two schools in terms of 
policies. Fazzari and Variato (1994) argue that although the Ncw-Keynesians share 
some methodological basis with the Neo-Classicals, they do not share substance. 
4.4 Post-Keynesianism: Domestic and International Instability 
The Post-Keynesian school draws on three main traditions; 
I. Stress on uncertainty, from Marshall, (189 1) 
2. Stress on the role of effective demand but making the distribution of 
income the starting point for effective demand failure from A Kalecki (1950). 
3. Stress on the role of various uncertainty reducing institutions 127 as a 
response to the absence of information the market cannot provide. This reveals the 
influence of institutionalist thinking from Veblen (1899). 
4.4.1 Uncertainty and Domestic Instability 
Building on Myrdal's banking principle 128, the Post-Keynesian body of 
literature assumes money supply to be endogeneous, responding to credit needs. 
Post-Keynesians also highlight the importance of profit expectations and cost-push 
factors in causing changing credit needs and consider the independent ability of 
126 The label is from J. Robinson. 
1 27 E. g wage contract, debt contract, trade agreements, administered prices. 129 Myrdal (1939) observes that changes in economic activity alter the credit needs of industrial firms 
and hence alter the amount of credit created by the banking system and, by extension change, the 
money supply. 
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financial institutions to fulfill the demand for credit and create money. Increased 
lending to meet credit needs is accompanied by increased deposits, which require a 
higher level of reserve requirements. To avoid liquidity and solvency problems to 
spread through the financial system, the central bank has to permissively supply the 
necessary reserves by granting access to the discount window and by open market 
operations. This stabilising function denies the central bank the possibility of 
controlling the monetary base and this will be again discussed in relation to Minsky's 
argument later in this chapter. 
Inspite of the development of revised versions of the financial liberalisation 
argument (Chapter 2), Post-Keynesians suggest that financial liberali I sation in itself 
could be a cause for greater fragility in developing and emerging economies. Akyuz 
and Kotte (1991) show evidence that a high interest rate policy can result in lower 
aggregate savings when the effect of income distribution, tax treatment of interest 
payment and corporate financial distress are taken into account. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1999) suggest that its theoretical foundations are weak, and that even 
where necessary preconditions, such as effective supervision or macroeconomic 
stability, exist, financial liberalisation could still become the main source of financial 
crises. Crotty and Lee (2002) argue that in Korea the demise of a well-working state- 
led, bank-based and closed system'29 led to a change in the power-relationship 
between government and domestic and international capital which resulted in 
financial crisis in 1997 and threatens Korea's long-term rate of capital accumulation. 
Post-Keynesians also argue that the incorporation of the New-Keynesian insights of 
129 Closed capital account. 
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asymmetry of information does not salvage the case for financial liberalisation that is 
considered as ultimalely growth-distorting. Further, while New-Keynesians consider 
borrowers as having perfect knowledge and uncertainty as being asymmetric and 
falling on the supply side, Post-Keynesians consider uncertainty to prevail 
symmetrically on both sides of financial markets. 
The Post-Keynesian analysis opposes the rational expectations approach that 
keeps a focus on a world where events are driven by some independent and relatively 
stable stochastic process. In such a framework, expectations do not affect the real 
world. Uncertainty is treated as in gambling where statistical inferences allow 
predicting the future on the basis of an unchanging population. It is then assumed 
that a stationary stochastic process produces realisations that are equivalent to 
random sampling with replacement. The Post-Keynesian framework is based on 
endogenous expectations and economic events are produced by non-stationary, non- 
ergodicl 30 processes making it implicit that the standard theory of statistical 
inference does not apply, Davidson (1982). Unlike gamblers in a casino, individuals 
taking decisions in the real world cannot specify fully the population of all possible 
outcomes and the capital development of a country is not to be taken as the activities 
of a casino as argued by Keynes (1936). 
Davidson (1998a, b) argues that lenders do not, in a probabilistic sense, have 
knowledge oý the functional relationship between loan interest and the composition 
of projects available for financing. Lenders' assessment of current interest rates and 
future default rates cannot be reliably predicted from past behaviour as per the 
130 A process where agents realise that the future cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of any given existing data. 
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rational expectations principle of the New-Classical economics. The Post-Keynesian 
analysis rests on Keynes' explanation of the existence of speculative activity. 
Economic events are time dependent and even if past probability distributions are 
constructed, these are non-stationary and thus not objective and as such can but 
provide only limited insights into the future. Keynes (1936) argued that even though 
we do not know the information needed to make optimal and safe decisions, we have 
a psychological need to behave in a manner which "saves our faces" as rational 
economic men. Keynes suggests that people develop a collective conventional 
process of expectations and confidence formation based on habit, tradition and 
instinct. Two key conventions according to Keynes are that: 
1. We assure that the past is a more service guide to the future than a candid 
examination of past experience would show it to have hitherto been. 
2. Knowing that an individual judgement is worthless, we endeavour to fall 
back on the judgement of the rest of the world, which is perhaps better informed. 
However, conventional wisdom is not static and the evaluation by agents 
about whether investment is reasonable or not changes with "feeling" over time. 
Ideas about the future are marked by waves of optimism and pessimism and 
investors actions are driven by animal spirit 131 rather than rational expectations. Post- 
Keynesian models, unlike Neo-Classicals and New-Keynesian models embody non- 
ergodic stochastic processes. They are thus characterised by systemic risk or 
uncertainty and consider that any event can trigger 'bandwagon behaviour'. No one 
131 Whims or spontaneous urge to action related to profit expectations. 
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can guarantee that a depression or hyperinflation or a collapse of financial asset 
prices will not take place at some future date. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated as 
such but can only be reduced by asset diversification by borrowers and lenders and 
by the process of conventional expectations formation 132 
" nat may appear to the agent ex ante as a highly diversified (and therefore 
relatively risk- f firee) portfolio may in fact experience signi cant ex post losses when 
the boom comes to an end'. 
[Crotty, 1996 pp. 333] 
Today, derivatives transactions render risks more complex. Although large 
hedge funds offer some players a protection against certain risks others players take 
these risks. The near collapse in 1998 of LTCM, one of the biggest players in the 
world's future exchanges both in equity and debt instruments, shows the dangers of 
high leverage, over-reliance on theoretical market-risk models 133 and reminds us of 
the limits of the rational expectations framework. 
Hyman Minsky (1963,1967,1978,1992) developed the financial instability 
hypothesis arguing that the financial system evolves naturally from a stable to an 
unstable position and that stability is ephemeral and destabilising. Apparent stability 
generates changes in expectations. Minsky considers that the real problem of 
economic units is the question of liquidity for survival rather than maximising profit 
or utility within a budget constraint. Because cash inflows from productive assets 
132 In normal times the expectations of the majority of agents is centered around a consensus forecast, thereby 
creating a high degree of expected covariance among assets and most assets are expected to do well 133 There was an assumption that the portfolio was sufficiently diversified across world markets to 
produce low correlation 
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inevitably fall short of outflows from time to time, firms inevitably issue financial 
assets to trade future cash flows. Although it eases the liquidity issue, debt-finance 
leads to the "upward instability" of capitalism. During growth periods entrepreneur's 
expectations about future returns are optimistic and firms' robust position make them 
increase indebtedness dramatically relative to inside capital and adopt a financial 
leverage position that cannot be validated should the events prove to be less 
favourable. A hedge (robust) position exists when firms have a positive net cash flow 
and can meet financial obligations and firms are then considered financially safe 
even though profitability may be low. However, should events prove to be less 
favourable than expected as in the case of a recession, firms move to a speculative 
(fragile) position with expected net cash flow being for a certain period of time 
positive while realised cash flow being negative. Firms will then seek additional 
credit to meet obligations. As expectations are disappointed, financial arrangements 
are disrupted. From a speculative position firms are pushed to a Ponzi position, 
which is a situation where expected cash flows are negative and firms' commitments 
are chronically above projected cash flows. Firms are then forced to increase their 
outstanding borrowing to meet financial obligations. A Ponzi finance posture 
increases the risks of systemic breakdown because of interrelated financial 
obligations and firms have to sell assets to pay loans. Further, the disposal of assets 
may lead to a drop in asset prices making the adjustment harder and sometimes 
"Ponzi" firms turn bankrupt. Such shifts from safe to weak positions can be due to 
various reasons, some of which are: - 
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(a) Refinancing on less favourable terms because either lenders become more 
concerned about their position or the central bank is adopting a tighter monetary 
stance to head off perceived inflation. 
(b) Any exogenous shock, e. g. an oil price shock. 
(c) Some expected income flows are not forthcoming for any number of 
reasons. 
The above arguments reflect an endogenous view of money responding to the 
credit needs of the economy. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is in fact 
institutional in nature and deals with the financial institutional arrangements and the 
evolution of behaviour in a world of uncertaint . It shows that the free market system . Py 
is not inherently stable as per the orthodoxy but that it is subject to explosive 
oscillations because growth over the cycle affects behavioural patterns in a way that 
promotes instability. This analysis enriches the traditional Keynesian multiplier- 
accelerator analysis. The Ponzi trap is a dilemma because on the one hand firms face 
higher costs of debt servicing and on the other hand costs are higher due to increased 
size of debt over time. As debts accumulate, firms are no longer borrowing to 
finance higher output levels, but just to maintain solvency. Minsky argues that in a 
Ponzi-boorn situation, banks tend to persist in lending because of self-interest. They 
actually want to ensure that borrower firms do not face bankruptcy as this represents 
a threat to their own solvency. Eventually banks' loan portfolios deteriorate with an 
accumulation of non-performing loans and this contributes to the instability of the 
banking sector. 
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The shift from a "Hedge" to a "Speculative" and subsequently to a "Ponzi" 
posture is independent of financial liberalisation policies and applies to any 
developed capitalist economy. However, the accompanied development of long-term 
finance 134 and more immediately the rise in interest rate following liberalisation 
make the analysis relevant to the developing countries undergoing liberalisation. 
Higher interest rates following financial liberalisation increases the cost of debt 
contracted under a previous set of expectations. Higher payments obligation often 
put a constraint on production as firms reduce consumption. Subsequently, lower 
sales receipts and higher debt servicing push firms into a Ponzi game. 
Further, as financial deepening follows liberalisation, new instruments are 
created transforming ownership of claims into easily traded ones with the new 
institutions and technology available today. This liquidity position allows any 
investor to react to changes in mood and rumours by shuffling ownership among the 
various competing assets of his portfolio with a view to realising immediate large 
gains. The investor does so by anticipating future sentiments of other market players. 
The economy benefits from the advantages of liquidity but the cost is short-sighted 
speculation. In their chase for higher returns, firms may divert resources from their 
primary activities to financing speculative activities. In various countries there has 
been an increase in interest rates underpinned by a growth in demand for loans. At 
firms' level there has been high borrowing for financing mergers, acquisitions, 
purchase of privatised assets, and acquisition of equity shares for portfolio 
diversification. At the household level as well there has been rising debt leverage for 
134 Otherwise the Minskian's transformation to fragility posture does not occur. 
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acquisition of financial assets. Such moves have very often resulted in run-ups in 
stock and real estate price indices and growth of Ponzi activities while short-termism 
pushes players to focussing on rapid increases in share values to the detriment of 
long-term productivity and employees' interests. 
Minsky argues that the endogeneous instability breeding dynamics can be 
interrupted by institutional interventions acting as circuit breakers and restarting the 
economy on a new path with new initial conditions. He suggests that through its 
willingness to intervene and to provide liquidity whenever there is pressure for 
"firesales" of assets that would cause prices to plummet the central bank places a 
floor on asset prices. 
Therefore according to the Post-Keynesian analysis institutional intervention 
serves as a counter-cyclical policy. The Central Bank should stand ready to inject the 
reserves needed to accommodate the credit needs of the Ponzi boom to avoid a 
systemic panic. In downswings monetary policy should therefore provide liquidity 
and prevent an interest rate rise. Minsky considered it more appropriate for the 
central bank to provide the reserves by a greater use of the discount window than by 
open market operations as this allows the central bank to reward prudent bank 
practices with more favourable terms. Minsky also suggested that the discount 
window could be opened to other financial institutions such as life insurance 
companies. 
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In the case of the LTCM which had taken long positions in illiquid securities 
and short positions in more liquid securities 135 a consortium of banks acted as lenders 
of next-to-last resort and bailed it out and the Fed (central bank) stood behind the 
banks ready to provide liquidity until the market became more calm. Many 
commentators were surprised by the indirect bailing out of a hedge fund by the 
central bank. Had the central bank behaved in a traditional manner and refrained 
from bailing out, the forced liquidation of LTCM highly leveraged bond, equity, and 
derivatives positions would have had dramatic effects. Because the operations of the 
LTCM as a market-maker was very closely entangled with those of other security 
dealers the central bank was therefore refinancing the market-making system. 
Not all Post-Keynesians adhere strictly to the argument that the central banks 
must always accommodate the desired reserves to avoid financial crisis. Jao (1989) 
argues that Central banks will be more accommodative if the economy is not fully 
employed and the inflation rate is low. 
The elimination of the source of a Ponzi boom and reduction of short-run 
welfare losses warrants intervention. The monetary authorities can actually re- 
impose interest rate ceilings and firms can be subjected to capital restructuration with 
write-off by banks of significant amounts of non-performing loans. These non- 
performing loans can then be managed under a fund operated by the central bank. As 
compensation, banks get easy access to the discount windows with the central bank 
acting as a lender of I st and last resort. Such a policy is however considered by the 
"s LCTM was taking a position on international level whenever there was a liquidity spread with the 
intention of capturing the spread over some time horizon. 
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New-Classicals as unwarranted obstructionism causing market distortions and 
sending wrong signals to investors both domestically and internationally. A non- 
accommodating position is in line with a liberalisation policy, which reduces access 
to the discount window by greater use of open market operation so as to influence 
the liquid position of banks and foster the development of primary and secondary 
markets. 
A deficiency of accommodation may however lead to a debt deflation as 
firms being unable to meet their obligations divest or go bankrupt. A non- 
accommodating policy can therefore put an end to the Ponzi boom and restore price 
stability but at the cost of very high loss in output, employment and more generally 
public welfare. 
Governments also engage in Ponzi financing. One of the objectives of 
liberalising the capital account in Turkey was to facilitate the financing of the public 
sector deficit without crowding out the private sector. This led government to offer 
high interest debt instruments (bills and bonds) to attract international capital. In 
Turkey, interest payment on debts absorbed less than 20% of the tax revenue by the 
end of the 1980s while by the end of the 1990s this figure rose to 75%136 showing 
that new debt instruments were needed to meet existing obligations. 
Da Costa E Silva (2002) adopts Minsky's Cycle in an open macroeconomic 
context by taking a country as a large company and shows how a sound emerging 
economy receiving increased capital inflow resembles a firm taking more credit in 
the pursuit of profit opportunities similar to a firm as per Minky's domestic approach 
136 PSBR rose from 7% to 24% of the GDP over the same period. 
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for firms. Capital inflow and growth of a country leads to a self-reinforcing process, 
causing an increase in the fragility of the country and in the probability of currency 
crisis. 
4.4.2 Post-Keynesianism and External Liberalisation 
Today, industrial countries have largely liberalised their capital accounts 
while many developing countries retain various controls over capital flows and there 
is mixed evidence that capital account liberalisation promote long-run growth. Some 
commentators observe that all crises from the mid 1990s onward (Mexico, South 
East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey) have in fact been capital-account 
dominated, (Leite, 2001). There is still no consensus in the literature on this issue. 
When the Bretton Woods agreement was designed, with the fixed exchange 
regime, the dominant economic thinking was that free capital mobility is 
incompatible with free multilateral trade and full employment. Capital control was an 
embedded element of the articles of the I. M. F under the influence of Keynes. 
Keynes' preference for capital control originates from his belief that: 
"Footloose flow of capital assumes that it is right and desirable to have an 
equalisation of interest rate in all parts of the world, In my view the whole 
management of the domestic economy depends upon being free to have the 
appropriate interest rate without reference to the rates prevailing in the rest of the 
world. Capital control is a corollary to this" 
[Keynes, Volume 25, pl. 49] 
-132- 
After the oil shocks in the 1970's and the stagflation that followed, the Neo- 
Classical efficient-market hypothesis gained momentum. It became widely accepted 
that floating exchange rates and free capital mobility would improve welfare benefits 
by reducing the cost of capital globally, curbing domestic policies that distort factor 
prices, offering possibilities for risk diversification and promoting financial 
development. These are supposed to facilitate capital accumulation in developing 
countries and accelerate their economic development. 
"To the extent that international financial integration represents an 
improvement in financial intermediation . ....... [perhaps] because institutions 
involved in the transfer of capital across jurisdictions improve efficiency with which 
capital is allocated, it offers a potential significant increase in economic efficiency" 
[Summers, 2000 pp. 3] 
However, unregulated capital flows could facilitate the occurrence and 
spreading of currency crises and as argued by Bhagwati (1998), substantial gains 
from capital controls have been asserted, not demonstrated. 
Post-Keynesians consider that flexible exchange rates coupled with 
liberalisation of capital accounts provide an incentive for gains through currency 
speculation. Grabel (1995) argues that financial liberalisation leads towards 
speculation-led economic development characterized by risky investment practice 
and unsound financial structures. Weller (2001) argues that after financial 
liberalisation as greater liquidity is used increasingly for unsustainable, speculative 
expansions emerging economies become more vulnerable to both currency and 
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banking crises. Additionally, financial liberalisation is growth distorting to the extent 
that under such a regime firms tend to get involved in short-term directly 
unproductive profit-seeking activities to the detriment of real sector economic 
growth. 
In the Keynesian perspective, the volatility of financial markets is largely 
endogenous and is generated by bandwagon overbidding and herd-like dumping of 
financial assets under uncertainty. In the foreign exchange market too players adopt 
similar strategies after the removal of capital control. Deregulated stock markets also 
turned these countries and other emerging economies into attractive places for "hot 
money" before the 1997/98 crisis. 
" With the removal of all restrictions on international capitalflows in a world 
offlexible exchange rates, the internationalfinancial transactions have grown thirty 
times asfast as the growth in international trade. Today internationalfinancialflows 
dominate trade payments and exchange rate movements rej7ect changes in 
speculative position rather than changes in trade patterns" 
[Davidson, P. 1998 - 639-662] 
The average daily turnover in the global forex market was estimated to be at 
1.88 trillion US$ in April 2004 as compared to 1.12 trillion US$ in April 1995, (BIS 
2004). While three decades back 80% of all forex transactions were related to trade 
and investment, today above 80% of these transactions are for unproductive 
speculative short-term interest/exchange rate speculation. Enormous portfolio flows 
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to the Latin American economies helped to generate a stock market boom and 
leaving aside short-term fluctuations, Mexico's share index rose from 250 in 1989 to 
around 2500 in 1994. But as pointed out by Krugman (1995), these portfolio flows to 
Latin America were not responding to fundamentals but represented a misplaced 
euphoria and a herd instinct. It is to be observed that in spite of the huge capital 
flows to Mexico, the rate of economic growth during the 1990-1994 period was only 
2.5% which was almost the same as the population growth. Stock markets have been 
playing a crucial role in the speculative process. 
Felix (1997,2000,2001) observes that speculation creates two 
inconveniences: 
(1) The power of Central Banks to counter-speculate collectively against 
unwanted exchange rate movements has been dramatically weakened. 
(2) A second consequence is that the Neo-Classical predicted savings on 
foreign currencies, as countries would no more have to protect the rate, did not 
materialise. In fact after the removal of capital controls, the ratio of official reserves 
to exports has increased because of requirements in trying to defend against volatility 
of capital flows. 
Felix further observes that with increased volatility, hedging exchange risk 
has become an important innovative activity. However, he argues that hedging apart 
from involving a cost, equally promotes a new vehicle for speculation by MNCs and 
financial institutions involved in the 'big gamble'. While individuals attempt to 
protect their position through hedging, the process renders exchange rate volatility 
self-generating and affects trade and investment adversely. According to Felix, in an 
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era of capital control whenever market players anticipate higher inflation from a 
monetary expansion, holders of long-term bonds can only shift to domestic equities 
or to short-term bonds. This move then reinforces the effort of the monetary 
authority to lower short-term rates. With liberalisation of the capital account, 
portfolio investors rapidly move from domestic into foreign securities and interest 
arbitrating across currencies by financial institutions will partly nullify the Central 
Bank's effort to reduce short-term interest. Financial globalisation then renders the 
manipulation of monetary aggregates ineffective. 
Capital flows in fact inflate asset prices that in turn boost imports and 
inflation in a speculative climate of euphoria. Financial institutions increase lending 
and contribute to the bubbling of assets 137 . But as usual the bubble sooner or later 
busts as speculators lose their nerves and turn against the currency which then 
overshoots in the opposite direction: 
"The momentforeign investors loose their nerve, which only requires a small 
shock; or negative development, 'hot-money' will disappear into safer heavens. In 
the process asset prices will collapse. Companies that were involved in speculative 
activities will find themselves bankrupt as a result of the collapse of asset prices. 
Financial institutions which hitherto were solvent and liquid, willfind themselves not 
only illiquid but also insolvent because many of their loans become doubtful 
overnight, a view that is close the Minsky's "Financial instability" hypothesis 
137 Even the traditionally prudent institutions join the speculative movement in fear of loosing market 
share. 
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(Minsky 1982). Their problems would be compounded if they also happen to have 
unhedgedforeign liabilities in their balance sheets, as a result of the collapse of the 
exchange rate. " 
[Arestis and Demetriades, 1999, pp. 441] 
Da Costa E Silva (2002) argues that evidence suggests that the various 
currency crises related with capital movements are in fact Minskian in nature with 
capital inflows preceding them and creating the condition to subsequently trigger the 
crises. 
The recession effect of the collapse of the bubbles does not only involve a 
private cost but equally a high social cost. Government often pays the depositors 
partly or in full regardless of the existence of a formal system of deposit insurance. 
The cost to the taxpayers has been very high in several crises - 8%GDP in Finland, 
1991-93; 13.5% in Mexico, 1995; 34.5% in Indonesia, 1997-98 (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996 and World Bank 1999); 13% GDP in Venezuala in 1995 
(Sundararajan, 1996). The 1994 Mexican crisis led to a 7% contraction in real G. D. P 
in Mexico in 1995. In the S. E. Asian Crisis in 1998, the Indonesian GDP contracted 
by 18% and around II million people lost their jobs. In Turkey around 500 000 jobs 
were lost in the 2001 crisis and several companies cut wages by 30-40% to be able to 
remain in business and retain their workforce. Additionally, the economic slump 
leads to lower tax revenue and governments are forced to cut back on social and 
welfare programmes. The boom-bust financial cycle warrants some regulations of 
international capital flows so as to prevent a feast or famine situation leading to 
international or regional systemic crises. 
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The Post-Keynesian school generally 138 supports the Tobin Tax approach 
although Davidson expresses reserves about its effectiveness. Davidson, 
(1987,1998b) cast doubts about the effectiveness of a weak 0 . 01% tax as a deterrent 
to short-run round trip speculation on exchange rate movements while a 0.5% tax 
would have an important tariff effect on trade. 
"Under the currentflexible exchange rate system, there may befour or more 
hedgingfinancial transactions involved in any single arms-length international trade 
transaction. This exceeds the two financial transactions implicit in a proverbial 
short-term speculative (non-hedged) round-trip. That Tobin's tax advocates use to 
promote supportfor their tax. If this 2 to I ratio is anywhere near correct, a 0.5 
percent Tobin's Tax could be equivalent to instituting an additional 2 percent 
universal tariff on all goods and services traded in the global economy. It would 
appear that a Tobin transaction tax might throw larger grains of sand into the 
wheels of international real commerce than it does into speculative hot moneyflows. 
[Davidson, 1998, pp. 639-662] 
Davidson therefore suggests an alternative solution in the form of an 
international clearing union providing for capital control and a credible social buffer- 
stock institution acting as market maker capable of assuring portfolio managers that 
exchange rates will remain stable over time. By announcing that it will "swim 
against any developing consensus view of a changed market psychology" the market 
maker modifies the uncertain environment, provides an anchor for market 
138 The debate being in the macroeconomic area, some differences of appreciation are bound to exist. 
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psychology and prevents any bandwagon tide leading to disruptive speculation and 
allows firms to firmly face uncertainty. This implies a new form of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rate mechanism where unlike the Bretton Woods arrangement, 
the burden of adjustment is on the surplus nation to create the international liquidity 
necessary of continued stability and growth. That is just another type of institution 
needed by capitalist economies as per Minsky's arguments to provide floors and 
ceilings on expectations of asset prices and hold back instability. 
"If the majority of market participants believe in the market makers' buffer- 
stock approach, the only speculators that could exist would befools, that is, a small 
group of offsetting bulls and bears who disagree with the vast majority of market 
participants but whose actions cannot affect market movements. to 
[Davidson, 1998, pp. 639-662] 
The market maker idea just the Tobin Tax approach aim at addressing the 
volatile characteristic of the forex market and its adverse impact on real variables. A 
very interesting aspect of Davidson's market maker is that its application is not 
restricted to the foreign exchange market but is relevant to the overall financial 
market which needs an "anchor" to prevent the inherent destabilizing bandwagon 
tide which is a natural behaviour in a non-ergodic stochastic system. The market 
maker plays a much more active role than a lender of last resort. It intervenes as soon 
as the market starts becoming "disorderly". 
Empirical evidence shows that the case for freely flowing short-term capital 
has not been made especially as the international financial system has until now been 
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unable to respond rapidly to short-term liquidity crises which in many cases ended in 
solvency crises. The debate for the creation of an institution capable of taking up this 
challenge as well as the debate about the re-introduction of some form of capital 
restriction remains on the agenda. 
As pointed out by Arestis and Demetriades (1999), time has come to "drop 
the utopian assumptions altogether and work within real-world constraints, rather 
than insists that the world should change to fit theoretical models, biases and 
preconceptions. In theoretical tertýs this means developing models that take into 
account institutional weaknesses, information relatedproblems and such. " 
[Ibid, 441-447. ] 
The idea of a market maker institution is indeed very ambitious but 
practically infeasible at this stage of economic integration. This idea is in line with 
Keynes' initial "bancoe' plan 139 and the creation of a supranational central bank as 
proposed at the Bretton Woods conference 140. In respect to very long-term solutions 
that can not be implemented at this stage it is appropriate to refer to the New- 
Keynesian writer Blinder's remarks: 
"Grandiose schemes involving elaborate international institutions tend to get 
nowhere fast. Regardless of its merits, no world central bank will he created in my 
lifetime. Even establishing a global financial super-regulator, a far modest step, 
139 A common world currency. 140 The final agreement rejected this but retained the basic idea of not allowing any nation to 
surrender control of its banking and fiscal policy. 
-140- 
would require an implausible surrender of national sovereignty. And an 
international bankruptcy court would require coordination among nations that have 
very different bankruptcy laws. Better to stick with more modest plans that require 
little or no institution-building. 77; e world's poor cannot waitfor grand edifice to be 
built. " 
[Blinder, 1999 pp. 3 I]. 
Blinder stresses the need to look for some shorter-term reforms that protect 
innocent poor people, who do not contribute to the speculative excesses but yet bear 
the burden of a financial collapse. It is however important to pave the way for a more 
stable long-term solution. 
4.5 Summary 
Different alternative schools of thought on financial liberalisation, growth and the 
volatility issue in both stock and currency markets have been discussed. In Chapters 
Two and Three the theoretical backing to the growth promoting financial 
liberalisation process was discussed. In Chapter Four the New-Structuralist growth 
impeding argument of financial liberalisation reducing the availability of loanable 
funds as well as the maintenance of an important presence of government in the 
financial sector in developing countries as professed by both New-Keynesian and 
Post-Keynesian schools of thought have been examined. The conflicting benefit and 
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cost effects of financial liberalisation have been reviewed, the thesis will now move 
towards presenting the financial liberalisation process in Mauritius. 
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Chapter 5 
THE MAURITIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
5.1. An Overview 
Prior to the mid 1980s, the financial sector was composed mainly of 
commercial banks, Insurance Companies, the Sugar Insurance Fund 141 , the National 
Pension Fund and several small friendly societies such as co-operative credit unions, 
provident/benevolent funds and other mutual aid associations. The mutual friendly 
societies provide micro uncollaterised credit to their members mainly for the 
purchase of consumer durables and housing renovation. 
As part of the modemisation of the Mauritian economy after the stabilising 
programme phase, that started by the end of the 1970s, financial reforms were 
undertaken nearly one decade later. In conformity with a supply-leading approach, 42 
several new institutions offering new products were established as from the end of 
the 1980s. Some of the new institutions created were the Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius, leasing companies, collective investment institutions, venture capital fund 
and offshore Banks and offshore business entities. Transparency of banks' operations 
has in recent years undergone a process of improvement 143 . Adequate and reliable 
telecommunication network covering the whole island has allowed the adoption of 
technology in the banking industry. Modernization of the national payment system 
has followed not only with increased electronic funds transfer point-of-sale terminals 
14 ' The SIF provides insurance cover to sugar planters against cyclone, drought or outbreak of crop 
disease. The Insurance Act does not apply to the Sugar Insurance Fund Board. 142 Patrick's debate, 1966 - see chapter 2. 143 This is discussed in chapter 7 (Disclosures to the central bank and to the public) 
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for retail transactions but also with the development of a real-time gross settlement 
system (RTGS) for high value interbank payments. The Mauritius Automated 
Clearing and Settlement System (MACSS)144 links all domestic banks and the 
ministry of finance 145 to the BOM through a reliable international payment system 
infrastructure, the SWIFT. Around 70% of total interbank settlements are made by 
electronic means through the real-time gross settlement and so the liquidity 
management of customers has improved due to the reduced uncertainty associated 
with cheque presentation and delayed clearing. New legislations governing payment 
systems and taking into account electronic means of payment have been adopted and 
banking supervision strengthened 146. Interbank clearing of "low-value" cheques at 
the Port Louis Automated Clearing House 147 (PLACH) is done twice daily on a net 
basis and settlement is through the accounts that the banks maintain at the BOM 
using the MACSS. Mauritius has participated in the joint IMF/World Bank Financial 
Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) and the report 148 observes a high level of 
compliance with international norms and practices and considers that overall the 
financial sector is currently in good health with short-term stability risks being 
modest. Today, the financial industry in Mauritius, with below 9000149 direct jobs 
and just below 10% share of the GDP, provides a blend of services through different 
institutions as illustrated in the chart below. 
144 MACSS is owned and operated by the central bank. 14' The ministry of finance uses the MACSS platform for collecting revenues (Income tax, customs 
and excise duty) as well as National Pension Fund Contributions. 
146 Strengthening of supervision is being examined in section 4.3 of this chapter. 147 The Port Louis Clearing House is part of the BOM. The standardization of cheques by the use of 
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) technology now allows automation of the cheque 
clearing process. 
14' The FSAP mission completed its report in September 2002. 149 Below 2% of the labour force. 
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Figure 1.5 
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153 95% of the occupational pension funds are administered/insured by insurers. The remaining ones 
are self-administered. 
154 A compulsory non-contributory (only employers contribute) defined contribution scheme set up 
in 1994 and providing a lump-sum to all employees. 
155 These funds are in most cases mutual organisations providing a lump sum upon retirement. 
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The network of financial services has been significantly improved over the 
last 15 years. The changes look similar to what have taken place in developed 
economies with insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and other 
financial institutions/instruments competing increasingly with banks for national 
savings. 
However, the domestic banking sub-sector remains dominant with total assets 
of amounting to Rs 160 billion as at December 2003 as compared to Rs35bn for the 
insurance sector, the second largest sub-sector. The size of the financial sector is 
estimated at around Rs490bn 156 and a break down is shown below. 
Table 1.5 
Assets of Major Financial Institutions - Dec 2003 
Assets 
(Rm) 
% GDP 
Banks Category I Banks 160,986 102.6 
Category 2 Banks 188,253""' 119.9 
Development Bank 13,185 8.4 
1 Post Office Savings bank* 1,811 1.2 
Central Bank 44,402 2.8 
NBFI Insurance Companies 32,592 20.8 
Occupational Pension Schemes 18,239 11.6 
Leasing Companies 8,479 5.4 
Fund/Investment/Portfolio 
anagement 
1,705 1.1 
National Pension Fund 25900 16.4 
National Savings Fund 1 4170 2.6 
'source LfUm, FSC, 
* Jume 2003 
156 This figure is arrived at by offsetting for double counting caused by ownership of most leasing 
companies by banks and insurance companies and also because some 70% of occupational pension 
assets is actually insured schemes. 
'57 The balance sheet figures are in foreign currency and this figure is therefore subject to 
fluctuations due to changes in exchange rate. 
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The above table gives an indication of size and depth of both banks and 
NBFIs. Category I banks constitute around 33% of the sector as compared to 14% 
58 for contractual savings institutions' . Category I Banks and Insurance together form 
40% of the sector and the combined size of these two sub-sectors relative to the 
economy'59 has been stable over the last few years with some improvement in the 
insurance sector as shown in table 2.5 
Table 2.5 
Changes in Relative Size of Banks and Insurers 
Year Bank Assets 
(% of GDP) 
Insurance Assets 
(% of GDP) 
2000 101 18 
2001 99 18 
2002 101 18 
2003 102 121 
Z; ource: Bank ol Mauritius as AnnualKeporl, various issues; 
Report of The Controller ofInsurance, FSC. 
The rest of this chapter will introduce the domestic banking, insurance sector 
offshore sector and the security market. A deeper picture of banking development 
and stock market development will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
158 Pension & insurance institutions. 
159 As measured by GDP at current price. 
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5.2. Introducing the Domestic Banking Sector 160 
A brief history of banking in Mauritius from 1810 to 1980s and showing the 
quasi-monopoly position of the MCB (Mauritius Commercial Bank) that was finally 
diluted with the arrival of the SBM (State Bank of Mauritius) appears in Appendix 5. 
Today the Mauritian population gets good access to banking services that are widely 
spread across the island with 10 Category I banks 161 operating 145 branches, 257 
ATMs and 6 Internet sites. Around 70% of the transactions at the two big banks are 
fully automated through different channels like EFTPOS, ATM, internet and phone 
banking. The sector has also been upgraded with the opening of II offshore banks. 
The legal framework for banks 162 is embodied in the "Banking Act 2004" and banks 
have to abide by the Code of Banking Practice and are therefore expected to act 
fairly in their dealings with customers. 
While concentration is now lower than before the arrival of the SBM, the 
market is a new duopolistic one with MCB and SBM as the two big players. The 3- 
firm concentration ratio is actually around 80% and the table below provides 
information on the two-firm concentration ratio (CR2). 
160 Domestic Banks are now classified as class I bank under law. 161 Five of them being local banks, four being branches of foreign banks and one being foreign 
owned but locally incorporated. 
162 Since 2004 banks have a single licence for both domestic and offshore banking activities, 
(Banking Act 2004). 
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Table 3.5 
Market Share of MCB & SBM - fCR21 
Deposits Loans Total Assets 
Year 
Ending 
June 
Amount 
1 (Rm) 
% of 
Banking 
Sector 
Amount 
(Rm) 
% of 
Banking 
Sector 
Amountl 
(Rm) I 
% of 
Banking 
Sector 
2000 38113 1 45.5 35821 57.9 48791 42.4 
MCB 
2001 41077 44.5 40143 56.1 50090 42.3 
2002 46899 45 44475 59.4 58909 43.7 
2003 51465 44.3 48411 56.4 65019 42.1 
_ 2000 21762 25.9 19762 JL8 27340 1 23.7 
SBM 2001 23383 25.3 20493 28.5 29417 24.9 
2002 24631 23.6 20875 27.8 33931 24.5 
2003 27045 23.3 20657 24 38904 23.8 
2000 59875 71.4 55583 89.7 76131 66.1 
2001 64460 69.8 60636 84.6 79507 67.2 
SBM 2002 71530 68.6 65350 87.2 92840 68.2 
2003 178510 67.6 69068 80.4 103923 1 65.9 
. NourCe: Annual reports (MCB, SBM & BUM) 
The table confinns the duopolistic nature of the industry and also that the 
MCB remains the leader. The concentration seems to be weakening over the last four 
years though the biggest bank is less affected than its close rival. 
Interestingly, the existence of a concentrated market has not slowed down the 
banking innovation process in Mauritius. In fact, the two big banks have been 
spearheading innovation and some smaller ones have had difficulties to follow due to 
the high cost of electronic infrastructure. It is sometimes argued that concentration in 
small markets can lead to technical efficiency 163 since big banks are usually more 
technically efficient. On the other hand concentration can lead to lower access to 
credit for small firms, as bigger banks tend to be "cherry pickere'. Cetorelli and 
163 Input being measured in terms of assets and number of employees while output can be measured 
in terms of loans and advances. 
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Gambera (1999) find international evidence of a general deadweight loss in 
concentrated credit markets resulting in a reduction in the quantity of loanable funds 
as expected by conventional wisdom regarding market structure theories. 
Banking Concentration varies widely across the world and does not seem to 
be related to the level of economic development as shown by CR3 ratios in table 4.5 
Table 4.5 
International Bank Concentration Ratios CR3 Yr 1998 
Country CR3 Country CR3 
S. Africa 69 UX 50 
Zimbabwe 78 U. S. A 15 
Kenya 59 France 28 
Malaysia 44 Germany 27 
Korea 28 Sweden 71 
India 40 Australia 60 
Pakistan 71 New Zealand 77 
Mexico 40 Denmark 74 
bource: cetorem ana LiamDera, (iyyy) 
The gradual drop in CR2 (table 3.5) reveals that the revocation of the banking 
licenses of some small operators'64 in recent years has not influenced 
depositors'psychology and the latter do not seem to hold on to the two big banks. 
However, MCB and SBM still benefit from the loyalty of an important proportion of 
164 e. g MCCB, BCCI, Delphis Bank 
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depositors who believe in the "too big to fail"' doctrine and they remain in a position 
to exert an undue influence on the determination of interest rate and liquidity. The 
higher fixed costs associated with the electronic payment infrastructure and higher 
capital requirements make it more difficult for small players of domestic origin to 
penetrate the market or for an existing small domestic player to challenge the two big 
banks. The concentration ratio in the banking sector suggests an oligopolistic market 
Because the banking sector has an important impact on capital accumulation, it does 
matter whether the industry structure is competitive or concentrated. However, 
concentration is a limited measure of competitive conduct If a market is contestable 
structure does not reflect conduct. 
Contestable market theory (Baumol 1982) suggests that low entry/exit16, cost 
turns concentrated markets into contestable ones with threat of hit-and-run 
competition from potential competitors making existing players keep price at a level 
where only normal profit is earned. Further, whenever a contestable market exists, 
concentration does not necessarily affect the conduct of firms. In the case of the 
Category I banking, given the size of the market, it is very unlikely for technology to 
contribute to make markets more contestable in the short-run. It is only in the long- 
term and if the financial sector develops fiffffier in size and in depth that several 
foreign players will find it attractive to settle and compete with the two big banks. It 
must be highlighted that the license delivered to the Caisse D'Epargne'66 in January 
2004 to operate the Banque Internationale des Mascareignes We as a category I 
165 High sunk costs constitute a major exit barrier. 166 Caissc D'Epargnc is the No. 3 top Bank in France. Since 1991 that bank was operating in 
Mauritius as a Category 2 bank under the name of Banque International des Mascareignes Lt6e. 
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bank and the acquisition in April 2005 of a51% equity stake in the small Mauritian 
retail bank IOIB whose current market share is around 8% by the State Bank of 
India 167 show that international banks, specially those that were already operating as 
category 2 banks, have started to develop an interest in domestic banking activities in 
Mauritius. This entry of foreign banks coupled with the recent expansion of Barclays 
Bank in 2003 through the acquisition of the BNPI as well as the appearance of a new 
bank, the Mauritius Post and Co-operative Bank 168 following the merging of the New 
cooperative bank with the Post Office Saving Bank in 2004 set the scene for a less 
concentrated market as well as the threat of new entry in future. It is not just a matter 
of rendering the requirements for licensing less stiff because very often and perhaps 
more importantly in LDCs informational barriers contribute in preventing the 
banking sector from turning into a contestable market. 
Additionally since September 1995 some weak competition, has come from 
outside the domestic banking sector, as the financial sector is moving towards 
integration 169 . Various non-bank financial institutions have been authorized to carry 
on deposit taking business 170 and to issue certificate of deposits. In the loan market, 
offshore banks are now authorized to grant loans in foreign currencies to domestic 
players. 
16' The State Bank of India is a top bank in India and it has a declared strategy of penetrating Asia 
and Africa through acquisitions. IOIB will become a subsidiary of SBI International which has in the 
past been operating as a category 2 bank in Mauritius. 
168 While the Post Office Saving Bank did not offer a full-fledge banking service and the New 
Cooperative bank did not have any branch apart from its head office in Port-Louis, the new bank will 
allow cooperatives to conduct transactions in the 70 outlets of the Mauritius Post Ltd. 169 Prior to liberalisation, structural regulation had contributed to the segmentation of financial 
markets. 
170 Mauritius Housing Company Ltd (mortgage lending) and various leasing companies. 
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The banking concentration issue in Mauritius is compounded by the relatively 
weak level of democratisation of the economy with implications in terms of credit 
exposure to single borrowers. The sector also faces sector-wise credit portfolio 
concentration as shown below. 
Table 5.5 
Sectorwise Credit Distribution to Private sector 
(November 2004) 
Sector % Credit 
Agriculture 6.2 
Manufacturing"' 13.4 
Tourism 15 
Construction 15.9 
Traders 14.4 
Finance & Business 10.7 
Personal 9.3 
Others 15.1 
Source: BOM 
Sectorwise credit concentration is related to the degree of diversification of 
the economic base and is yet another factor that could contribute to a potential 
fragility of the banking industry should some sectors of the economy face a lean 
period. 
Of which 45% goes to the Textile & Gannent sector. 
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Under the Banking Act, banks in Mauritius get a license from the BOM for 
banking business only, i. e. accepting deposits and making loans and advances. 
However, in the wave of liberalisation and the removal of binding portfolio 
constraints the big domestic banks can now invest in listed companies subject to 
certain restrictions. They have also developed subsidiaries/affiliates engaged in 
various activities including merchant banking, offshore banking, leasing, stock 
broking, fund management, insurance agency, and trusteeship. Rather than adopting 
the universal banking route domestic banks have moved towards becoming financial 
conglomerates providing integrated financial services not only in Mauritius but also 
in the region. Such a shift from pure bank to financial supermarkets having deposit 
taking and lending activity as core business warrants stronger supervision. Both the 
MCB and the SBM are among the 10 largest banks in Africa. As clearly spelt out by 
the SBM group, its vision is "to be the leading Provider of Premier Integrated 
Financial Services in the region" (Annual report 1999, p29). Regional expansion 
actually provides an important opportunity for growth of banks since they are 
constrained by the narrowness of the domestic sector. Regional expansion also 
contributes to diversify the earning base of the domestic banks but at the same time 
expose them to other risks 172 . 
Banks occupy a central position in financial intermediation across the world 
due to their role as providers of liquidity and monitoring services. In Mauritius, the 
sector contributes to around 7% of the GDP and the level of financial intermediation 
measured by banking sector claims on the private sector as a percentage of GDP has 
172 In the some Affican countries operational risk, credit risks, political risk and foreign exchange 
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more than doubled, from 27% pre-liberalisation period 173 to 58% in the year 2003. 
This is very good by African standards but still weak compared to countries with 
developed financial sectors as shown in the table below. 
Table 6.5 
BANKING SECTOR CLAIMS ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(% of GDP, Dec 2003) 
Mauritius S. Africa Botswana Malawi Mada- New Singapore United 
gascar Zealand Kingdom 
Below Below 
58 85 20 N. A 10 122 112 148 
, Nource: ]PS2004 
It is to be noted that as a client the Mauritian government does not have a 
dominant role in the financial sector. The claims of commercial banks on 
government represent around one fifth of the claims on the private sector. Further, as 
an owner, government never had a major role, as is often the case in developing 
countries. This presence has been further weakened with the privatisation of the 
SBM and its listing on the stock exchange. As at June 2003 government directly or 
indirectly controlled only 35% of the voting rights of the SBM - [Government of 
Mauritius: 5%; State Insurance Company of Mauritius Ltd: 15% and National 
Pension Fund: 15%]. 
risks are more important than in Mauritius. 
173 Before 1985. 
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The monetary reforms affecting the banking sector as well as changes at 
regulatory and supervisory level will be examined in chapter 6. 
5.3 The Insurance Sector in Brief 
5.3.1. An Overview 
I Insurance business started in Mauritius in the 1950s and in 1960 the first law 
concerning Insurance business was passed 174 . The situation with respect to the 
institutions and categories of business is surnmarised in the following table. 
Table 7.5 
Insurers bv Cateaorv as at June 2003 
Local Foreign Total 
Long Term Insurance Business 6-n-ly775-- 3 1 4 
General Insurance Business Only 5 2 7 
Long Term and General Insurance Business 12 0 12 
1 Total 1 20 1 31 23 1 
, murce: PY(; 
Life insurance dominates over general insurance and is associated with 60% 
of the total gross premiums. Long-term insurers also administer and or insure above 
95% of the pensions schemes established by private sector entities. The insurance 
sector, just like the banking sector, is highly concentrated with SICOM Ltd & Anglo- 
Mauritius as the two big players as shown below: 
174 This legislation has now been replaced by the Insurance act 1987 with effective date, 30 th 
June1988. 
... Life insurance, pension schemes and permanent health business. 
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Table 8.5 
Share of Assets among Insurers* 
2001 2002 2003 
SICOM 36.5 37.1 38.1 
Anglo Mauritius 26.5 26.5 25.8 
British American Insurance -BAI 9.9 9.4 10.3 
Mauritius Union 5.2 5.2 5.3 
Life Insurance Corporation of India - LIC 3.9 4.1 3.9 
Albatros 3.2 3.0 3.0 
Swan 2.7 3.1 2.6 
Others 12.1 11.6 11 
Source: FSC 
* Both short and long-term insurance combined. 
The table reveals a high CR2 and CR3 of 64% and 74% respectively for year 
2003 and no major change over the last few years. The dependence on reinsurance is 
shown below. 
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Table 9.5 
Gross Premium and Reinsurance (Yr 2002-2003) 
2002 2003 
Gross annual premium (Rm) 2443 2729 
Short-Term Reinsurance Premium (Rm) 1241 1398 
Insurance Net premium (Rm) 1201 1330 
Reinsurance as a% of Gross premium 50.7 51.2 
Gross annual Premium (Rm) 3760 4142 
Long-Term Reinsurance (Rm) 136 160 
Insurance Net Premium (Rm) 3624 3982 
Reinsurance as a% of Gross premium 3.6 3.8 
Source: I-SC 
The above table reveals a high degree of dependence on reinsurance for 
short-term insurance. While the overall percentage of short- term reinsurance is 51 
some companies 176 are involved in reinsurance to as high a level as 73%. Short-term 
insurers prefer insurance protection and assume only a small part of the risk of the 
insurance policy they underwrite. It must be noted that many small insurers have 
weak financial ratios and face delays as regards the settlement of claims. If only 
long-tenn insurance is considered to keep the focus on financial intermediation, the 
share of gross premium 177 among insurers as shown in table 10.5 again reveals a high 
concentration ratio with CR2 47.5% and CR3 79.6% respectively. 
176 E. g Big short-term insurers like Albatross and SICOM exceed 70%. Reinsurance at SWAN, the 
largest general (short-term) insurance is at the level of 63%. "' The most important source of income. 
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Table 10.5 
Share of Gross long-term Premium (%) 
2002 2003 
SICOM 30.0 26.9 
Anglo-Mauritius 22.3 20.6 
BAI 30.5 32.1 
Mauritius Union 4.6 4.6 
LIC 5.1 4.7 
Albatros 3.1 3.6 
Others 4.4 7.5 
Source: FSC. 
There has been an important deepening in the sector during the 1990s with 
gross premium income (long-term business) increasing from 1.6% GDP in 1990 to 
2.6% in 2003 178 . It must be pointed out that income tax relief on contributions to 
individual pension, health schemes and other insurance premiums has considerably 
contributed to the development of intermediation by the insurers and has therefore 
had a positive effect on the mobilisation of savings. However, the lack of long-term 
financial assets in the economy affects the matching of assets and liabilities by 
adding some reinvestment risks. 
178 The Insurance industry (short-term and long-term) has a penetration of around 4% of the GDP. 
This is comparable to Singapore. 
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The insurance sector has always been ranked second after the banks in the 
mobilisation of domestic finance but is quite far behind banking in terms of 
contribution to the intermediation process as shown in table 11.5. 
Table 11.5 
Contrib ution to the Interme diation Process 
Annual Premium on 
Long-Term 
Insurance* 
in GDP % 
Deposits* 
(Banks) 
in GDP % 
1990 1 1.6 48.4 
1991 1.6 52.5 
1992 1.7 55.4 
1993 1.7 58.7 
1994 1.8 58.2 
1995 12 64.5 
1996 2.1 62.6 
1997 2.2 66.2 
1998 2.2 63.7 
1999 2.2 68.7 
2000 2.3 68.5 
2001 2.5 68.1 
2002 2.6 170.7 
2003 2.6 170.6 
Source: IFS, Annual report of the Controller of InsurancelFSC 
* General Insurance (Fire, Motor, Personal, Transport) are jjot considered here since they do not really 
represent an act ofintermediation 
** Demand deposits do not reflect intermediation and so are not included Only Time, Savings and foreign 
currency deposits are being considered. 
5.3.2. Regulation and Supervision of the Insurance Sector 
Insurers are regulated under the Insurance Act 1987. Under this legislation, 
there are various provisions to ensure that insurance companies remain solvent and 
are able to discharge their obligations to the public. Every insurer must have a 
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deposit of Rs8rn with the Financial Services Commission 179 and a paid-up capital of 
not less than Rs25m as from Ist July 2001. There is no risk-based capital 
requirement imposed on insurers yet. However, insurers must also have adequate 
reinsurance arrangements and must maintain a margin of solvency. In the case of an 
insurer caffying long-term insurance business, a margin of solvency implies that the 
amount of the admitted liabilitieS180 in respect of policies issued does not exceed the 
amount of long-term insurance funds 181 as certified by the insurance actuary. In the 
case of general insurance business, the value of the admitted assets 182 should exceed 
the amount of the admitted liabilities by no less than Rs Im or 10% of the premium 
income, net of reinsurance premiums, in the preceding financial year, whichever is 
greater. In the case of insurance business that carries both long-term business and 
general insurance business, insurers have to maintain a separate margin of solvency 
in respect of the two types of business. This separation, as well as separation of 
accounts for the two types of businesses, represents a very important shield against 
contagion from one activity to another in case of insolvency in one of the two 
activities. The Insurance Act also imposes an obligation on long-term insurers 
carrying long-term business to have an actuarial investigation of their financial 
position every three years and the report is to be submitted to the supervisory 
authority. 
Supervision implies a close scrutiny of the financial reports, maintenance of 
statutory deposits, reserve funds, margin of solvency, and proper reinsurance 
179 With the Office of the Controller of Insurance until 2001. 
180 Liabilities not including the share capital and reserves. 
11 All monies received in respect of long-term insurance business. 
1 Does not include intangible assets, loans to directors/agentsof the insurer/related corporation 
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arrangements. The FSC is a member of the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) 183 . Despite this international membership, supervision in the 
insurance sector had for long been of a low standard compared to the banking sector. 
This is due to understaff ing and lack of training. This shortcoming will gradually be 
addressed within the new integrated supervisory framework discussed in section 5.6. 
5.4. Introducing the Securities Market 
Brokerage activities started in Mauritius as early in 1771 under French rule 
when the first broker was appointed. However, the securities market has been very 
opaque and inactive until a stock exchange was created in 1989 under the Stock 
Exchange Act 1988. Only 5 companies were listed when the stock exchange started 
operations in July 1989 as compared to 42 companies in year 2003. Initially the 
stockbroking firms held 100% of the ownership of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius 
(SEM). This capital structure has now been open to non-stockbroking companies and 
the stockbroking firms hold only 48% of it. This demutualisation process has not 
only allowed a diversification of the shareholder base 184 but has allowed the splitting 
of the owner function from the user function and given rise to an improved form of 
governance. The SEM has a two-tier structure for trading in two markets. Tier I is 
for the forty listed companies meeting all the criteria for listing as per the listing 
rules and the eighteen listed debentures and since November 1997 trading takes place 
183 This is the international organization responsible for setting standards for insurers as to improve 
the strength of the financial sector. It was established in 1994 and is based in Basel, Switzerland. 
184 Out of 25 member companies of the SEM Ltd, II are stockbroking companies. 
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on all weekdays 185 . Tier 2 is the over-the-counter market for the seventy-five quoted 
companies that do not meet all the criteria and trading is twice weekly. No tax is 
imposed on dividends or capital gains for shares listed on the official market. 
Circuit breakers were introduced in the USA after the 1987 stock market 
crash to protect investors and markets in extreme situations in line with the 
recommendations of the Brady Commission, (Presidential Taskforce on Market 
Mechanism, 1988). Greenwald and Stein (1991) suggest that such circuit breakers 186 
are beneficial and can play a useful role in reducing transaction risk. Such a circuit 
breaker represents the type of institutional intervention suggested by Minsky 
(Chapter 4) to constrain instability arising from high incentive to proceed with 
"firesales" of assets to protect asset value. Other academics argue that circuit 
breakers could have the perverse effect of increasing price variability by forcing 
agents to advance their trades, Subrahmanyam (1994). An experimental study by 
Ackert, Church and Jayaraman (1999) confirms that participants have the tendency 
to accelerate trade whenever trading interruption is imminent but show that market 
closures and temporary halts do not have any perverse effect on price deviation from 
the fundamental values. 
As regards trading restrictions in Mauritius, section 28(7) of the Stock 
Exchange Act and section 3.9 of the listing rules 2000 of the SEM provide for a 
temporary suspension of trading of individual stocks in certain crisis situations. Such 
restriction has been applied in the past in cases of takeovers and more recently in a 
185 When the SEM started its activity in 1989 trading was done only twice weekly. 186 In American exchanges for instance, circuit breaker regulation was introduced in the year 
following the 1987 crash and was triggered for the first time in October 1997 when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average fell by 554 points, Le by 7.2%. 
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case of a massive financial fraud at the level of one major bank' 87 . The trading of the 
bank's shares was temporarily suspended for one week to enable the shareholders 
and investors to trade on an informed basis and to maintain a fair and orderly market. 
As regard a temporary halt 188 or a market closure'89 in case of sudden plummeting of 
stock, the Financial Services Development Act confers on the FSC190 the power to 
order a temporary closure of the stock exchange for a period of 3 days (renewable for 
another 5 days) whenever prevailing circumstances 191 may prevent orderly trading 192 . 
There are however no rules regarding pre-defined percentage drops leading to 
temporary interruption or to market closure. 
Another trading restriction at the SEM concerns a ±20% 193 price limit per 
trading session. While this provision aims at moderating volatility, it also limits 
stock exchange arbitrage and stock market activity. 
The Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) is a founder member of the African 
Stock Exchange Association (ASEA), a member of the SADC Stock Exchange 
Association, a member of the South Asian Federation of Stock Exchanges and a full 
member 194 of the World Federation of Exchanges'95. The SEM was until December 
2001 regulated and supervised by the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC), a full 
187 A fraud that went on undetected for many years and amounting to roughly R880m ($30m) was 
discovered at the MCB in February 2003 and it had to be accounted as a loss. Given that MCB is a 
blue-chip on the SEM a plummeting of MCB share price could intensify the bearish direction that the 
all-share price index had been taking for some years. 188 Trading is stopped for some minutes/hours for all listed shares. "9 Trading is shut down and does not resume until the next market period. '90 The FSC supervises daily trading on real-time basis via computer terminals. 9'E. g Natural disaster in Mauritius, economic or financial crisis in Mauritius or elsewhere. : 92 The automated trading system now in place has been designed to render possible this possible. 19' 6% until in recent years. 194 The previous status was one of an affiliate. 195 Previously called Federation Internationale des Bourses des Valeurs (FIBV). 
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member of the International Organisations of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 196 . 
The regulatory and supervisory functions have been transferred to the Financial 
Services Commission'97 . These memberships illustrate the willingness to adhere to 
international standards. 
In this respect, the stock exchange has in recent years adopted a modem 
infrastructure to improve the quality of the services it offers in two areas: 
(1) Open outcry floor-based trading disappeared in June 2001. Screen 
based automation of trading via workstations located at each of the II existing 
stockbroking firms and linked to the SEM trading server makes it now possible to 
effect on-line trading and to follow market evolution on a real-time basis. The Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius Automated Trading System (SEMATS) has rendered trading 
more efficient 198 and transparent. With information transmitted to all market 
participants without discrimination and in a timely manner the price discovery 
process has been enhanced. This will ultimately facilitate the process of integration 
underway in the SADC region since the automation infrastructure offers the 
possibility of linking the SEM with other exchanges. 
(2) Manual delivery and payment of securities has, in 1997, been replaced 
by an automated central deposit clearing and settlement system (CDS'99) and shares 
certificates were immobilised. Under the Companies Act 2001 share scrips of listed 
196 The organization responsible for setting international standards in the industry. 
197 Refer to Integrated regulation and supervision in chapter 5. 
19' The quality and flow of stock market information has improved. 
199 Central Depository and Settlement System. The system is operated by the CDS Ltd, a subsidiary 
of the SEM Ltd, and since July 1999 it has extended its services to companies on the over-the 
Counter market. 
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companies have been dernaterialised 200 . The CDS now provides participants with on- 
line access in full harmonisation with international standards. Automated clearing 
and settlement system has not only facilitated daily trading as mentioned earlier but 
has also allowed a major improvement in the settlement cycle from T+2 1201 to a T+5 
delivery versus payment, with the Bank of Mauritius acting as clearing bank making 
irrevocable transfers of fundsý02. In September 2001, the settlement cycle has been 
further reduced to a T+3 day basis putting the SEM on the same footing as several 
important markets. This shorter cycle improves the liquidity of holders who can now 
sell their securities only three days after buying. 
The CDS has also a guarantee fund used to guarantee the settlement of 
transactions in the event of a default by a participant and ensure the integrity of the 
market. However, to avoid moral hazard, no participant is authorised to trade beyond 
a settlement lirnif203 unless additional cover is provided as a cash contribution and 
letter of credit. , 
The stock exchange is expected to contribute to capital market development 
through various channels: 
(1) Broadening of share ownership. 
(2) Facilitating the issue of capital through new issues, rights issues and 
debenture issues. 
200 Shares are issued and traded without a physical certificate but through entries in the electronic 
register of the CDS Ltd. 
201 T is the transaction date. 
202 In respect of payment fee and of the obligations of participants towards the CDS Ltd. 203 Based on the moving average of cumulative liability over the past 12 months. 
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(3) Facilitating the ongoing privatisation process by providing a 
benchmark for the pricing of government assets and providing an exit for holdings in 
privatised companies. 
(4) Attracting foreign capital. Automation of trading has created greater 
scope for that. 
Insider trading is a breach of good corporate governance as they violate the 
principle of equitable treatment of shareholders trading. Appropriate legislations 
have been adopted to prevent any such fraudulent practices and to enhance stock 
market activities. 
Two stock indices are used to depict market price trends: 
(1) SEMDEX204, the all-share index, was launched at the start of the 
exchange in July1989. The weighting of the different stocks are relative to market 
capitalisation. 
205 (2) SEM-7 , the index for the seven largest listed eligible shares 
measured in terms of market capitalisation, liquidity and investibility. It was 
launched in 1998 and the composition of the SEM-7 changes periodically. 
The graphical representation below illustrates the changes in SEMDEX over 
time. 
204 SEMDEX= 
Current MarketValueof AJILIstedShares 
X100 
Base MarketValue of All Usted Share 
205 Only shares which meet certain liquidity and investibility criteria are eligible for inclusion in 
SEM-7 
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Figure 2.5 
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The security market has displayed a bearish character for a period as long as 
from mid 1998 to mid 2002. It has now picked up again and at August 2004 
SEMDEX stood at 642. A glance at the chart also reveals that SEM-7 has been 
generally less volatile than SEMDEX. 
Table 12.5 
Descriptive Statistics: SEMDEX & SEM-7 (Jan 1999 to Aug 2004) 
SEMDEX SEM-7 
Mean 436.3612 99.32265 
Median 405.2100 97.57000 
Maximum 655.0900 137.2700 
Minimum 340.9200 74.65000 
Std. Dev. 83.33212 15.99882 
-168- 
Using standard deviation as a formal measure of volatility (table 122.5) a big 
difference can be observed in the stability of the seven most important shares 
compared to the remaining ones. Both SEMDEX and SEM-7 capture only the market 
price of stocks and do not reflect overall return 206 on listed stocks. Table 13.5 shows 
that SEMDEX had considerably worsened between 1999 and 2001 in spite of a 
higher dividend yield in recent years and did not actually providez good indication 
of overall performance of the listed stocks. 
Table 13.5 
Average Dividend Yield and Change in Stock Price Index - 1996-2003 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Dividend Yield (%) 3.97 4.3 4.03 5.54 6.84 
- 
8.7 9.8 5.74 
Change in SEMDEX ý 7 1 10.65 ý 19.04 1 -6.4 . 46 
[: fO 1 -12.61 17.11 137.65 
Z; ource: SLM Eact Books 
In order to reduce information imperfection, in October 2000 the SEM 
introduced a Total Return Index, the SEMTRI, which captures both capital gain/loss 
and gross dividend on stocks of the ten top 207 companies listed and enable financial 
investors to better evaluate market performance and makes it available on line. The 
methodology employed for the calculation of SEMTRI is explained in Appendix 6. 
Faster dissemination of information to participants coupled with electronic trading 
allow price to adjust rapidly to new information and should over time contribute to 
206 Yield + capital gains. 
207 Top in terms of capital gain and dividend payment. 
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the development of a more efficient market. The efficient market hypothesis will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Figure 3.5 
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Source: SEM 
SEMTRI indicates an improved overall market performance 208 since the 
dividend component is now integrated in the index. The SEM expects that improved 
information will facilitate the investment decisions of market participants and attract 
more of the pension funds, which by the long-term nature of their liabilities can 
increase the amount of shares they hold as assets. 
208 The difference between the two indices should be less important when the PER rises. In the last 
three years it has been falling. 
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5.5 The Offshore Sector (Global Business) 
Offshore business is basically business in Mauritius owned by non-residents 
providing services primarily to non-residents and conducted in foreign currencies. 
Offshore activities started in the Bahamas in 1936 to provide management services 
to wealthy international clients. The main reasons for making use of offshore 
financial centres nowadays are: 
1. Tax Planninsz. Investments are managed to minimise tax liabilities and 
maximise confidentiality. Many multinational firms route transactions through 
offshore financial centres to minimise total taxes trough transfer pricing. Individuals 
also set up offshore trusts to benefit from favourable tax regime. 
2. Asset Protection. Clients use an international jurisdiction different 
from their own residence for protection of income and asset protection from political, 
fiscal and legal risks. This can be the case for clients from countries with risk of 
collapse of banking and currency crisis and exchange control. Further, facing 
unlimited liability in their home jurisdiction they may restructure their ownership in 
the form of offshore trust to protect these assets from domestic lawsuits. 
3. Estate Planning. Administration of assets is done in the most 
favourable legal and fiscal jurisdiction. 
4. Regulations and Supervision. Low reserve requirements and capital 
standards make it attractive for banking and insurance business. Further supervision 
and reporting requirements are light. 
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Establishing an offshore financial centre is considered beneficial not only to 
the development of the financial services sector and the development of high value- 
added jobs. There are also several spillovers to other sectors such as the hotel and 
restaurant sector and upgrading of telecommunications. The marketing of the centre 
can also attract additional foreign investment in the economy. The size of the 
offshore business is estimated at US $10- 12 trillion and is expected to grow at an 
annual rate of 15%, (Higgins, J. K, 2000). Therefore a small part of the industry could 
mean a lot to a small country with an important offshore centre. On the other hand, 
offshore activities can make the domestic financial system vulnerable to changes in 
international capital flows. Further, confidentiality facilitates money laundering since 
the true sources of funds are concealed. 
In Mauritius, the launching of offshore business banking and offshore 
business non-banking activitiesý09 was a major development in the early 1990s. Since 
then it has been the declared policy of government to develop the financial services 
sector as a fourth "pillar" of the economy so that Mauritius becomes an international 
centre for financial intermediation in the Southern and Eastern African region. This 
move imposed an obligation on Mauritius to raise itself to international standards. 
Consequently, a series of new legislations have been introduced/revised. The 
Financial Intelligence and Anti-money Laundering Act 2002 incorporates the basic 
tenets of the forty recommendations laid down by the OECD Financial Action Task 
Force 210 (FATF) set up by the G7 countries and provides for reporting to the 
209 Offshore Business is now referred to as Global Business in Mauritius under the Financial Services 
Development Act 2001. 
21 0 This is an inter-governmental body initially set up by the G-& countries but that now has the full 
OEDC as its membership. It is the main force spearheading the movement against money laundering 
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Financial Intelligence Uniell of suspicious transactions by financial institutions 
which warrants investigation. This illustrates the political willingness to pay 
attention to the development of a "clean" financial sector with low "reputational 
risk". The authorities are very concerned about sending a good signal to the 
international community particularly because it is widely recognised that money 
laundering is facilitated by offshore financial centres. The FATF estimates that some 
financial centres are tax havens 212 involved in harmful tax competition and are "non- 
cooperative"2 13 in the fight against money laundering. Mauritius was one of the 
countries in the "Naming and Shaming' list of the preliminary FATF in February 
2000 but following advanced commitments made by government regarding 
eliminating tax practices regarded as harmful, Mauritius escaped "blacklisting" and 
was excluded from the Final report in June 2000214. 
A new Trusts Act 2001 has been adopted regarding the recognition of Trusts 
to enhance offshore business activities. A new agency, the Financial Services 
Promotion Agency (FSPA) has also been created with the phasing out of the 
MOBAA 215 to act as a one-stop-shop on all matters relating to global business 
16 activities2 . 
internationally. Since September 112001 events the mandate of the FATF has been extended to 
include developing international standards to combat terrorist financing. 21 1 Financial Intelligence Units in countries where they exist play an essential role in combating the 
use of the financial system by criminals. With the creation of the F. I. U detection is separated from 
gthering of intelligence and investigation. 12 In a tax haven tax is very low or nominal, there is lack of transparency, no effective exchange of 
information and there are incorporated businesses with no substantial real activities. 
213 Le they have not taken the steps needed to address shortcomings in legislations, regulatory and 
supervision areas as far as combating money laundering is concerned.. 
214 Mauritius does not appear in the latest list of tax havens dated April2002 
215 Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Authority (MOBAA) was the regulator. 
216 E. g Work and residence permit, visa application, immigration formalities facilities for non- 
residents coming for global business activity, tax resident certificates. 
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While offshore banks in Mauritius are involved mainly in wholesale banking 
to non-bank customers, offshore businesses are categorised as either Category I or 
category 2 global business license companies. 68% of these companies are Category 
2 companies and they are not considered as residents for tax purposes. Having no 
physical presence in Mauritius, Category 2 global business entities are difficult to 
supervise and monitor. They' 17 are the ones that could represent the dangers in terms 
of money laundering and financing terrorists. Category I global business 
corporations undertake activities in various areas such as aircraft financing and 
leasing, assets management, consultancy services , employment services, financial 
services, funds management, information and communication technology, insurance, 
licensing and franchising, logistics and or marketing, operational headquarters, 
pension funds, ship and ship management and trading. Mauritius has poised itself to 
become an efficient tax-planning jurisdiction via Category I global business 
companies which can take advantage of a network of double taxation avoidance 
agreements 218 and which benefit from an incentive tax rate of 15% as compared to 
the normal 35% corporate tax. However, this rate may be reduced to 3% following 
request for foreign tax credit. Various international firms therefore use Mauritius to 
route their funds to emerging economies like India, Indonesia, China and South 
Africa. The investors obtain a tax benefit when repatriating their profits from the 
country where they have invested. India remains the main country receiving inward 
investment through Mauritian Global Business Companies 1. In 2003 around 50% of 
217 Some were licenced before Mauritius had strong identification requirements in place. 
218 26 Treaties have been ratified and more are being negotiated. 
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the total investment representing US$ 17.6bn has flowed from the rest of the world 
to India via the Mauritian conduit. Most of the investment comes from the USA 
(25%), Singapore (20%) and the British Virgins islands (19%). However, the recent 
exemption (20%) from long-term 219 capital gains announced in the 2003-2004 Indian 
Budget raises concern about the neutrality of this measure on investors' behaviour as 
many investors might consider that the incentive to use the Mauritian offshore sector 
has been watered down. 
Table 14.5 
Offshore Companies in Mauritius 
Date No. of Global Business Companies 
(Categories 1 &2) 
June98 7264 
June99 9227 
JuneOO 12542 
June 01 16264 
June 02 19349 
June 03 21414 
June04 23595 
Source: PSC. 
The number of offshore entities has significantly increased since early 1990s 
as shown above. However this number is minute when Mauritius is compared with 
219 In India assets held for more than 3 years are long-tem but listed shares, units, bonds and 
debentures are considered as long-term if held for more than 12 months. 
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the centres like British Virgin Islands and Bahamas where according to KPMG the 
number of entities in 2001 were 316,566 and 101,107 respectively 220. Even in the 
area of offshore banking specifically, Mauritius, with II institutions, is very weak 
compared to Cayman islands the biggest offshore banking centre with 450 offshore 
banks. 
5.6 Recent Institutional Changes at the Regulatory and Supervisory 
Level in the Financial Sector 
In the past regulations were industry-based and this had contributed to 
financial market segmentation. The wave of liberalisation blowing over the financial 
services industry has after some years reduced the binding portfolio constraints of the 
specific institutions rendering the distinction increasingly bluffed between banks and 
non-banking financial institutions. Banks and Insurance companies have developed 
into financial conglomerates offering integrated services through various subsidiaries 
and affiliates. However, during that same time period, regulation and supervision had 
remained product-based. The situation was that different segments of the industry 
were facing different levels of supervision and there had not been any important 
prudential reforms outside the banking sector. Still worse, some sectors were either 
not regulated or partly regulated and not supervised. These sectors were the Post 
Office Savings Bank, Leasing Businesses, Venture Capital Funds, the Sugar 
Insurance Fund 221 , Fund Management Companies, Pension 
Funds (except those 
220 Most of these being international business companies. 
221 S. I. F did not fall under the purview of the Insurance Act 1982. As such it remained outside the 
jurisdiction of the Insurance Controller. 
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managed by Insurance Companies), Commercial Credit Institutions and the friendly 
societies. Some of these are high-risk sectors to both depositors and investors where 
failure can affect the stability of the financial system. One important lesson from the 
LTCM case (see Chapter 4) is that systemic failure can start off within the NBFI 
sector. 
In recent years, this uneven degree of supervision within the Mauritian 
financial sector has been identified as a severe weakness responsible for various 
problems: - 
1. It provided room for regulatory arbitrage. 
2. It exposed some sub-sectors to fraud and malpractice 222 with 
potential failures of certain institutions accompanied by the risk of contagion in some 
otherwise sound sub-sectors. 
3. Reputational risk prevented the development of certain new sub- 
sectors with high growth potentials such as asset management and fund management 
activities. It was considered that only a high standard of regulation and supervision 
could improve public confidence in soundness of these activities and in the guarantee 
of receiving a fair treatment in dealings (Steering Committee Report 2001). 
Improved confidence was seen as essential for higher mobilisation of savings 
through investment portfolios. Already some transfer of domestic savings out of 
Mauritius into global markets had been identified and it was considered that only a 
high level of regulation and supervision in such business areas could reverse this 
222 E. g misuse of clients'assets. 
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movement as well as attracting world-class operators that are generally sensitive 
about their reputation. 
A strategy of developing a framework of cohesive regulations covering all 
prudential and market conduct regulations, integrating all sub-sectors to reduce the 
risk of individual failure as well as systemic risks and ensure market integrity was to 
be put in practice via the adoption of a unified approach to regulation and 
supervision (Government of Mauritius 2001). This model has been initiated 
successfully in Scandinavian countries, Taylor and Fleming (1999). Regulations and 
supervision now adopt a risk-based approach with a view to achieve the objective of 
enhancing the protection of both financial investors and consumers of financial 
services. It was recognised in 2001 that the Bank of Mauritius had already gained the 
status of an internationally strong regulator and supervisor. As such it was imperative 
to learn from the experience acquired in the banking sector and develop a high 
degree of regulation and supervision for the whole industry while at the same time 
avoid banking supervision being diluted with the teething problems in the non- 
banking sector. 
Consequently, it was decided that the Bank of Mauritius should be the anchor 
around which the unified regulatory authority should be built. However, rather than 
moving directly to a single licensing, regulatory and supervisory body the reform 
was designed to take place in two distinct stages so as to be both effective and 
efficient. 
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I" Stage: The Financial Services Commission was created by mid 2001 under 
the FSD ACt223 to bring all non-bank financial services under one licensing, 
regulatory and supervisory umbrella. The FSC took over the responsibility of all 
previous regulators (SUý24' MOBAA225' and the Office of the Controller of 
Insurance) except that of the Bank of Mauritius and it equally held the responsibility 
for the hitherto unregulated activitieS226 . The supervision 
227 task is carried by both 
Off-Site monitoring of financial statements and by On-Site inspection. To facilitate 
the anchor role of the Bank of Mauritius, the Managing Director of the BOM has 
been assigned the task of chairing the FSC which also uses the infrastructure and 
logistics of the bank. In the meantime, the BOM continues to license, regulate and 
supervise the domestic and offshore banking sector as well as the deposit-taking 
activities of the non-bank financial institutions, moneychangers and foreign dealers. 
2 nd Stage: It was initially planned that at the end of phase 1, and in the light of 
a review exercise carried out in the beginning of January 2003, full integration of the 
BOM and the FSC would be implemented. It has now been considered that the 
reform proposals were too optimistic and that banking and NBFI supervision 
integration is not likely to happen before 2007. 
223 Financial Services Development Act 2001 
224 Stock Exchange Commission. 
225 Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority. 
226 E. g leasing, Mutual funds, unit trusts, pension funds, equity funds, cooperative credit union. 227 Revocation of license is possible in case of serious violations of regulations. 
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5.7 Summary 
Chapter 5 has provided a description of the Mauritian financial sector 
brushing the development of some of its sub sectors namely banking, insurance 
business, offshore activity and security market. It has shown that the intermediation 
sector is dominated by banking activity and insurance comes next. It also reveals that 
both the banking and the insurance sectors are highly concentrated but that the some 
merging, acquisitions and appearance of new foreign players in banking sector is 
likely to bring more competition in the future. 
This chapter has also shown evidence of a country where intermediation has 
been boosted through government direct action. However, rather than adopting the 
traditional and quite often ineffective route followed by many African countries after 
independence through nationalization of the banking sector, government here in 
Mauritius simply created a new bank which stimulated non-price competition for 
market share. 
The modemisation process has been examined in relation to (i) the security 
market-trading infrastructure for a more transparent and efficient market, (ii) the 
legal framework to minimize financial crime, (iii) the changes from an industry- 
based regulatory and supervisory framework to an integrated one. 
Chapter 6 will focus exclusively on the domestic banking sector and will 
attempt to shed light on the monetary policy reforms, the impact on bank 
performance, interest spread and banking crisis. 
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Chapter 6 
LIBERALISATION AND THE BANYdNG SECTOR IN 
MAURITIUS 
6.1. Introduction 
The McKinnon and Shaw paradigm suggests that if developing countries 
adopt the market determination of price and allocation of credit, the attractiveness of 
holding claims in the banking system will increase. It must be pointed out that in the 
early 1970s Mauritius, unlike many developing countries, was not characterised by 
vast rural areas with an important part of payment being in kind. The narrow money 
supply as a proportion of the GDP in Mauritius highly exceeded that of several 
African countries and it compared with Singapore and the USA. 
Table 1.6 
Narrow Money Supply as a Percentage of GDP (1971) 
Niger Nigeria Uganda Senegal Zambia Mauritius Singapore USA 
6.4 8.9 10.8 11.5 14.1 22.4 25 23.8 
wurce: j. -3; 
When the liberalisation policies were adopted in the early 1990s, Mauritius 
was therefore already a highly monetised economy with a weak unofficial money 
market and a long banking history. Financial intermediation proxied by the quasi- 
money collection had already reached 52% of the GDP in 1991as compared to 24 % 
in 1971. 
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Until the mid 1980s, the engines of growth had been sugar, textiles and 
tourism. By then it was clear that the economy had emerged from convalescence228 
but would not stay long on the path of high growth unless these sectors were to be 
modernised and the economic base further diversified (Government of Mauritius, 
1987,1988). A switch to this new direction implied undertaking reforms in the 
financial system to satisfy higher investment requirements and access to a 
competitive market for long-term funds. The supply of loanable funds had to be 
substantially improved by better mobilisation of savings. In the mid 1980s, private 
sector credit from the banking sector was at a low level of 27% of GDP compared to 
68% for the USA. 
The table below shows that financial liberalisation was initiated in Mauritius 
against a background of improved macroeconomic conditions following the 
structural adjustment that started in earlY 1979. 
Table 2.6 
Pre-Liberalisation Macroeconomic Indicators 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 984 1985 1986 
Inflation Rate 
14.5 42 14.5 11.4 5.6 7.4 6.7 1.6 
Budget Deficit* 11.6 10.3 12.6 11.8 7.6 4.5 3.5 1.8 
B. O. P 
-94.6 -27. -60.1 -31.4 -43.6 -2.6 121.5 
Overall Balance" 
5ource: JPS Yearbook (Various Issues) *DelicitasaYbOJ(iDP, ' **USSM 
228 By the end of the 1970s the economy faced severe internal and external imbalances and like many 
other third world countries it adopted the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes. 
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The process of financial liberalisation in Mauritius has to a large extent 
adopted the path suggested in the ex-post financial liberalisation literature reviewed 
in Chapter2. Reforms in favour of a broadening and a deepening of the financial 
sector were undertaken with a focus on market orientation and internationalisation in 
two areas: - 
1. Monetary policy 
2. Strengthening of supervision and prudential regulation at the level of 
both banking and non-bank institutions. 
The rest of this Chapter deals with these two issues and the analysis is 
restricted to category I banks only. 
6.2. Internal Reforms 
6.2.1. Directed Credit and Reserve Requirement 
Unlike Mexico where freeing of interest rates, abolition of directed credit 
programmes and the drastic reduction of the reserve requirement was achieved 
within a very short time (1998-1999), in Mauritius, the whole process of internal 
liberalisation was sequenced over a period of four years. 
However prior to the mid 1980's the monetary policy measures in Mauritius 
reflected a regime of financial repression characterised by the following: - 
-A policy of minimum interest rate on savings deposit and maximum rate 
on lending. 
- Interest rate determined yearly by government. 
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- Credit growth ceilings for advances to the private sector, introduced in 
1973 to limit deposit expansion. 
- Credit-deposit ratio at 61%. 
- Credit allocation on a ratio of 3: 1 shared between priority sectors 
229 at a 
subsidised rate and non-priority sectors. 
- Until 1990, the directed credit ceiling favoured the export processing 
zone (EPZ) sector. Banks had to direct 50% of their credit to the EPZ firms and other 
producers in key sectors (category 1). Loans to traders and other non-preferential 
customers (category 3) could not exceed 25% of the ceiling and the remaining credit 
went to category 2 borrowers. Additionally, non-sugar export firms (EPZ) benefited 
from refinancing of bills of exchange (post shipment) 230 at a preferable rate of 
12.25% and these were not included in the commercial banks' credit ceiling. 
- The banking system was heavily taxed with high reserve requirements at 
37% in 1978. 
- Banks facing a money deficit had automatic direct access to the central 
bank refinancing facility without seeking out accommodation from other banks 
having surplus liquidity. The central bank was acting more like a lender of first than 
last resort. 
Such direct means of monetary control had proved to be very useful in the 
early days of Independence at a time when financial resources were very scarce and 
economic diversification weak. It ensured the flow of credit to specific sectors in line 
229 Agriculture, manufacturing and tourism sectors. 
230 Not applicable to pre-shipment working capital loans for exporters. 
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with the economic growth strategy of the government and in an embryonic financial 
market it facilitated the control of the monetary authority on overspending and 
inflation. With the economy changing rapidly by the mid 1980's, the authorities 
decided that there was a need to remove the rigidities in the banking system so as to 
allow resources to be directed to a variety of sectors and to rapidly shift from the less 
profitable to the more profitable areas. Indirect monetary control by the central bank 
on the monetary base was adopted to allow banks the freedom of allocating credit 
according to market forces. Reorientation of the monetary policy stance has been a 
gradual process lasting around a decade. 
In order to facilitate the availability of credit to different productive sectors, 
bank ceilings were gradually abolished as per the following sequence. In 1991 credit 
to productive sectors was allowed to increase by 17% while a ceiling to non-priority 
sectors was maintained at 18%. In 1992, the credit ceiling to priority sectors was 
abolished and the same applied to non-priority sectors in 1993. 
The main sectors of the economy now getting access to banking credit are the 
Manufacturing, Tourism, Trading, Construction, Agriculture, Finance and Business 
and Personal sectors. The share of credit between these sectors is shown below. 
Table 3.6 
misirIDUtion oi isamung ureuit to ine rrivat e becroi 
1983 2002 2003 
Manufacturing 44 17.0 15.4 
Tourism 7 14.8 16.4 
Traders 7.5 14.2 14.4 
Construction 4.6 14.0 13.5 
Agriculture 21 9.4 9.8 
Finance and Business Sector 0.4 9.0 8.9 
Personal 11.3 7.8 9.6 
aource: Lf. u. m 
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It can be observed that with the elimination of directed credit policy some 
sectors like tourism, traders, construction and finance have gained access to a larger 
share of credit allocation. 
For prudential reasons the credit-deposit ratio was temporarily raised from 
61% to 65% but subsequently phased out. As far as the liquid reserve ratio is 
concerned, the minimum non-cash liquid ratio was at 25% in 1978 coupled with a 
cash ratio of 12%. The minimum non-cash liquid asset ratio was reduced to 20% in 
July 1996 and was completely phased out in July 1997. The cash rati023 1 has faced 
successive reductions until it reached 5.5%232 of total deposit liabilities in July 1998. 
Such changes have been made to -reduce the leakage or tax effect of the reserve 
requirement in the intermediation process. With a higher credit multiplier, there was 
an inevitable expansion of the balance sheet of the domestic banks and this added to 
the already consistent credit expansion that started with the long period of expansion 
of the economy beginning in the mid 1980s. Further the high reserve requirement 
damaged competition between domestic and offshore banks or even NBFIs. 
Table 4.6 
Credit to the Private Sector as a% of GDP 
As at June 1983 1 1993 1 2003 
Credit 21.9 38.3 
1 56.3 
as a% of GDP 
Source: BUM Annual Reports, severat issues 
231 Cash ratio deposits denominated in both domestic and foreign currencies are considered. The 
assets satisfying liquidity are cash in vault and balances with the central bank in non-interest bearing 
accounts. 
232 5.5% of total deposits is a minimum weekly average cash ratio. 
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As banks competed for offering loans, they relaxed their lending standards. 
At the same time, the high growth rate of the Mauritian economy began to slow 
down. Soon the amount of non-performing loans increased and the asset quality of 
banks deteriorated. As a percentage of total advances, non-performing loans went up 
from 7.8% in 1996/1997 to 9% in 1998/99. Figures for individual banks are not 
available but some banks were certainly more affected than others. By the end of the 
1990s banks being burdened with non-performing loans chose to limit the amount of 
loans they granted. There was therefore no situation of credit crunch as many then 
suggested since demand for loans did not exceed the lending capacity of banks per se 
but credit was rationed because of unwillingness of banks to lend following a 
deterioration of the credit quality after liberalisation, (Basant Roi, 2001). 
"Unavailability" of credit distorted the transmission of the monetary policy and also 
forced the central bank to provide bridging finance for the restructuring of the Sugar 
Industry and facilities to firms in the EPZ by the end of the 1990s. 
Liberalisation of interest rates started in the early 1990's and just as in the 
case of removal of ceilings, it was done through stages. Before the reforms, 
government fixed the bank rate every year and Treasury bills were issued at a pre- 
determined rate. There was no fixed time for these irregular issues that were made 
for the twin purposes of managing the national debt and giving banks and other 
financial institutions (mainly the National Pension Fund) a short-term investment 
outlet for their surplus liquidity. 
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6.2.2 Shifting to Indirect Monetary Policy Instruments. 
As a first stage, open market operations started in November 1991 in the 
primary market only, and treasury bills were no more being issued on tap but on 
tender. The BOM started issuing BOM bills and the auctioning of Treasury bills on a 
weekly basis and subsequently on a bi-weekly basis, whenever required. Around 
60% of the bids received for the primary auctions came from the banking sector. 
Such regular issues facilitated the withdrawal of cash reserves from the banking 
system and acted as a check on credit expansion as compared to the previous direct 
method of credit ceilings. 
In 1992, the central bank revised its refinancing policy and stopped making 
regular advances to commercial banks. Those facing a shortage of liquidity were to 
obtain funds from the selling of BOM/Treasury bills to those with excess cash and 
vice versa. This process facilitated a redistribution of available liquidity in the 
banking sector and it gave rise to the emergence of an interbank secondary bill 
market233 . The inter-bank market is dominated by transactions on call (overnight) 
money and short moneY234 while term moneY235 transactions are still negligible. As 
mentioned in chapter three, a run on one bank may trigger contagion runs on other 
banks via the interbank market. The interbank market being still very thin at this 
stage, the magnitude of possible contagion from problem banks is then low. 
233 An interbank market for financial assets 
234 Up to 7 days. 
235 
above 7 days. 
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The start of open market operations in November 1991 and the development 
of an inter-bank market represent two decisive moves in the shift to indirect methods 
of monetary control. 
With the issue of bills on tender in the primary market, the interest rate was 
henceforth influenced by the interplay of market forces namely: - 
(i) The supply of bills, related to government's need in connection with the 
management of national debt; and 
(ii) The demand for bills, related to the commercial banks' reserves and 
investment need. 
Initially the bank rate represented the overall weighted average on 
Treasury/BOM bills of different maturity 236 at auctions for the preceding twelve 
weeks plus a margin of one percentage point. In 1995, the twelve-week period was 
reduced to one week (i. e. the last auction's figures) and the one percentage point 
margin reduced to 0.25% before being completely phased out. These gradual 
measures rendered the bank rate closer and closer to the prevailing market 
conditions. Given that the bank rate served as a benchmark for commercial banks to 
set their interest rate structure 237 and also for central bank's lending to government, it 
can be considered that liberalisation of interest rates had effectively been achieved by 
1995. With market-based borrowing there is no more scope for government getting 
access to artificially cheap finance and fiscal discipline is improved. Although the 
236 91 -day, 182-day, 364-day, 364-day and 728-day Treasury bills. 237 Inclusive of various deposit as well as loan rates. 
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bank rate had become market-based, it moved like wreckage, unable to send a 
specific signal to the money market. 
However, it was several years later, in December 1999, when a reasonable 
number of banks and non-bank holders of government securities had been 
established that it became possible for the central bank to influence the monetary 
base in an effective manner and improve liquidity management through open market 
operations. As the secondary market became relatively active, it became possible to 
enhance banks' liquidity management by shifting to a second phase of open market 
operations with flexible two-way operations (repurchase/repo transactions) in 
238 existing securities . In line with its liquidity forecasting framework for a given 
monitoring week the central bank takes the initiative between weekly primary market 
auctions of treasury bills to increase/decrease 239 the short-term liquidity of the 
domestic money market. 
By buying eligible securities from any commercial bank the central bank 
increases liquidity under a contract that also allows the resale of the securities at a 
specified future date and price. Banks tender for the central bank's fund under the 
umbrella of a Master Repurchase Agreement between BOM and commercial banks. 
In cases of excess liquidity the central bank gets involved in reverse repurchase 
(reverse repo) by selling securities with an agreement to rebuy these at a specified 
238 Le in the secondary market. 
239 e. g if the central bank considers that the interbank market cannot redistribute liquidity due to 
shortage in the whole system, repurchase transactions are undertaken to inject the necessary liquidity 
in the system 
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date and price. The broad monetary aggregate M2 240 which is the intermediate target 
is subsequently influenced in the direction wished by the monetary authority. The 
repurchase rate 241 is normally above the inter-bank market rate. Repurchase 
transactions are conducted at rates closer to the Lombard rate whenever the central 
bank wants to tighten monetary policy while in the case of a loosening of the 
monetary stance the repurchase transactions are conducted at rates closer to the inter- 
bank rate. 
Under the new refinancing framework, individual commercial banks now get 
access to a standing overnight facility - the Lombard facility at the Lombard rate, 
which represents a penalty premium over the inter-bank market overnight rate. This 
new accommodation policy encourages individual banks that have liquidity problems 
to get the reserves first from those that have a surplus in the interbank market before 
seeking refinancing from the central bank. While repo transactions are conducted at 
the initiative of the central bank to change the liquidity of the banking system, the 
Lombard facility operates at the request of any bank facing a liquidity shortage. Such 
overnight loans are collateralised by government security (treasury bills or other 
bonds acceptable by the BOM) and the Lombard rate represents the highest rate in 
the short-term money market. Refinancing is now at the discretion of the central 
bank both in terms of rate and volume. Each bank is allowed to draw down part of 
the full amount of the facility allowed to it to meet unexpected overnight shortages. 
As the interbank market and the repo transactions develop, there is less active 
240 In Mauritius there are only two monetary aggregates. MI is the narrow money composing of 
currency and sight deposits while M2 consists of MI plus savings and all types of time deposits. 241 Repo rate is a weighted average rate of the bids. 
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reliance on central bank refinancing and this has allowed the central bank to shift 
from a previous position of a lender of I" resort to becoming effectively one of last 
resort in recent years. There is therefore a consolidation of the process of developing 
indirect monetary control. Periodic changes in the Lombard rate are made by the 
central bank to send the desired signal about monetary stance to the banking sector 
for self-adjustment of their interest rate structures and subsequent transmission to the 
rest of the economy. Changes in monetary policy are now transmitted to the various 
sectors of the economy more effectively and faster than in the initial stage when the 
key rate was the Bank rate. To further improve the connection between the Lombard 
rate and the money market some changes will be made late this year when the 
Lombard rate will be replaced by the repo rate as the key interest rate signaling the 
monetary instance for transmission to the economy. 
6.2.3 Changes in Interest Rate 
The theory 242 discussed in Chapters 2&3 predicted that financial liberalisation 
would lead to an initial increase in real interest rates following the de-repression 
measures. This would be accompanied by higher rates of savings. Later when 
external liberalisation follows greater access to foreign savings would push towards 
lower interest rates. Both stages actually would favour a higher level of investment. 
The real deposit rate is now examined for different time periods. 
242 McKinnon and Shaw and the various refinements. 
-192- 
Table 5.6 
Changes in Real Interest Rate before and After Liberalisation 
Year 
Nominal 
Deposit Inflation Real Deposit R. +- ate 
(June) Rate Rate 
- 
Year 
(June) 
Period 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
1975 4 20.6 -13.76 
1976 41 14.7 -9.33 
Pre- 1977 4.5 9.6 -4.65 
liberalisation 1978 6.5 10.1 . 3.27 4 8 6 2 Period A 243 1979 7.5 8 -0.46 . 
- . 
1980 9-9.5 33 -17.86 
1981 9-9.5 26.5 -13.64 
1982 9 13.4 -3.88 
1983 91 7.5 1.40 
1984 8.5-8.75 5.6 2.87 
1985 8.5-9.0 8.3 0.42 Pre- 
i lib li 1986 8.5-9.0 4.3 4.27 2 3 3 9 sat era 
dB 244 i P 1987 8 0.7 7.25 
. . 
er o 1988 8 1.5 6.40 
1989 10 16 -5.17 
1990 12 10.7 1.17 
1991 12 12.8 -0.71 
Lib li 1992 10 2.9 6: 90 era sation 
i d P 1993 7 8.9 -1.74 
0.99 3.5 
er o 1994 8 9.4 -1.28 
1995 8 16.1 1.79 
1996 8 5.8 2.08 0.96 
1997 8 7.9 0.09 
1998 8 5.4 2.47 
Post- 1999 9 7.9 1.61 liberalisatio, 2000 6. 5-8.5 5.3 2.49 
1.32 
Period 2001 - 7 4.4 0.19 
2002 6.5 6.3 0.86 
6 5.1 1.61 
Source: B OM 
243 Period A is defined as the pre liberalisation period during which the real interest rate was negative 
due to high inflation rate. 244 Period B is defined as the preliberalisation period during which the real interest rate went positive 
following macroeconomic corrective policies adopted. 
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Figure 1.6 
Real Interest Rates on Savings Deposit and Inflation Rate 
(June 1975-2003) 
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Table 5.6 and Figure 1.6 reveal that the real deposit rate has not gone higher 
but more stable after the liberalisation process as expected. Such behaviour has also 
been observed in other developing countries (Turtleboom, 1991). More 
interestingly, they reveal that: 
1. The real interest rate was negative at the beginning. This was due to 
high inflation caused by the expansionary economic policies of government in the 
early 1970s, the oil shocks and the devaluations in October 1979 and September 
1981 245 respectively. 
The real interest rate had already turned positive after the structural 
adjustment period. 
245 3 0% devaluation in 1979 and 20% in 198 1. 
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3. The real interest rate on savings has not moved upward after the 
liberalisation phase has been completed. 
4. The interest rate has been less volatile after the completion of the 
liberalisation reforms 
The empirical evidence therefore does not support the McKinnon and Shaw 
hypothesis about upward movement of the savings interest rate following de- 
repression measures. 
6.2.4 Stimulating Savings 
In the past both the debenture market and the banking sector had shown 
rigidity concerning an upward adjustment of interest rates to surplus units. To 
increase competition and allow interest rates to adjust rapidly as well as to diversify 
the availability of savings instruments in view of financial deepening, financial 
institutions were in 1996 authorised to issue certificates of deposits. Further, the 
authorities adopted an array of gradual steps to develop a secondary market for 
govemment securities. 
In December 1998 both the non-financial corporate sector and individuals 
were authorized to purchase treasury bills over the counter. That was a first step 
towards allowing financial investors first experience with treasury bills. 
To boost secondary money market activity in government securities and 
enhance its liquidity in the absence of a well-informed investor base, the BOM 
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established a primary dealer system in February 2002 with four banks 246 . Existing 
eligible bidders at the weekly primary auctions were eliminated and required to 
purchase treasury bills on the secondary market. The four appointed primary dealers 
got the specific privilege of participating in primary weekly auctions for treasury 
bills and the privilege of bidding for third parties at primary auctions. In return they 
agreed to act as market makers in the secondary market by continuously quoting 
two-way prices for the trading of second hand treasury bills, secondary transactions 
with non-bank financial institutions as well as individuals 247 . Holders in need of cash 
could at any time before maturity sell back their bills in this market. The fact that 
only four specific players have been selected could give rise to market structure 
issues. However, at this early stage market size could be considered as too small to 
support a large number of primary dealers to operate on a profitable basis and 
without subsidies. A system of rotation of primary dealers based on performance, as 
in Mexico, could have been envisaged for fairness and a motivation to efficiency. 
A turning point was reached in December 2003 with the trading of treasury 
bills on the SEM through stockbrokers. While the primary dealers would continue 
with their involvement in weekly auctions, all other financial, non-financial 
institutions and individuals now have to purchase treasury bills on the secondary 
market. The final move will take place in the near future with the introduction of 
long-term government securities on the SEM. Then onwards it will be possible to 
establish a yield curve through regular issues of long-term government bonds. Such 
246 The Barclays Bank, the HSBC, the MCB and the SBM. 
247 The secondary market cell then stopped its OTC sales that started in December 1998 to the non- 
bank institutions and to individuals. 
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regular issues while promoting long-term savings will also reduce the current roll- 
over risk arising out of its short maturity profile of domestic public debt. Moreover, 
the reinvestment risk issue raised in Chapter 5 regarding long-term insurers will be 
addressed. The yield curve will constitute a benchmark for financial investors in 
their decisions regarding their funding operations and also for banks as regards 
deposit and lending rate policies. Additionally, the yield curve will act as an 
information gap-filler facilitating the detection of overpriced and underpriced 
equities and debentures in a process of reducing market imperfections. 
The development of an active secondary market for treasury bills became 
essential following the removal of the obligations on banks to absorb government 
debt. It will allow easier sterilisation of any massive foreign reserves inflow. The 
secondary market for treasury bills now and eventually for longer-term government 
security is expected to contribute to the stimulation of savings in the context of the 
emergence of a multi-layered financial system with capital markets playing a more 
important role alongside the banking sector. 
In spite of liberalisation of interest rates and other measures taken to 
stimulate savings until now these measures have not yielded the expected results. 
The evidence does not support the theory as shown by the curves depicted in figure 
2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 
Savings Ratio 1976-2004 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0ý 
76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 
- G. Domestic Savings ------ G. National Savings 
Source: CSO 
6.3. External Reforms. 
As for the international aspect of financial liberalisation, constraints were 
first relaxed on trade-related flows before starting to ease restrictions on long-term 
direct investment inflows/outflows. Premature capital account liberalisation led to 
problems such as capital flight or disruptive capital inflows in Korea in the1960s and 
Chile in the 1970s (Fry, 1978). The relevance of sequencing in this area is fully 
debated in Dooley and Mathieson, (1987), De Grawe (1987), Blejer and Sagari 
(1987) and McKinnon (1993). When Mauritius embarked on the financial 
liberalisation path in the early1990s, the foreign exchange regime was a fixed 248 and 
partly convertible one. Liberalisation of exchange control actually started at current 
account level in July 1987 with the partial lifting of restrictions on overseas travel 
allowances and cash gift allowances. Subsequently the waiving of import 
248 Pegged with a weighted basket of currencies of the major trading partners of Mauritius. 
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permits/licenses added competitive pressures on local producers to improve both the 
price and the quality of their products. In 1992, exporters were allowed to operate 
foreign exchange accounts 249 with their commercial banks and were thus able to 
exchange one currency for another without having to convert into rupees, thus saving 
in terms of transaction CoSe5o. Full convertibility of domestic currency into foreign 
exchange for current account transactions had been reached. 
As far as outward capital movement is concerned, the situation in thel980s 
was as follows: 
1. Non-bank residents were allowed to transfer to any country a 
reasonable amount of capital subject to permission, on payment of a 45% stamp 
duty. That constituted a barrier to F. D. 1 outward and to regional co-operation. 
2. Non-residents were subject to similar limitations except that the 
payment of stamp duty amounted to a lower level of 35%. 
3. Repatriation of capital by foreign companies was tax-free up to the 
amount of the original investment. Capital gains were therefore blocked and released 
only subject to investment in Mauritius or for transfer abroad for payment of a 35% 
stamp duty. 
4. Emigrants were entitled to transfer the equivalent of one hundred 
thousand Mauritian rupees from their Mauritian assets and the balance of their funds 
were credited to a blocked account with possibility of release, subject to payment of 
a 45% stamp duty. 
249 The yield to residents being the foreign nominal interest rate plus the depreciation of the 
domestic currency. 250 Conversion fees paid only once instead of twice 
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All these indicate the high level of control on capital account transactions. 
The first liberalisation measure was announced in the June 1991 budget 
speech (Government of Mauritius, 1991). Provision was made for domestic 
banks holding foreign currency balances of foreign companies in their 
correspondent banks abroad or with offshore banks to be exempted from the 
15% payment of stamp duty on outward capital transfers251. In 1992 all 
foreign investors were authorised to repatriate their capital, including capital 
gains without the payment of 15% capital transfer tax and without prior 
approval from the Bank of Mauritius. As for local residents, the capital 
transfer tax in the case of outward movement of capita1252 was initially 
reduced to 5% with prior approval of the Central Bank and finally by 
July1994 the capital account was fully liberalised with the lifting of controls 
on portfolio investment and Mauritius acceded to IMF Article VI 11253 . There 
are no more blocked accounts for non-residents and exchange control has 
been suspended on both current and capital account transactions. This new 
framework has opened the door of the London interbank market to Mauritian 
institutions willing to buy investment instruments. Foreign exchange 
accounts are now permitted in the banking sector with no distinction between 
accounts of residents and non-residents. Any resident may hold accounts in 
foreign currency with both domestic and offshore banks. This has allowed 
251 Outward transfers faced a higher restriction in the 1980s when the stamp duty on outward transfer 
of capital was at a level of 45%. 
252 Promoting FDI outward especially in the context of regionalisation in the Southern & Eastern 
African region. 
253 Article VIII is not a compulsory requirement for IMF country members. 
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some corporate bodies to borrow directly abroad in foreign currency to take 
advantage of interest differences and their actions complemented domestic 
savings for investment purposes. Loans and advances in foreign currency has 
now reached a level of 9% of total credit and foreign borrowings by some 
firms also sometimes create a problem of excess liquidity in the domestic 
banking sector. Figures 3.6 and 4.6 reveal that important changes have taken 
place in commercial bank foreign liability after the liberalisation of the 
capital flows. 
Figure 3.6 
Foreign Currency Deposits as a% of Total Deposits 
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The rise in foreign currency deposits is also due to a certain extent to a fall in 
the Treasury bill rate. That has led financial investors to shift from domestic 
denominated assets to foreign denominated assets. In future as participants 
who have international transactions change their mind set and start getting 
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involved in hedging to minimise the impact of any adverse currency 
movements, they would use foreign deposit accounts more often. At this 
stage, the proportion of total deposits in the banking system in the form of 
foreign currency is still very low as compared to above 75% in many 
European countries where banks are involved in a lot of hedging. 
Figure 4.6 
Banks' Borrowings From Abroad as a% of Total Deposits 
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Source: BOM 
There is definitely a greater access to foreign savings in the last few years. 
The authorities expect that external liberalisation will gradually integrate the 
domestic economy into the global financial market and will facilitate capital mobility 
in a process of efficient allocation of global financial resources. The relationship 
between commercial banks' borrowing from abroad as a percentage of total deposits 
and real interest rate is examined below. With greater access to foreign savings one 
could have expected that the domestic interest rate would go down. However, figure 
5.6 shows that it was not the case and a regression is run between the foreign deposit 
ratio and interest rate to examine the relationship between the two variables. 
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Figure 5.6 
Banks' Borrowings from Abroad and Real Interest Rate 
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Table 6.6 
Regression Output 
Dependent Varia ble: REALI NT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/14/04 Time: 23: 24 
Sample: 1994 2003 
Included observations: 10 
Variable Coefflcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.541441 0.830840 0.651679 0.5329 
FORDEPRAT 0.239257 0.270518 0.884440 0.4023 
R-squared 0.089070 Mean dependent var 1.191000 
Adjusted R-squared -0.024796 S. D. dependent var 1.213493 S. E. of regression 1.228446 Akaike info criterion 3.426233 
Sum squared resid 12.07264 Schwarz criterion 3.486750 
Log likelihood -15.13117 F-statistic 0.782234 Durbin-Watson stat 2.089709 Prob(F-stafistic) 0.402257 
The low Rý obtained shows the limitation of changes in the foreign deposit ratio to 
explain changes in the interest rate. It also suggests that there are some other 
variables missing in the equation. However, the objective here is not to find out 
about the strength and significance of other possible variables. We do however note 
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there is no evidence that greater access to foreign savings is a significant explanatory 
variable to a drop in the real interest rate. 
As regards the foreign exchange regime, the Mauritian rupee moved from 
pegging with a basket of currencies 254 to a managed floating regime in mid 1994. A 
foreign exchange market in US$ was established in Port-Louis through a page in 
Reuters Screen in July 1994 to enhance the flow of information between domestic 
commercial banks for the purpose of the inter-bank foreign exchange operations and 
hence improving the efficiency of the forex. market. In a context of liberalisation of 
exchange control, the BOM has gradually changed its role in the forex market from 
that of a market maker to one of a market player. Initially, the Mauritius Sugar 
Syndicate (MSS) continued surrendering all sugar proceeds to the central bank in 
exchange for the rupee equivalent being credited to their accounts held in 
commercial banks. In July 1996, the MSS had to surrender only 75% foreign 
currency receipts from the sugar proceeds to the BOM and the remaining 25% was 
released directly to the inter-bank foreign exchange market through the auction 
process. Similarly, all companies having foreign currency reserves 255 were required 
to sell 25% in the free market. In July 1999, the MSS was allowed to manage all of 
its foreign exchange earnings though there is a voluntary arrangement whereby the 
MSS surrenders a minority share of its proceeds to the BOM. The proportion 
o/256 surrendered in the financial year 2001-2002 was 36 0. Trade is now boosted in the 
inter-bank foreign exchange market and both domestic and offshore banks are 
254 A weighted basket of Mauritius's major trading partners. 255 Mainly textiles firms and hotels 256 The IMF has, in 2002, urged the government to stop exerting a moral suasion on the MSS in this 
connection. 
-204- 
allowed to trade foreign currencies. The participation of the offshore banks has been 
made possible by authorizing them to invest the rupee counterpart of any sale of 
foreign currency in treasury bills. A few enterprises from the EPZ and tourism 
sectors have set up their own dealing rooms. Broader participation in the foreign 
exchange market allows the exchange rate to be fully market determined. From a 
managed floating regime where the central bank intervenes actively to influence the 
BOP position and exchange rate, although with no commitment to a pre-announced 
path, the country finally moved to an independent floating regime. The exchange rate 
is now essentially market determined but the BOM maintains some intervention 
aiming at smoothing undue short-term fluctuations having adverse impacts on the 
EPZ or on the tourism sector. The intervening currency for the BOM is the US dollar 
while the other currencies face cross rate adjustments. 
The shift to an essentially market-oriented approach by the central bank fits 
in a global financial reform. The central bank is currently targeting the broad 
monetary aggregate M2 as its intermediate target but is informally undertaking some 
inflation targeting. The BOM is considering moving to a formal inflation-targeting 
framework, which will require a better understanding of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (IMF 2002). This will render the monetary authority more 
accountable. Although Mauritius adopted gradualism in the abolition of directed 
credit, interest control and exchange rate control, liberalisation of the banking sector 
did not precede that of the capital account as per the sequencing path proposed in the 
literature (see chapter 3). A table summarizing the various liberalisation stages 
appears in appendix 7. 
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6.4. Regulation, Supervision and Performance 
With financial liberalisation, the banking sector is exposed to greater 
instability. Apart from its basic function of controlling inflation, the central bank has 
to ensure financial stability so that the general public maintains confidence in the 
banking system. 
Risk-managemene 57 is now indispensable in Mauritius and is the 
responsibility of not only banks but also that of the central bank. The quality of the 
regulatory environment is based on risk management and this influences the 
resilience of the financial sector to shockS258 . The high CR2 (see Chapter 5) 
compounded with sectorwise credit concentration warrants strong supervision since 
the failure of a big bank could have a systemic impact. The BOM sets out prudential 
regulations and carries out both off-site and on-site surveillance. It has endorsed all 
of the 25 Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision. To ensure that banks 
harmonise business practices to conform to international standards the BOM has 
issued guidelines in several areas as listed in appendix 8. The performance of banks 
is constantly assessed based on the following various criteria namely, capital 
adequacy and availability, concentration of risk and large exposure, foreign 
exposure, non-performing advances and provisions, profitability and Liquidity 
management. Bank capitalization and asset quality are discussed below. 
A. Bank Capitalisation 
257 The policies, practices and procedures regarding timely measurement, control and monitoring of 
risks so as to minimize any potential adverse impact. 
258 The magnitude of the shock is also another important determinant. 
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Capital Base 
To tighten prudential requirements the minimum capital was increased from 
Rs 25m to Rs 50m in January 1997 then to Rs 75m in January 1988 and to Rs 100m 
as from January 1999. Raising the minimum capital requirement also guaranties a 
minimum size for all banks in a small country and avoids the proliferation of too 
259 small banks , which, because of inability to achieve economies of scale in areas 
such as maturity transfort-nation and risk pooling, might be tempted to adopt risky 
behaviour. In order to ensure diversification of ownership, no single individual or 
related party is authorised to owe more than 15% of a bank's capital. 
Capital Adeguacy Ratio Solvency Ratio) 
Banks assets are classified into four categories of risk weights as shown 
below. 
Table 7.6 
RISKINESS OF ASSETS 
Risk 
Weights 
Assets 
0 Cash, Treasury Bills 
20 Inter-bank loans 
50 Loan to individuals... 
100 Other loan & overdrafts to 
firms 
Risk 
Weights 
% of bank's total on-balance sheet assets 
at different w ights. 
% June 
2001 
June 
2002 
June 
2003 
0 23.6 
_27 
31.5 
20 8.8 8.6 7.9 
50 5.7 4.0 4.1 
100 61.9 60.5 56.5 
, aource:, uum aource: Lium 
2'9 Taiwan is facing a banking glut with adverse impact on the banks' efficiently and their capacity to 
compete in the South East Asian region. 260 Totally secured by I' rank mortgaged. 
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It can be observed that the amount of assets in the 100% risk weight is 
declining while a higher figure is registered in the 0% risk category. This suggests 
that banks are moving to a lower risk profile. 
In 1993, the target ratio of capital base to risk asset was set at 8% as per the 
Basel provision. For the purpose of calculation, some deductionS26 1 are made from 
the capital base. However the Basel figure represents only a minimum standard and 
many banks in Latin America adhering strictly to this figure have been in trouble in 
recent years. This has led several countries to tighten the prudential requirement so 
as to be in a better position to absorb any unforeseen shock. Argentina for instance 
has raised it to 11.5% while in Mauritius the figure has been changed from 8% to 9% 
and subsequently to 10%262 in July 1997. It is to be observed that in case of winding 
up, depositors do not lose money if the loss is lower than the bank's capital since 
depositors' funds are ranked before capital. So a higher ratio gives a higher 
protection to depositors. This inspired the BOM to pitch the ratio at a level still 
higher than international standards. 
26' E. g. investments in subsidiaries and associates, lending of a capital nature including subordinated 
loan capital to subsidiary and associated banks, and holdings of other banks' capital instruments in 
Mauritius. 
262 Le In Mauritius a bank's capital is 10% of the size of its credit exposures. 
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Table 8.6 
Changes in Capital Ratio (June 1996 - 2004) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
As at End of June 
Required % 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Average for 12 35 12 96 49 12 12 93 24 12 13.1 13.4 12.6 14. Banking sector (%) . I . . I . . I I 
Low N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A I N. A 13 12.3 12.6 
High N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 13.4 13.5 15.0 
Range for 9.11 10.21 10.5 10.64 10.56 10.8 11.1 
All Banks (%) to to to to to to to N. A N. A 
25.03 1 38.81 49.30 69.06 61.00 70.6 1 63.6 
, Nource: Bank oj Mauritius 
The table reveals that capital adequacy ratio for the industry satisfies the 
international requirements (8%) and the higher domestic requirements. The range 
shows that the ratio varies widely among banks but that no bank is undercapitalized. 
The Basel provision regarding core and subsidiary capital is reproduced in appendix 
9. In Mauritius, the ratio of tier I (core capital) to tier 2 as shown in the table below 
is stable and well above 50% reflecting high prudence by international standards. 
Table 9.6 
PrODortion of Core nnd Snh-ddinrv Cnnital 
AsatendofJune 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Core Capital 
84 3 84 3 84 8 84 2 81.1 83.6 83.4 84.2 81.4 81.8 % of total Capital . . . . 
Subsidiary Capital 
15 7 15 7 15 2 15 8 18.9 16.4 16.6 15.8 18.6 18.2 % of total Capital I . . . . I I I I I 
-i Source: Bank ofMaurilius 
The ratio core capital to deposits indicates the extent to which shareholders 
have committed their own resources into the bank in comparison to funds made 
available by depositors. This ratio as examined in table 10.6 has been fluctuating 
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very narrowly around 10% showing that bankers have been injecting adequate 
capital in their business 
263 
. 
Table 10.6 
Core Capital as a proportion of Total Deposits 
As at end ofJune 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
" 
2004 
Core Capital (Rbn) 4.5 5.1 5.8 7.0 8.1 9.3 10.5 11.9 12.9 13.0 
Total Deposits (Rbn) 44.8 51.9 56.8 66.6 75.8 84.3 92.4 104.2 116.3 132.7 
% 10.0 9.8 10.2 10.5 10.7 11.0 11.4 11.4 11.1 9.8 
Source: BOM 
B. Asset (Credit) Quality 
To facilitate the depicting of any potential downgrading of assets, loans are 
now classified by riskS264 in four categories (Standard credit, Sub-standard credit, 
doubtful credit and irrecoverable loans) with specific provisions in banks' income 
statements (see appendix 10). 
263 A figure above 8% is generally considered good. 264 Le related to the probability of their being serviced. Classification as "current" or in "arrears" is 
no longer acceptable to the BOM as in the past. 
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Table 11.6 
Non-Performing LoanS265 Ratios (1997 to 2003) 
As at 
June 
Total Loans 
& Advances 
of Banks 
(A) Rsm 
Capital 
Base 
(C) 
Non- 
Performing 
Loans 
(NPL) 
NPL 
% of 
A 
NPL 
% of 
C 
1997 34629 N. A 2717 7.8 N. A 
1998 40698 7092 3496 9.0 49.2 
1999 52795 8627 4774 9.0 55.3 
2000 61836 9255 5172 8.1 55.9 
2001 71507 10704 5570 7.8 52.0 
2002 74715 12174 5987 8.0 49.2 
2003 85391 12543 6860 8.0 54.8 
2004 89037 15248 7464 8.4 48.9 
Source: BUM, Annual Reports - Several Issues 
The NPL ratio 266 is high but not alarming 267 in spite of a small rise during the 
last three years. Fortunately, banks in Mauritius are adequately-capitalized as 
discussed in the previous section and the exposure of banks capital to erosion seem 
to be going down (except for year 2003) as indicated by the ratio NPL to capital 
base. The provisions made are below 50% of the non-performing loans level. 
265A loan is defined as non-performing whenever the principal or interest on past due accounts are 
due and unpaid for 90 days or more. 266 Ratio NPL to Loans. 
267 In Dec 2001 the NPL ratio of the largest bank in China was 29.8%. In Dec 2004, the NPL ratio of 
the 16 largest banks in China had been brought down to 13.2%. Government policy in an emerging 
economy like Taiwan is to reduce the NPL ratio to below 5%. The ratio in USA during the last 2 
decades has been below 3%. 
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Table 12.6 
Ratio Provisions for Bad Debts to NPL (1997-2004) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1 2002 2003 1 2004 
PFBD* 
% of 46.7 50.3 38.4 31.1 30.8 35.2 42.2 44.8 
NPL 
3ourCe: BUM Annual Report -Neveral Issues , rrovisionjor Lfaa VeDIS 
This low proportion has not posed any problem to banks as they benefit from 
a preferential creditor rights in the liquidation exercise and they generally achieve 
full recovery from collateral. Personal loans are generally not collateralized but are 
guaranteed by two persons 268 whose monthly salaries are credited to deposit accounts 
at the lending bank. It is only recently in an attempt to compete with the two big 
banks that that Barclays Bank has started providing personal loans even without 
guarantors. However this is restricted to small loans of below RI 
0000269. 
C. Proritability 
Profits contribute to the capacity of banks to absorb losses. Interest for loans 
and advances remains by far the most important contributor to domestic banks' 
profits as shown below. 
268 Jointly and in solido. 
269 RI 0000 is below the average wage in the public sector. 
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Table 13.6 
Comnonentq nfRnnk-. 1 Inenmi-. Uiinpý fil tn flAl 
Income (016) Item Share 
of Banks' 
June June June June 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Interest on Loan and advances 66 66 64 72 
Interest on Investment in Treasury bills and _ 
Government Securities 15 14 17 8 
19 1 20 1 19 1 20 
aource: BanK oj Mauritius Annual Report 
Figure 6.6 
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Figure 6.6 reveals that there has not been any important change after 
liberallisation in the degree to which banks' assets have been utilised in realizing 
profit as indicated by a stable return of around 2%. In so far as return on equity is 
concerned a slight downward trend can be observed. However, the current level of 
270 Profit from foreign exchange transactions, fees and commission receivable, non-interest income. 
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profitability (above 18%) still compares favourably with the top non-financial 
corporate entities in the country whose pre-tax return on equity border on 13%271. 
6.5 Market DisciDline in The Bankin Sector 
Strong prudential regulation and supervision can minimize the risk of bank 
distress and failure but will never eliminate such risks completely. To promote a 
sound and efficient financial system, many countries are calling for greater market 
discipline as a complementary approach. Regular and timely public disclosure by 
banks to market participants rather than only to supervisors increases accountability 
of bank managers and directors. Whilst the ordinary depositors might not be able to 
interpret the disclosed information correctly 272 and might thus not show much 
interest at reading these, the financial analysts, advisers and fellow bankers 273 will do 
so. It is sometimes argued that when a bank discloses a loss or a severe deterioration 
in asset quality, the bank faces liquidity pressure exacerbating its problems. To this 
Brash (1997) counter argues that in the absence of disclosure requirements market 
speculation about a bank's financial position may lead to a reaction that is more 
adverse from depositors. Further, a bank knows in advance that it will be making 
adverse disclosure and it can mitigate potential hostile reactions by taking remedial 
steps and mentioning these in the disclosure. 
In Mauritius, bank directors as well as officers are legally liable to fine and 
imprisonment for erroneous or misleading information to the central bank. Apart 
271 Calculated from the figures available in the SEM Fact Book. 272 In New Zealand the central bank has reduced informational imperfection by preparing a user 
guide to assist depositors' understanding of bank disclosure. 
273 Fellow bankers will have a close monitoring because of inter-bank deposits. 
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from six monthly audited accounts banks have to submit monthly statements of 
assets and liabilities as well as any information concerning their operations and those 
of their affiliates whenever required by the BOM. There is however no obligation on 
banks to publish regular statements for the general public 274 . The latter gets access 
only to annual financial statements that are in a format that does not allow 
comparison in the industry. External auditors have to submit a copy of their report to 
the central bank and are legally required to report any case of misconduct by 
managers or directors. However, no legal action is provided for against external 
auditors by the central bank in cases of negligence. 
6.6 Reforms and Interest Spread 
6.6.1 Changes Observed 
The objectives of the policy of liberalisation is that after government determination 
of interest rates has been replaced by market determined ones, increased competition 
should lead to improved efficiency causing a narrowing of the interest spread. As a 
matter of fact some banks in Mauritius do offer the same interest rates on deposits 
and this could be hastily interpreted that there is cartelization. Nonetheless the 
general picture observed by the supervision department of the BOM is that deposit 
and lending rates, fees and commissions do vary from bank to bank, (Basant Roi 
2004). 
274 In New Zealand for instance, banks are required to publish a disclosure statement on a quarterly 
basis. A user guide is prepared by the central bank to improve readership. 
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Interest spread is examined over a 16-year period to find out what changes have 
been observed after liberalisation. The interest spread has been calculated as the 
difference between a weighted average lending and deposit rate. 
Figure 7.6 
Bank Interest Spread 1987-2003 
8 
7 
6 
6 
4 
3 
2 
88 so 92 94 96 98 00 02 
Source: BOM 
The observation is that interest spread has been widening up from 1992 to 1996 and 
from then onwards it has started to narrow down. Taking into account that the 
interest rate liberalisation started in 1991 and ended in 1995 it then appears that the 
shift to market-oriented monetary instruments has, after an adjustment period, led to 
a continuous reduction in the cost of intermediation. This could suggest that some 
competitive forces are at work and that government determination of interest rates 
has not simply been replaced by collusive oligopolistic actions of banks. However, it 
is to be noted that the spread today has not yet reached its pre-liberalisation level. 
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6.6.2 Reforms and Banking Crisis 
In Chapter 4 reference was made to several financial sector crises following 
liberalisation. There has not been any bank run or any other easily identifiable crises 
in Mauritius yet. Nonetheless, an attempt is made here to define banking crisis with 
respect to certain quantitative criteria and to find out whether the banking sector in 
Mauritius has faced a crisis as per these criteria. Banking crisis is defined here as a 
period of significant decline in deposits. Such periods are made more visible using an 
adapted version of CMAX for the banking sector. CMAX is actually a widely used 
variable by equity practitioners 275 and will also be used in Chapter 7. CMAX is 
defined here as follows: 
CMAX Deposits = 
Aggregate Banking Deposit at Time t 
Maximum Aggregate Banking Deposit for the Period up to Time t 
The denominator in the above ratio represents a previous historical maximum. Two 
levels of crisis are identified using trigger levels of 1.5 and 2 standard deviations 
below the mean of the CMAX series. The first level is considered as a mini crisis and 
the second one a crisis. Using such criteria crises are identified below. The decline in 
deposit during a crisis situation is measured by the percentage drop from the pre- 
crisis level to the one at the trough of the crisis. 
275 See MSCI, a monthly publication of Morgan Stanley. 
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Figure 8.6 
Bank Deposit CMAX Crises - Jan1985 to Dec 2004 
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Figure 10.6 reveals a generally stable situation over the last two decades with seven 
episodes of crisis, four of them being mini-crises, and three crises. The profile of 
these crises is exhibited in the table below. 
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Table 14.6 
Bank Deposit Crisis and Characteristics 
Crisis Trough Type % Drop in 
Duration 
No. Date Deposit 
Mar. I month Mini 
1 1985 or less Crisis 1.6 
1 month Mini 
2 Jul. 1989 or less Crisis 1.9 
2-3 
Crisis 
3 Oct. 1989 months 2.9 
1 month Mini 
4 Feb. 1995 or less Crisis 1.8 
Apr. I month 
Crisis 
5 1995 or less 3.3 
Apr. 8-9 
Crisis 
6 1996 months 4.7 
Jul. I month Mini 
7 1998 or less Crisis 1.7 
Although the April 1996 crisis is the most important episode based on magnitude of 
decline in deposits and duration of crisis it is nonetheless still far from a bank run 
situation where deposits would most likely have dropped by a much larger 
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proportion. Identification of these crises could lead to future research about whether 
these were caused by bad banking or a bad operating environment of a 
macroeconomic nature. 
6.7 Summary 
Chapter 6 has covered the major monetary reforms that have taken place 
since the end the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. It has shown that there has been an 
adjustment in the distribution of credit in the economy following the elimination of 
directed credit programme. On the internal front reforms have led to a shift from 
direct to market oriented monetary control mechanisms rendering price and 
allocation of credit more market determined. Externally, there has been a gradual 
lifting of exchange controls and the exchange rate is now basically market 
determined. In spite of a gradual liberalisation Mauritius proceeded with both 
internal and external liberalisation side by side and did so successfully. There is 
neither any evidence of an increase in real interest rate just after liberalisation nor 
any improvement in domestic savings as suggested by the liberalisation theories. 
Further the greater access to foreign savings following external liberalisation has not 
led to a drop in real interest rate. 
The regulatory and supervision framework adopted by the BOM to maintain 
the stability of the financial system as well as some aspects of banks' performance 
have been examined. The general picture is that banks in Mauritius adhere to the 
requirements and are prudently managed. The level of non-performing loans has not 
been improved over the last few years but is not alarming especially because banks 
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are adequately capitalized and have full recovery from collaterals. Information flow 
has also improved with accounting standards, disclosure requirements, external 
auditing and credit rating being now under scrutiny. 
As for the effects of liberalisation on interest spread, the study has shown 
that this initially widened but is now gradually narrowing. The study also shows that 
banking crisis has not been a major issue in the Mauritius. From the seven episodes 
of crisis identified, the most serious one was earmarked by a drop in aggregate 
deposits of only 4.7% and lasted eight to nine months. 
Although the banking sector is very dominant, the strategy of developing a 
multi-layered financial system with a stronger influence of the capital markets than at 
present justifies an examination of the impact of liberalisation on the stock market in 
the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
AND LIBERALISATION IMPACT IN MAURITIUS 
7.1 Stock Market Development in Mauritius 
The methodology employed in measuring stock market development uses 
four indicators following Demirgat-Kunt and Levine (1996) and Levine and Zervos 
(1998). 
1. No. of listed companies 
2. Market Capital isation/GDP 
I 
Reflecting Market Size 
3. Tumover (traded value)/Market Capitalisation - Reflecting Market Liquidity 
4. Tumover /GDP -Reflecting Market Activity. 
During the 1990s, various policies have been reviewed in order to consolidate 
the stock market. Some of the new policies are the opening of the market to foreign 
portfolio investors, the adoption of new listing ruleS276 in line with international 
standards to facilitate cross-border listing and a changeover to electronic trading. 
Yet, the figures displayed in table 1.7 do not indicate significant improvement in 
market size, liquidity or activity. 
276 Listing Rules 2000. 
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Table 1.7 
Stock Market Development Indicators in Mauritius (1989-2003) 
Year No, of 
Listed Entities 
Market 
Capitalisation to 
Turnover 
to 
Turnover 
to 
(AtDec) 
Equity Equity 
& 
Debt* 
GDP 
(%) 
Capitalisation 
(0/0) 
GDP 
(0/0) 
1989 6 6 432 0.97 0.04 
1991 19 20 10.97 1.67 0.18 
1993 29 30 26.39 4.64 1.22 
1995 39 41 39.58 4A3 1.75 
1997 42 46 41.92 8.11 3AO 
1999 43 48 38.73 4.74 1.84 
2001 40 46 31.1 5.52 1.72 
2003 39 44 24.33 10.24 2A9 
Source., SEMFaclBooAs -Severallssuea 0 Deht Debentures & TreasuryBill 
The figures reveal that the market is not very active. Market size grew rapidly 
just after trading started in 1989 and stabilized in the mid 1990s. Since then there has 
been no significant improvement. Market capitalization ratio went down on account 
of 'bearish' market conditions. Insufficient liquidity can affect the interest of security 
holders should they face a liquidity shock. Given that listed companies and their 
subsidiaries benefit from 15% corporate tax rather than the 25% normal rate, there is 
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a possibility that companies are being listed primarily for fiscal advantages but this 
requires further investigation. The low activity could be an indication that the 
investors have a stronger tendency to adhere to Malkiel's preaching about long-term 
buying and holding of a broad-based portfolio rather than chasing capital gains from 
the best individual security, (Malkiel, 1973). Such passive strategy of investors also 
reflects the insufficient presence of managed funds in the capital market. In 
developed financial centres, collective investment schemes play a crucial role in 
directing savings to the stock market and are active in security trading. In developing 
countries the capacity of the branch network of these institutional investors to reach 
the dispersed small and medium sized investors is often constrained by geographical 
remoteness (Calamanti, 1983). However, difficulty of access to such financial 
institutions is not an issue in Mauritius given the size of the country and the adequate 
communication network 277 . Yet the popularity of savings in the 
form of collective 
investment is still very low amongst small investors. People from the industry over- 
emphasize savings capacity as a reason for low share ownership (directly or through 
collective investment schemes). This could be one of various determinants that need 
to be identified. Table 2.7 shows that although the gross national savings rate in 
Mauritius is weak compared to South East Asian emerging markets, still it compares 
favourably with South Africa, and Zimbabwe, USA and UK. The security markets in 
these four countries are nonetheless highly capitalized and very liquid. It must 
however be remembered that these are highly internationalized ones. 
277 Road transport and telecommunication. 
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Table 2.7 
Gross National Savings Rate 
December 2002 
Mauritius 27.0 
South Africa 15.5 
Zimbabwe* 7.9 
Kenya 9.3 
Botswana 30.9 
Tanzania 10.2 
Ghana 21.3 
Nigeria 14.7 
South Korea 27.2 
Malaysia 30.9 
Singapore 42.0 
USA 15.0 
UK 14.7 
Source: World Bank 
Some possible reasons for low share ownership could inter alia be family- 
based business tradition, lack of public stocks, and a thin spread between risk-free 
278 return on Treasury bills and stock portfolio return . 
278 Stock returns before and after liberalisation are examined at section 7.2.4 of the chapter. 
-225- 
The factors responsible for low exposure to share ownership in Mauritius 
remain an area of study for future research. Changes in market sentiment due to 
stock crises in S. E Asia in 1998 and the bearish NASDAQ market between 2000 and 
2002 279 contributed to the moroseness on the Mauritian stock market between 1998 
and 2002 but the indicators have picked up since mid 2002. Stock market crisis will 
be examined at the end of this chapter. 
Table 3.7 reveals that the stock exchange in Mauritius can be considered as 
the third most important exchange in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
279 From II th March 2000, over a 640 days period, NASDAQ declined by about 70%. This drop is 
comparable to the Dow Jones drop that started on September Yd, 1929. 
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Table 3.7 
Comparison with Sub-Saharan Africa (December 2002) 
Date of 
Establishment 
Date of 
Liberalisation 
No. of 
listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio 
S. Africa 1887 1995 450 144.2 49.6 
Zimbabwe 1896 1993 76 188.2 21.1 
Kenya 1954 1995 57 18.4 3.0 
Nigeria 1960 N. A 195 12.6 8.4 
Mauritius 1988 1994 40 26.9 4.5 
Botswana 1989 1994 18 29.3 3.9 
Ghana 1990 Yes 24 12.6 1.5 
Swaziland* 1991 Not Yet 6 10 0.3 
Namibia 1993 N. A 13 6.1 0.9 
Zambia* 1994 1999 12 8.1 1.0 
Malawi* 1996 Yes 7 7.4 5.9 
Uganda* 1998 Not Yet 2 N. A N. A 
Tanzania* 1998 Not Yet 4 3 19.4 
Mozambique 1999 Not yet N. A N. A N. A 
Sources., Slandard & Poors; World Bank- COAESA, SEMfact Book, Liquidaftica. com 
* For these countries onlyyear 2000figures are available 
In Mauritius stock market development is not constrained by unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions, political instability, an unfavourable tax regime and a 
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very low level of income, as is the case in several Sub-Saharan countries. Yet, it is 
still weak in terms of both market size and liquidity. South Africa exhibits an 
exceptionally high level of development but this is a country with a sophisticated 
equity market and a well-established securities exchange created in 1886. 
Table 4.7 
Selected Country Comparison of Stock Market Size with Banking Sector Size 
(December 2002) 
Source: Standard & Poors, International Federation of Stock Exchanges, IMF. World Bank 
StockMarket 
Capitalisation 
in GDP % 
Bank Asset 
in GDP % 
Credit* 
to Private Sector 
in GDP % 
Mauritius 26.9 91.7 58.1 
S. Africa 144.1 91.2 74.5 
Zimbabwe 188.2 121.9 63.7 
Kenya 18.4 124.8 105.3 
Nigeria 12.6 294.3 128.3 
Botswana 29.3 31.9 19.2 
Ghana 12.6 39.9 12.1 
Swaziland** 6.1 24.0 14.4 
Namibia 6.1 51.3 41.4 
Zambia 8.1 24.3 5.9 
Malawi 7.4 13.6 4.1 
Tanzania 3 18.7 6.3 
Japan 53 151.2 102 
Indonesia 17.3 63 21.8 
Malaysia N. A 142.2 97.7 
Thailand 36.6 115.4 81.0 
U. S. A 105.6 60.5 51.9 
U. K 120 293.5 141.7 
* Deposit Bank Credit to Private Sector, ** Year 2000figures 
The above figures reveal that both stock market capitalisation and banking 
intermediation in Mauritius and in most Sub-Saharan African countries are still far 
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below the level reached in developed financial markets and in some important 
emerging markets. 
Although the stock market in Mauritius has contributed to the improvement 
of the financial environment, balance sheet examination of some listed companies 
reveal that most corporate physical investment in Mauritius is still being financed 
from retained earnings and to a lesser extent by loans. Corporate financing will be 
further examined in Chapter 8 through an econometric analysis. 
Table 5.7 
Annual Investment Changes, Share Capital, Equity & Debt (Rsm) 
Some Listed Companies (1990 to 2001) 
Companies 
Gross 
Physical 
Investment 
Average 
Increase in 
Share 
Capital 
Average 
Increase in 
Shareholders 
Fund 
DEBT* 
HAREL 
FRERES 3.4 0.24 15.3, 37.1 
MDA 17.6 0 3.5 7.1 
UBP 60.6 8.6 27 3.7 
MOROIL 13.9 10.4 19 1.3 
COURTS 22.2 8.5 8.6 0.3 
NISM 22.6 0.9 13.4 3.3 
ROGERS 252 9.6 60 52 
MOUNT 3.5 0 2.1 3.6 
SWAN 8.6 1-0.1 28.5 0 
MTMD 16.9 111.3 145.7 10.4 
SAVANAH 20.6 10 25.2 13.4 
Nource: Annual Reports. 
Average ofchange between highest & lowest levelfor the period 
The contribution of new issues to the financing of private fixed capital 
formation is still low, despite dividend yield, which provides a rough approximation 
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for the cost of raising capital by new issues, being consistently lower than the cost of 
bank borrowing. 
Table 6.7 
Average Dividend Yield and Lending Rate 1990-2001 
1990 1992 1994 1996 19981 2000 20021 2003* 
Avemge Dividend Yield 
of listed Companies 6.2 6.0 3.32 3.97 4.03 6.84 9.8 5.74 
Lending Rate 18 17.13 18.921 20.81 19.921 20.771 14.7 14.3 
Source: SEM lid Fact Boolt, IFS, BOM 
* 2004 Average dividendyield will only he published in theforthcomingSEMFactbook2005 
Even if the lending rate were to be adjusted downward to capture the tax 
advantage aspect of borrowing, still the cost of bank borrowing 280 would be higher 
than the cost of raising capital by new issues. The lack of preference for equity 
financing could then be an indication that the stock market is not strong. This could 
suggest that most of the private companies that have gone public during the last 
fifteen years have maintained their family-based tradition and are not very willing to 
offer shares to the public beyond the minimum requirement per the listing 
requirements. 
280 Cost of debt = Bank interest on loans (I -Tax Rate), while marginal tax rate is 25%. 
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7.2 Stock Market Liberalisation 
7.2.1 Transactions by Foreigners 
The decision to allow foreigners to buy shares on the SEM was taken after 
the other reforms such as interest rate liberalisation and trade liberalisation had been 
implemented. As far as capital inflows are concerned, following the lifting of 
exchange controls in July 1994, foreigners can invest freely on the SEM subject to 
two restrictions 281 pertaining to the portfolio nature of the capital flows: 
I. Acquisition of shares must not aim at controlling interest in the company. 
2. Foreigners can hold a maximum of 15% of voting rights of a company in 
the sugar sector. 
As for capital outflows, all foreign capital repatriation is fully authorised. The 
same fiscal incentives apply to foreigners and to local investors. Dividends, interest 
on bonds as well as capital gains are tax-free for both residents and non-residents. 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) now includes Mauritius in its 
frontier index and international investors can therefore compare with other markets. 
The SEM now acts as a channel for portfolio capital inflows. 
The removal of barriers to cross-border flows is expected to enhance 
integration in world capital markets and to bring domestic share prices in line with 
prices abroad. Firms wishing to get access to portfolio capital inflows have to 
improve their disclosure of information, accounting systems as well as their 
performance. 
28 'A foreigner may however be granted an exempt status and hence does not face the two 
restrictions. 
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External liberalisation also brings the Mauritian stock market infrastructure 
under international scrutiny as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Before 1994, access to Mauritian financial securities by foreigners could only 
be through the Mauritius Fund, a closed-ended fund listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Since the opening of the SEM to foreign investors the market has 
generally contributed to inflows of short-term capital but since 1998 there has been 
an important reversal of flows as shown in figure 1.7 and this has had the effect of 
reducing the accumulated foreign investment as depicted in figure 2.7. 
Figure 1.7 
Foreign Portfolio Flows on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius: 1994-2003 (Rsm) 
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Figure 2.7 
Accumulated Foreign Portfolio Investment on the SEM (Dec 94-03) 
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The exceptionally high inflow in 1997 (Figure 1.7) is due to a one-off event. 
This was because of the sales of SBM shares under the NEDCOR-SBM alliance and 
which accounts for Rs960 million (50% of the inflows) while those in 2000 are due 
to a better price earnings ratio. The huge outflows inl998-99 resulted from loss of 
confidence in emerging markets following the S. E. Asian crisis. Another reason 
attributed in SEM "circles" to foreign disinvestment is that sticky stock prices do not 
provide large scope for international speculators. It must also be recalled that the 
willingness of foreigners to invest is influenced by the exchange rate. A persistent 
depreciation of the Mauritian rupee against the major currencies is a disincentive as 
foreign investors loose upon switching their investment back. 
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A comparison between domestic and foreign activity on the SEM as 
measured by traded value in Figure 3.7 reveals that after ten years of liberalisation, 
the integration of the domestic equity market in the world capital market is still at an 
infant stage. 
Figure 3.7 
Share of Domestic and Foreign Turnover (1994-2003). 
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7.2.2 Liberalisation and Stock Prices 
As indicated earlier, with foreigners getting free access to transaction in shares listed 
on the SEM, a realignment of share prices was expected. A Chow-test is run with 
semdex for 200 trading sessions before and 200 sessions after the liberalisation date 
to identify any structural change. 
f1O :PI :_02 [Same Slope Coefficient] 
H, : Pj : ýý_ P2 
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Table 7.7 
Stability Test with Break Point in the Liberalisation Year, 1994. 
Dependent Variable: SEMDEX 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/02/04 Time: 11: 54 
Sample: 1400 
Included observations: 400 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
YEAR 0.355198 0.027178 13.06939 0.0000 
C 282.7063 6.288220 44.95808 0.0000 
R-squared 0.300292 Mean dependent var 353.9235 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298534 S. D. dependent var 74.93931 
S. E. of regression 62.76433 Akaike info criterion 11.12164 
Sum squared resid 1567866. Schwarz criterion 11.14160 
Log likelihood -2222.328 F-statistic 170.8090 Durbin-Watson stat 0.003207 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Chow Breakpoint T st: 201 
F-statistic 1866.000 Probability 0.000000 
Log likelihood ratio 937.6537 Probability 0.000000 
The results show that the null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected. 
Stock prices are now examined to check volatility of stock prices before and after 
liberalisation. Two samples of SEMDEX value, one for the two hundred trading 
sessions held just before August 1994 and one for the next two hundred sessions are 
examined to determine whether stock prices are more variable after liberalisation 
than before. 
-235- 
Table 8.7 
Equality Test for Variability 
F-Test Twc 
Sample for Variances 
BEFORE 
LIBERALISATION 
AFTER 
LIBERALISATION 
Mean 309.27405 398.5729 
Variance 4013.326217 3239.51587 
Observations 200 200 
df 199 199 
F 1.238866046 
P(F<=ý one-tail 0.065844719 
F Critical one-tail 1.263340543 
After liberalisation higher variability could be expected due to integration 
with in the world capital market and the consequential alignment of domestic stock 
prices. However, the results from these two samples reveal lower variability with 
variance 3239 as compared to 4013 for the period before liberalisation. 
NullHypothesis H0 :aI= cr 2 
Upper one-tailed test. 
Altemati-c HypothesisH 
I: cr I> cr 2 
At 5% significance level, the F-test statistic value does not exceed the upper 
critical F-value. It can therefore be concluded that the sample does not provide 
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that variability of stock prices before 
and after are equal. 
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7.2.3 Random Walk of Stock Prices 
If investors can choose any security in a world where price reflects all 
available information then asset prices represent accurate signals for the stock market 
to allocate the capital stock in the economy and the market is considered to be an 
efficient one. Fama (1965,1970) argued that if important current information is 
almost freely available and the stock market is flooded with a large number of 
rational profit-maximisers competing actively, the market is likely to be an 
efficien t282 one with prices responding rapidly to new infonnation 283. In the extreme 
case of a perfectly efficient market it is pointless to waste time trying to identify 
undervalued stocks to buy or overvalued stockS284 to sell. Buying and selling then 
become a fair game of chance and stock prices move as random walks over time and 
are serially independent. Under such conditions, historical pattern of price is of no 
use in predicting future stock prices, and the present value of market price is the best 
predictor of future price with a stochastic 285 error having an expected value of zero. 
It is worth noting that this belief is in opposition to Chartism (Technical Analysis) 
which considers that share prices and volumes move in trends which are determined 
by the fundamental factors like changing attitudes of investors towards economic, 
political and psychological factors and that these trends are predictable to a certain 
extent (Prince, 1985). Chartists examine daily/weekly patterns from charts indicating 
high, low, closing prices and volume and consider that the emerging bullish and 
282 Informationally efficient. 
283 Information relates to events like merging, stock splits, firm's dividend policy. 284 If price responds rapidly to information there is in the extreme case no possibility of having 
overvalued or undervalues stocks. 285 Unpredictable. 
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bearish patterns are useful for building an investment strategy. It must be pointed out 
that under the random walk hypothesis even if asset prices exhibit trends over time, 
the fluctuations away from the trend should be unpredictable. If we cannot predict 
the changes in stock prices then the random walk model of stock prices implies that 
the net change in a stock price is, on average, equal to zero. In mathematical terms: 
Pt =a+ PI-1 + et 
AP =a+ el E[eI=0 
The real world cannot be totally efficient and often it has been observed that 
fund managers have been outperforming the market by devoting resources to 
uncovering information. Warren Buffett, the world's greatest stock market investor, 
has actually made millions by an investment strategy based on undervalued stocks. 
Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis however argue that because of 
anomalies in the market, prices may be overvalued or undervalued only in random 
occurrences and strategies to beat the market cannot be a consistent phenomenon. 
Under this analytical framework, Fama (1970) defined three categories of 
efficient market with respect to the extent to which information is reflected in market 
prices: 
(i) Strong form of efficiency: all information in the market is incorporated in 
stock prices; 
(ii) Semi-strong efficiency: all public information is accounted for in stock 
prices; 
(iii) Weak efficiency: all past prices are reflected in to-day's price. 
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Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) and Maghyereh and Omet (2002) find no 
evidence of improved informational efficiency after liberalisation in emerging 
markets. The earlier discussion in this Chapter suggests that the stock market in 
Mauritius is characterized by lack of participants and presence of participants 
adopting the passive buy-and-hold strategies. This justifies the need to investigate the 
random walk movement of SEMDEX before and after liberalisation and market 
efficiency. In respect to this a variety of approaches is adopted below. 
In order to get a first insight of the empirical evidence in Mauritius, the stock 
prices for two samples each representing two hundred observations, one before and 
one after liberalisation are regressed against their lagged values (orderl) below. 
Figure 4.7 
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Figure 5.7 
Stock Prices Lagged One Trading Session 
(200 Sessions after Liberalisation) 
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It can be observed that both before and after the liberalisation period the plots 
are tightly scattered about the trend line. This is a first indication that both before and 
after liberalisation, stock price at trading session t is nearly perfectly predicted by 
price at session t-l. The stock prices do not therefore contain any other predictable 
component and tend to follow a random walk. 
Further indication is obtained by examining the correlograms below. 
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350 400 450 500 
Figure 6.7 
Correlog ram: 200 Trading Sessions 
lielore Liberalisation ILevels 
l-orrellogreirin of 5 TOPRIBEF 
Date. 10/31/04 Time. 16: 03 
Sample: 1 200 
Included observations: 200 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.976 0975 193.03 0.000 
2 0.949 -0.041 376,70 0.000 
3 0.922 -0014 551 18 0.000 
4 0.896 -0.014 716.65 0.000 
5 0,870 -0,006 87347 0.000 
6 0.846 0.023 1022.5 0.000 
7 &823 0 016 1164.3 MOO 
8 0.801 -0.009 1299.3 0.000 
I 1 1 9 0.779 0 000 1427.7 0,000 
10 0.758 0,000 1549.8 0.000 
11 0737 0 001 115661 OZOO 
12 0.718 0020 1777,0 0.000 
13 0.700 0.000 1882.8 0.000 
14 0.682 -0009 1983,7 0.000 
15 0.663 -0,009 2079.8 0.000 
16 0.646 0,012 2171 
ý40.000 17 0,629 -&003 2258.7 0.000 
18 0613 0008 2342,1 &000 
19 0.597 0,003 2421.7 0.000 
20 0.562 0,005 2497 
ý80.000 
Figure 7.7 
Correlogram: 200 Trading Sessions 
Before Liberalisation 11" difference] 
Date: 05/31/04 Time: 19: 31 
Sample: 1 200 
Included observations: 199 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC O-Stat Prob 
1 0.532 0.532 57.087 0.000 
2 0.336 0.075 80.070 0.000 
3 0.234 0.041 91.282 OMO 
4 0.174 0.028 97.617 0.000 
5 0.222 0.142 107.69 0.000 
6 0.161 -0.030 1113ý07 0.000 
7 0.111 -0.013 115.63 0.000 
8 0.012 -0.099 115.67 0.000 
9 0.017 &039 115.73 0.000 
10 0.041 0,022 116-08 0000 
11 -0.061 -0.140 116.86 0.000 
12 -0.082 -0.032 118.30 0.000 
13 -0.062 0.046 119.12 0.000 
14 -0-075 -0.036 120.35 0.000 
11 15 0.006 0.085 120.36 0.000 
11 1 16 -0.053 -0.085 120.98 0.000 
11 1 17 -0110 -0.063 123.64 0.000 
18 -0.101 0.016 125.87 0.000 
19 -0.076 0.007 127.13 0.000 
20 -0.018 0.018 127.21 0.000 
The slow decline 
of the correlograrn 
is an indication of 
NonstationaritY. 
When testing the 
first difference of 
the time series the 
correlations cut off 
after some lags, 
indicating 
stationarity. 
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Figure 8.7 
Correlogram: 200 Trading Sessions 
IAHCr UlDerausation 
Date: 05/31/04 Time 20,35 
Sample: 1 200 
Included observationsi 200 
Autocorrelation Part iaI Correlation AC PAC 0- St at Prob 
1 &994 0.994 20&54 0.000 
2 0.986 -0.177 39&78 OMO 
3 0.976 -0.060 594.30 U000 
4 0.966 -0.054 78677 0000 
6 0,956 -0,018 976M 0.000 
6 0.946 0.043 1162.2 0.000 
7 0.935 -OM9 13453 0.000 
8 Oý925 -0.005 1525.1 0.000 
9 0.914 -0.007 1701 8 OMO 
10 0.903 -0.057 113761 0.000 
11 Oý891 -0.012 2044,9 0.000 
12 0,879 -0.069 2210.8 &000 
13 0.865 -0.084 2372.6 0.000 
14 Oý850 -0,083 25296 0.000 
15 0.835 -0.037 2681.7 OMO 
16 0.81B 0.004 2828.8 0.000 
17 0,802 -0,047 29707 0000 
18 0.785 0,036 3107,7 0000 
19 0,769 -0006 3239.7 0000 
20 0.753 0004 3367.0 OMO 
Figure 9.7 
Correlogram: 200 Trading Sessions 
After Liberalisation 11" difference] 
Date. 05/31J04 Time. 20: 39 
Sample. 1 200 
Included observatiow 199 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.485 0.485 47.549 0.000 
2 0.326 0.119 69.141 0.000 
3 0,137 -0079 72997 0000 
4 0.003 -0.091 72,999 &000 
5 -0.053 -0.028 73,586 0.000 
6 -0.071 -0,006 74616 0.000 
7 -0.093 -0.043 76.421 0.000 
8 -0.059 0.014 77.144 0.000 
9 0.022 &085 77.243 0.000 
10 OMO -0.005 77,436 0.000 
11 0.066 0.024 78373 0,000 
12 0ý095 0,050 80,292 0.000 
11 13 0.142 0.092 84,6" 0.000 
14 0.091 -0.036 86,438 0.000 
15 OM2 -0.057 86654 0.000 
16 0.011 0.023 86678 0.000 
17 -0.045 -0.031 87 129 OLOO 
18 -0077 -0046 88424 0000 
19 -0,133 -0.084 92,372 0.000 
20 -0.166 -U63 98.525 0.000 
After liberalisation, 
As well there is an 
indication of 
nonstationarity of the 
time series of level of 
stock prices. 
Again, with the 
first difference of 
the time series 
there is indication 
of stationarity. 
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A visual display of the plot of the first difference of stock prices shows that 
the adjusted series looks approximately stationary both before and after 
liberalisation. 
Figure 10.7 
200 Trading Sessions Before and after Liberalisation - (1" Difference) 
Before Liberalisation After Liberalisation 
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A formal confirmation about nonstationarity and stationarity is obtained by 
running the Dickey-Fuller unit root test. The plot of SEMDEX in Chapter 5 (Figure 
2.5) suggests that the test should be for a random walk with drift. 
The test is therefore run with 200 end-of-month stock prices before and after 
the liberalisation date. A random walk is a special case of a unit root process. 
Consider an autoregressive process of order 1: 
P, =aoPo +aP, -, +e, 
If the first difference [1 (1)] of the stock price time series is stationary and not 
autocorrelated, stock prices can be described by a random walk model with each 
value being a random step away from the previous one. 
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ii I- D(AFTER200) 
Unit root test for differenced [1 (1)] series. 
AP, = P, - P, -l 
AP = Po +PIP, -, +, y 
Ho: p, =O (Nonstatiomry) 
HA: ßl <O 
The test will be carried out first with levels of stock prices for 200 
observations for consecutive trading sessions before liberalisation. 
The OLS report of the Dickey-Fuller test contains the Durbin-Watson d 
statistic but this figure is biased towards 2 because of the presence of the lagged 
dependent as explanatory variable. DW test is then invalid and the Breush-Godfrey 
test for serial correlation in the residuals is first run to determine the number of 
lagged variables to be introduced in the equation. 
Estimation Equation: 
STOPRIBEF = C(1)*STOPRIBEF(-I) + C(2) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
STOPRIBEF = 1.004434481*STOPRIBEF(-I) + 0.005888444817 
HO: No Serial Correlation 
HA: Serial Correlation 
Table 9.7 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 1: 
F-statistic 74.90205 Probability O. E)UUUUO 
Obs*R-squared 55-02176 Probability 0.0000009 
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The probability value of the test statistics (Obs*R-squared) indicates that we 
should reject the null hypothesis. 
The equation is adjusted for an autoregression of order 2 with lagged 
residuals set to zero. 
Estimation Equation: 
STOPRIBEF = C(1)*STOPRIBEF(-l) + C(2)*STOPRIBEF(-2) + C(3) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
STOPRIBEF = 1.530144031*STOPRIBEF(-l) - 0.529412603*STOPRIBEF(-2) 0.4253386469 
TablelO. 7 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 2: 
F-statistic 1.100759 Probability 0.295405 
Obs*R-squared 1.117117 Probability 0.290540 
Now the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the error term can be 
accepted and the lag length for the ADF test is therefore two. 
Only the upper section of the OLS report is reproduced hereunder. 
Table 11.7 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on STOPRIBEF 
1% 
ADF Test Statistic 1.907578 Critical Value* -4.0074 
5% 
Critical Value -3.4336 
10% 
Critical Value -3.1404 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
The test reveals that we should accept the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
The same process is now repeated with the first difference of the time series. 
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Estimation Equation: 
D(STOPRIBEF) = C(I)*D(STOPRIBEF(-l)) + C(2)*D(STOPRIBEF(-2)) + C(3) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
D(STOPRIBEF) 0.4902485626*D(STOPRIBEF(-I)) 
0.07575128467*D(STOPRIBEF(-2)) + 0.6089643878 
Table 12.7 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 3 
F-statistic 0.454988 Probability 0.500783 
Dbs*R-squared 0.463325 Probability 0.496074 
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation can be accepted 
Table 13.7 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on D(STOPRIBEF) 
kDF Test Statistic -5.449985 1% CriticalValue* -3.4650 
5% Critical Value -2.8763 
10% Critical Value -2.5746 
The null hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected for the first difference of the stock 
price series. The presence of a unit root leads to the conclusion that before 
liberalisation stock prices followed a random walk in conformity to the efficient 
market hypothesis. The post liberalisation period is now examined. 
Estimation Equation: 
AFTER200 = C(1)*AFTER200(-l) + C(2) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
AFTER200 = 0.9961755701*AFTER200(-I) + 1.045399498 
Ho: No Serial Correlation 
HA: Serial Correlation 
-246- 
Table 14.7 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 4: 
F-statistic 61.66499 Probability 0.000000 
Obs*R-squared 47.62515 Probability 0.000000 
The probability value of the test statistics (Obs*R-squared) indicates that we 
should reject the null hypothesis. The equation is adjusted for an autoregression of 
order 2 with lagged residuals set to zero. 
Estimation Equation: 
AFTER200 = C(1)*AFTER200(-l) + C(2)*AFTER200(-2) + C(3) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
AFTER200 = 1.487333235*AFTER200(-l) - 0.4916416969*AFTER200(-2) 1.448850745 
Table 15.7 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 5: 
F-statistic 2.850212 Probability 0.092969 
Obs*R-squared 2.866860 Probability 0.090421 
Now the null hypothesis of no serial correletion can be accepted. 
Table 16.7 
Au2mented Dickev-Fuller Test on AFTER200 
kDF Test Statistic -2.374057 1% Critical Value* -4.0074 
5% Critical Value -3-4336 
10% Critical Value -3.1404 
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
The test reveals that we should accept the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
The same process is now repeated with the first difference of the time series. 
Estimation Equation: 
AFTER200 = C(1)*AFTER200(-l) + C(2)*AFTER200(-2) + C(3) 
Substituted Coefficients: 
AFTER200 = 1.487333235*AFTER200(-l) - 0.4916416969*AFTER200(-2) 1.448850745 
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Table 17.7 
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is accepted. 
Table 18.7 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on d(AFTER200) 
ADF Test Statistic -6.032041 1% Critical Value* -4.0077 
5% Critical Value -3.4337 
10% Critical Value -3.1404 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 6: 
IF-statistic 2.850212 Probability 0.092969 
[Obs*R-squared 2.866860 Probability 0.090421 
The null hypothesis is rejected. It can be concluded that after liberalisation as 
well, stock prices levels continue to follow a random walk in conformity with the 
efficient market hypothesis. The regression output for the lagged equations before 
and after is now examined for the weak form of efficiency. 
Table 19.7 
AutoRegression Output before Liberalisation 
Dependent Variable: D(STOPRIBEF) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/03/04 Time: 21: 39 
Sample(adjusted): 4 200 
Included observations: 197 after aýjustinq endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(STOPRIBEF(-1)) 0.490249 0.071904 6.818127 0.0000 
D(STOPRIBEF(-2)) 0.075751 0.072358 1.046902 0.2964 
C 0.608964 0.195165 3.120254 0.0021 
R-squared 0.286284 Mean dependent var 1.390660 
Adjusted R-squared 0.278926 S. D. dependent var 2.818274 
S. E. of regression 2.393168 Akaike info criterion 4.598224 
Sum squared resid 1111.087 Schwarz criterion 4.648222 
Log likelihood -449.9251 F-statistic 38.90834 
, Durbin-Watson stat 1.997123 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table 20.7 
AutoRegression Output after Liberalisation 
Dependent Variable: D(AFTER200) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/03/04 Time: 21: 44 
Sample(adjusted): 4 200 
Included observations: 197 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(AFTER200(-1)) 0.434095 0.071275 6.090429 0.0000 
D(AFTER200(-2)) 0.122516 0.071561 1.712055 0.0885 
C -0.225425 0.247511 -0.910771 0.3635 
R-squared 0.251966 Mean dependent var -0.475939 Adjusted R-squared 0.244254 S. D. dependent var 3.962531 
S. E. of regression 3.444772 Akaike info criterion 5.326704 
Sum squared resid 2302.093 Schwarz criterion 5.376702 
Log likelihood -521.6803 F-statistic 32.67322 Durbin-Watson stat 1.959382 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Chapter 5 pointed out the expectation that the introduction of the electronic 
trading and TRI would improve the informational imperfections and so allow quick 
response of prices to information. The empirical evidence illustrates a somewhat 
weaker form of efficiency after liberalisation supported by a slightly weaker R2. This 
suggests that there are some more anomalies that need to be investigated. A possible 
cause is that before liberalisation the stock market was in its infant stage and the 
variability of returns was higher. Investors then considered that the expected profit 
from their strategy would easier exceed the transaction costs than to-day. This has 
policy implications regarding a review of transaction costs to help correct 
misalignment of asset prices and hence sending more accurate signals for a more 
efficient investment and consumption decisions. 
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7.2.4 Stock Market Liberalisation and Returns 
Figure 11.7 
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Fig 11.7 plots annualized returns calculated at the end of each month. These 
figures have been calculated from the total return index (TRI) for each asset on each 
trading session. TRI figures were obtained from the SEM. From the TRI the 
annualized return for each asset was calculated and the market return is taken as a 
weighted average based on market capitalization. Usually as soon as a security is 
listed there is some overshooting of its price. To moderate these inconsistent 
excesses, the security is introduced in the portfolio as from the end of the month 
nearest to three trading sessions after its listing date. The chart shows that overall 
market returns have been very close to the Treasury bill rate during the last five 
years. An investor holding a well-diversified portfolio would therefore be earning a 
return close to the risk-free one. This could be an indication that the stock market 
prices were not overpriced or underpriced. The plotted values also indicate higher 
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mean and higher variability of returns before than after liberalisation. Equality test of 
means and variances are run for inferential purposes and the results shown below. 
The mean of the annual return at the end of every 6 months from December 
1990 to 1994 is now compared with the mean for the period December 1995 to 
December 2003 to find out whether they are statistically different. 
Table 21.7 
Test for Equality of Means 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuminj 
Unequal Variances 
BEFORE 
LIBERALISATION 
AFTER 
LIBERALISATION 
Mean 36.36400816 14.16395892 
Variance 176.4128276 24.34774178 
Observations 11 18 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
df 12 
t Stat 5.323556563 
P(T<=t) one-t il 9.06215E-05 
t Critical one-tail 1.782286745 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000181243 
t Critical two-tail 19.178812792 
The samples means show higher average returns before liberalisation. 
NuIlHypothesis H0:. ", = 'U2 
Altemativ Hypothesis HI: li ý" 102 
The t-value for a one tailed test is much greater than the critical value. So the 
null hypothesis that the returns before and after liberalisation are equal is rejected.. 
Test for equality of variance is carried out below 
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NullHypothesis H0 :aI =0 2 
Upper one-tailed test 
Altemati-%e Hypothesis HI: aI> cr 2 
Table 22.7 
Test for equality of Variances 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
BEFORE 
LIBERALISATION 
AFTER 
LIBERALISATION 
Mean 36.36400816 14.16395892 
Variance 176.4128276 24.34774178 
Observations 11 18 
df 10 17 
F 7.245551934 
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.000210841 
F Critical one-tail 2.449915826 
The F value is in the critical region. The null hypothesis is rejected, 
suggesting that higher volatility before liberalisation is not due to chance. The period 
before liberalisation much overlaps the introduction stage and this probably explains 
the higher volatility. 
7.2.5 Stock Market Liberalisation and Non-Diversifiable Risk of Listed Shares 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] (Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965) suggests that the expected return of a security or a portfolio equals the 
rate on a risk-free security plus a risk premium. If this expected return does not meet 
or beat the required return then the investment should not be undertaken. 
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The model considers total risk on holding shares as comprising two 
components: 
1. Unsystematic risk286 _ (Unique to an individual asset; is 
diversifiable) 
2. Systematic Risk 187 _ (Risk of holding the market portfolio; is non- 
Diversifiable) 
The market pays a premium on systematic risk only since it is non- 
diversifiable. The theory provides a framework for measuring the systematic risk of 
an individual asset and relates it to the systematic risk of a well-diversified portfolio. 
The Security Market Line diagram developed from the CAPM considers the 
equilibrium relationship between an asset's required return and its associated risk 
and is expressed as follows: 
Figure 12.7 
Security Market Line 
Asset 
Retum 
rf 
Slope =P 
,8=1, 
Average risk 
,8=0, 
Zero risk 
,8>1, 
Above average risk 
,8<1, 
Below average risk 
Market Retum % 
286 These arise from uncertainties specific to the individual asset e. g the company faces an important 
management change, or looses an important contract. 287 Market risk e. g Increased Taxation affects all shares; Adverse political/social events affect the 
whole economy 
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In notation form, the above is given as: 
Return on Asset = Riskfree Return + fýMarket Return - Riskfree Return) 
For each individual observation, 
ri = rf + P(rm - rf 
Where, 
,8= Beta of the security 
Co var iance Between Asset Re turn and Market Re turn 
Variance of Market Portfolio 
COV(ri. rm) 
2 (r 
j a M) 
The above equation suggests that beta alone accounts for differences in 
returns 288 among securities. The market does not reward for holding stocks with lots 
of diversifiable risk and only beta as a measure of systematic risks matters. Given an 
expected future price and a beta for a specific stock, a financial investor will bid 
current price up or down to ensure that the equation is satisfied. This makes the 
equation an asset-pricing model. The model assumes a simplified world with a 
maximizing behaviour of market participants, zero taxes (transaction costs), same 
perceptions from investors regarding expected returns and volatility of available 
risky investments. 
Using the above formula, the Beta as a measure of non-diversiflable risk for 
the different shares in a portfolio of all listed companies has been calculated by 
288 
risks 
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working out each asset return at the end of each month from TRI 289 as at each trading 
session date. Every 12-months asset and market returns are then used to determine 
the yearly beta with a view to track changes in beta for some listed firms and 
determine whether there is greater variability in non-diversifiable risk after 
liberalisation. 
Table 23.7 
Betas of listed Companies 
Date MCB MDIT Msm MTMD UBP MCFI MDA 
1990 0.344 0.177 -0.057 0.698 0.126 0.000 1.686 
1991 1.089 0.306 -0.184 0.729 0.911 0.092 1.354 
1992 0.677 0.619 0.851 0.346 0.157 1.182 -0.696 
1993 0.062 0.143 0.179 0.216 0.006 0.419 -0.059 
1994 0.277 -0.154 -0.498 0.436 0.084 -0.188 0.877 
1995 0.287 0.376 0.222 0.335 0.391 0.298 0.360 
1996 0.342 0.573 0.463 0.353 0.302 -0.017 0.513 
1997 0.047 -0.626 -0.370 -0.259 0.038 -0.411 -1.112 
1998 0.465 0.056 0.129 0.307 0.197 0.054 0.567 
1999 0.706 0.026 0.375 0.586 0.623 0.028 0.630 
2000 1.063 -0.154 0.303 1.268 0.254 0.945 0.836 
2001 0.559 0.145 0.052 -1.000 -0.236 -0.709 -0.734 
2002 1.452 0.307 -0.261 1.578 0.020 0.530, 0.390 
2003 0.561 0.465 1.218 0.290 0.802 0.811 1.347 
SAVANAH MOR ROGERS GIDC COURTS SWAN MOUNT 
1990 1.709 -0.258 3.846 0.481 -0.001 N. A N. A 
1991 1.214 0.066 0.087 0.272 -0.911 -0.009 -0.321 
1992 0.035 0.463 1 0.700 0.409 1.617 0.937 0.063 
1993 0.010 0.015 0.266 -0.145 0.085 0.067 0.126 
1994 0.680 -0.371 0.911 0.051 0.013 -0.073 0.842 
1995 0.281 0.126 0.634 0.685 0.829 0.235 0.170 
1996 0.384 -0.212 0.513 0.943 0.477 0.208 0.535 
1997 -0.139 0.072 0.267 -0.857 0.018 0.113 0.140 
1998 0.378 -0.040 0.447 0.698 0.164 0.199 0.080 
999 
- 
1.069 0.319 0.154 1.125 1 0.217 0.897 0.457 
000 
- - 
0.781 -0.208 -0.104 0.722 2.098 0.523 0.875 
001 -0.487 0.440 1.713 0.885 0.541 -0.102 -0.197 
002 -0.159 0101 ý! 'Iul 0.022 
0.217 1.674 0223 -0.829 
003 -0.483-- 
--- 
[ 
0.561 0.290 1.463 2.4 3 . 
0.960 
289 TRI was obtained from the SEM 
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Datel HFr Mal CMPL CMPL UDL POLICY SUN 
1990 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1991 0.141 3.442 1.407 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1992 0.401 -0.475 2.641 3.477 1.387 N. A N. A 
1993 0.089 0.128 0.361 0.295 -0.063 1.312 3.899 89 
1994, 1.356 0.604 -0.364 0.620 0.079 1.091 0.51 
1995 0.259 0.662 0.770 0.675 0.629 1.065 0.92 
1996 0.343 0.426 0.835 0.693 0.527 1.075 0.19 
N 
1997 0.441 -0.970 0.027 2.403 -0.824 -0.096 0.87 
1998 -0.103 -0.058 -0.043 0.230 0.100 0.163 O4 8 
1999, 0.944 0.109 0.153 0.138 1 0.214 1.480 0.411 
2000 1.790 0.946 0.558 -0.095 0.267 1.511 0.47 
2001 0.070 0.035 -0.182 -0.531 -0.270 -0.363 1.68 
M 
2002 -2.010 0.484 0.090 0.544 -0.184 0.130 1.42 
2003 0.614 0.965 0.705 0.985 1.174 1.563 -0.45 
1 BAI LIT PBL PIM NIT MUA IME 1 
1990 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1991 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1992 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1993 -0.202 -0.341 3.581 -0.034 -0.129 
N. A N. A 
1994 , 1.418 -0.847 1.211 -0.480 1.382 -2.526 1.82 1.82 1 , 
19951 0.599 1.033 0.936 0.415 1.126 0.661 0.12 - 12 *12 
19961 0.523 0.765 0.406 0.890 0.916 0.142 0.28 0 
128 
19971 -0.590 -0.944 0.396 -0.422 -1.058 0.332 0.20 0.20 0.20 
19981 0.123 0.215 0.283 0.584 0.383 0.503 1 0.34 0.34 0.34 
1999 1 0.529 0.361 1.474 -1.404 -0.025 0.952 O4 0 0.40 
000 1 0.551 -0.170 1.275 -0.196 -1.905 0.325 0.14 0.1 4 0.14 
2001 1 0.571 1.042 -0.024 -3.714 0.849 -0.893 
d 
0.53 0.53 0.53 
2002 1 -0.069 0.127 0.437 -0.122 0.812 0.863 _0.14 -0.1 4 -0.14 
2003 1 0.725 1.383 1.188 1.146 1.368 0.812 1.28 1.28 1.28 
BMHL IBL FINCORP ASL GAMCIVIC AIRM SBMj 
19901 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
19911 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
19921 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
19931 N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A N. A 
19941 1.399 -1.796 20.381 0.000 
N. A N. A N. A 
19951 0.970 -0.726 3.061 -0.633 -0.574 0.196 0.11d 
19961 1.551 0.444 1.060 0.259 0.311 -0.044 0.5211 
19971 -0.664 2.247 -0.568 1.176 -0.243 -0.299 0.820 
19981 0.138 0.984 0.008 -0.003 0.085 0.869 1.994 
19991 0.110 0.013 0.910 0.513 -1.229 -0.363 1.667 
0001 -0.695 -0.275 0.978 -0.384 0.419 -1.588 1.711 
001 -0.282 1.611 -0.477 -0.337 -0.851 0.783 = 3.27 
002 -0-016 0.676 0.541 0.521 0.392 
ý4 
01 1.03 
003 1.375 0.769 3.307 1 1.662 0.850 2.430 1 1.60d 
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PAD HWF NMHL CAUDAN 
1990 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1991 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1992 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1993 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1994, N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1995 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1996 1.064 1.666 5.576 N. A 
1997 0.600 0.969 3.046 N. A 
1998 0.294 -0.026 1.708 N. A 
1999, 0.056 0.326 1.942 N. A 
000 1.067 0.754 3.511 N. A 
001 -2.544 1.568 2.335 N. A 
002 0.093 0.559 -0.732 9.302 
003 2.471 -0.376 1.310 2.306 
While the beta for all listed companies have been calculated, only some 
shares were listed before the liberalisation year. To be able to compare variability in 
beta before and after the liberalisation year only the securities that were already 
listed in December 1989 are considered below. The tests are run for 5 years before 
liberalisation and 9 years after liberalisation. 
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Table 24.7 
Test for eaualitv in variancer. for Rptn Before and After Liheralisatinn 
F-Test Two- 
Sample for 
Variances 
MCIB MDIT IVISM 
Before After Before After Before After 
Mean 0.4898 0.609111 0.2182 0.129778 0.0582 
1 
0.236778 
Variance 0.16091 0.180316 0.078559 0.133628 0.256104 0.212425 
Observations 5 9 5 9 5 9 
df 4 8 4 8 4 8 
F 0.892374 0.587889 1.2056171 
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.489253 0.319121 0.379467 
F Critical one-tail 0.165534 0.165534 3.837854 
MTMD UBP MCFI 
Before After Before After Before After 
Mean 0.485 0.384222 0.2568 0.265667 0.301 0.169889 
Variance 0.049747 0.574366 0.136952 0.100134 0.290872 0.292035 
Observations 5 9 5 9 5 9 
df 4 8 4 8 4 8 
F 0.086612 1.367681 0.996017 
P(F< D one-tail 0.015843 0.326467 0.537343 
F Critical one-tail 0.165534 3.837854 0.165534 
F-Test Two- 
Sample for 
Variances 
MDA SAVANAH MOR 
Before After Before After Before After 
Mean 0.6324 0.310778 0.7296 0.180556 -0.017 0.128778 
Variance 0.983322 0.585327 0.549155 0.29296 0.105428 0.072737 
Observations 5 9 5 9 5 9 
df 4 8 4 8 4 8 
F 
j 
_ 1.679953 1.874506 1.44943 
P(F<=f) one-tail ý 0.246565 0.208399 0.302964 
F Cri ical on e-ta il 3.837854 3.837854 1 3.837854 
71 
The samples reveal greater variability in beta for MCB, MDIT, MTMD and 
MCFI after liberalisation. In the case of MCB and MDIT and MCFI, the F-statistics 
were in the critical region suggesting that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of variances before and after liberalisation for these stocks. In the case of the 
MTMD, the F-statistic lies in the acceptable region indicating that there is not 
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enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equality of variance before and after 
liberalisation. As for the remaining stocks, the samples reveal lower variability after 
liberalisation and the F-statisfic show that the null hypothesis of equality of 
variability cannot be rejected. Most of the above mentioned stocks are the cherished 
ones individually. Participants holding small portfolios minimize the beta variability 
of such portfolios by diversifying in larger portfolios of 100 to 500 stocks (Tole, 
1981). That is not possible in the Mauritian context given the number of securities 
listed on the SEM. The tempting mechanistic strategy for participants would be to 
combine the above mentioned stocks with other stocks having low variability. 
Research, however shows that this produces portfolios that are more variable than 
those produced with random combination, (Kulman and Weintraubj 994) 
7.2.6 Stock Market Liberalisation and Stock Market Development 
Changes in Market Size and Liquidity (Pre-liberalisation to Post- 
liberalisation) are examined to determine whether liberalisation has increased 
variability and growth of these indicators. 
Difficulty of access to data prevents the carrying out of a cross-country 
analysis for the dynamics of changes in the Sub-Saharan region. This is because 
many countries have opened their stock market to foreign investors too recently 
while some others have not yet done so. 
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Table 25.7 
Variation in Market Capitalisation Ratio 
Before and After Liberalisation 
Before After 
Count 50 50 
Mean 16.279718 43.42386641 
Standard Deviation 8.0774989 3.25772095 
IMinimum ý. 2624371 37.57084489 
[Maximum ý2.594159 53.59178477 
The standard deviations indicate that the market size as measured by market 
capitalisation ratio fifty months before August 1994 and fifty months just after has 
become less volatile. 
Table 26.7 
Test for equality of Variance 
F-Test Two-Sample fc 
Variances 
Before After 
Mean 6.280 43.424 
'ariance 5.246 10.613 
bservations 0 50 
f 9 49 
. 1478895 
. 
P(F<=f) one-tail 1.283E-09 
IF Critical one4ail 1.6072903 
An F-test for equality of variance shows that the test statistic falls in the 
critical region and the null hypothesis is rejected. The alternative hypothesis that the 
standard deviation before is larger than after liberalisation is accepted. , 
The dynamics of short-term growth of market capitalization is examined 
below. 
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Figure 13.7 
Growth in Market Capitalisation Ratio - (Pre/Post Liberalisation) 
50 
40 
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Figure 13.7 provides a first indication that growth in market capitalization has 
not improved with liberalisation. of the stock exchange. Equality tests are run to 
determine whether the changes are statistically different. 
NullHypothesis H0 : /Jl = IJ2 
Altemathe Hypothesis H, :, ýi > JU2 
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Table 27.7 
Equality of Means 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assumin 
Unequal Variances 
Before After 
ean 3.859865321 0.919765763 
ariance 76.4963783 54.136132 
bservations 50 50 
Hypothesized Mean Difference ) 
df )5 
t Stat 1.818952687 
P(T<=t) one-tail ). 036034538 
t Critical one-tail 1.661051101 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.072069077 
t Critical two-tail 1.985249583 
The t-value for a one tailed test is higher than the critical value and so the 
difference between the means is not statistically different. 
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Figure14.7 
Comparative Growth in Market Capitalisation Ratio - 
(Pre/Post Liberalisation) 
100 
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Source: liquidAfrica 
Figure 14.7 shows growth in capitalization ratio for some selected countries 
in their respective liberalisation year t, three years before and three years after. The 
short-term dynamics reveals that Mauritius has comparatively performed better than 
the other countries both before and after their respective liberalisation dates. 
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Table 28.7 
Variation in Turnover Ratio 
Before and After Liberalisation 
Before After 
No. of Observations 50 50 
Minimum 0.052014541 ). 210822 
Maximum 0.919762731 2.95628 
Range 0.86774819 2.745457 
Mean P. 309430762 
.. 
510373 
Ptandard Deviation 
ý. 
202475471 
ý. 
403028 
Unlike the capitalization ratio, the turnover ratio seems to be more volatile 
after liberalisation. The same series of tests is run with the market liquidity indicator. 
NullHypothesisH 
0 : cr I =CF 2 
Lower-tail test 
Altemativ HypothesisH 
I: aI <(F 2 
Table 29.7 
F-Test for equality of variability. 
Before ýfter 
Mean 0.309430762 0.510373 
Variance 0.040996316 0.162432 
Observations 50 50 
df 49 49 
F 0.252391202 
P(F<=o one-tail 1.88554E-06 
IF Critical one-tail 0.62216543 
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The F statistic falls well within the critical region. The sample therefore 
provides strong evidence for the unequal population variances. Liquidity has 
therefore become more volatile after liberalisation. The contribution of foreign 
capital flows to this higher level of liquidity is an area for research in the future. 
Figure 15.7 
Growth in Turnover Ratio - (Pre/Post LiberaliSation) 
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The result for a t-test for equality of means before and after liberalisation is 
shown below. 
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Table 30.7 
Equality of Means 
Before After 
Mean 30.59757 16.03254 
Variance 11807.73 5082.23 
Observations 50 50 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 5 
t Stat 0.792468 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.215147 
t Critical one4ail 1.662979 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.430294 
t Critical two-tail 1.988269 
NulUiypothesisH 
0: '41 -`ý42 
Altemativ HypothesisH I: Jlý llý /ý 
The t-value for a one tailed test is much smaller than the critical value and so 
the difference between the means is not statistically different. 
Comparison of short-term dynamics is made with some southern sub-Saharan 
countries with respect to three years before and after the countries's respective 
liberalisation dates at time t. Such comparison is limited to a yearly basis since 
monthly figures have not been accessible. 
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Figure 16.7 
Comparative Growth in Turnover Ratio - (Pre/Post Liberalisation) 
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Figure 16.7 depicts growth in turnover ratio for the same selected countries as 
for market capitalisation in their respective liberalisation year t, three years before 
and three years after. The short-term dynamics this time reveals that Mauritius has 
again comparatively performed better than the other countries before but not after 
their respective liberalisation dates. A likely reason for the post liberalisation 
situation is the bearish market conditions as depicted in figure 2.5. 
7.3 Stock Market Crisis 
Earlier in Chapter 7 reference was made to CMAX for identification of crises. 
Observations are made from end of month SEMDEX values for the period 1990- 
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2000. To make any sharp price decline more visible CMAX is worked out following 
Patel and Sarkar (1988), 
CMAX Equity = 
SEMDEX at Time t 
Maximum SEMDEX for Period up toTime t 
Three levels of crisis (mini-crisis, crisis and serious crisis) are identified using trigger 
levels of 1,1.5 and 2.0 standard deviations respectively below the mean of the 
CMAX series. Using such criteria crises are identified below by taking into account 
the following points: 
- Beginning of the crisis is the month in which the CMAX falls below one 
standard deviation below the mean of the CMAX series. 
- Trough is the month during which CMAX reaches its minimum during the 
crisis. 
- Recovery is the month in which the CMAX moves back above the first 
trigger level (standard deviation level 1). 
The decline is measured as the drop in SEMDEX from its pre-crisis level to 
its trough level. 
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Figure 17.7 
Stock Price Index Relative to Historical Maximum (Jan. 1992-Jun. 2004) 
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Table 31.7 
Equity Crisis and Characteristics 
Crisis Trough % Drop in 
Duration Type 
No. Date Stock Prices 
Nov. 5-6 Mini 
1 10.47 
1995 months crisis 
Nov. 10-11 Mini 
2 10.87 
1996 months Crisis 
Dec. 17-18 
3 Crisis 11.88 
2001 months 
LlAqaajýss 2 Standard Deviation 
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Figure 17.7and table 31.7 show evidence of a less stable situation than in the banking 
sector with two successive long periods of decline. However the equity market has 
been facing fewer episodes of crises. 
7.4 Summary 
Stock markets in sub-Saharan African countries are generally small in size 
compared to the banking sector except for South Africa and Zimbabwe. Stock 
market indicators are found to be more favorable in Mauritius than in Sub-Saharan 
countries other than the same two countries mentioned. The SEM has also performed 
better than the most important stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa as regards to 
growth in market capitalization both before and after their respective liberalisation 
dates. In terms of growth in turnover ratio, Mauritius performed better that these 
countries before liberalisation but not after. 
However, in spite of important initiatives taken to make the security market 
more transparent, more efficient, open to international capital and less exposed to 
financial crimes, there has been no significant change in market size, liquidity and 
activity after liberalisation. Growth rates in market capitalisation and liquidity were 
superior prior to liberalisation. Variability in market capitalization was higher before 
liberalisation while in the case of liquidity it was higher after liberalisation. Managed 
funds do not yet indicate signs of ability to considerably mobilize savings and hence 
to boost the security market. After 10 years of liberalisation the importance of 
foreign flows is still very weak reflecting a low level of integration of the domestic 
capital market in the global market. This could be a reason why stock prices have not 
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been more volatile after liberalisation. The annualized return was higher but more 
volatile before liberalisation. There is scope for further research to identify whether 
this is because the stocks were initially undervalued and or the stocks are now 
underperforming. 
There is a first indication that physical investment in Mauritius is driven by 
borrowing in spite of its high cost compared to raising new capital. This will be 
further investigated in the next chapter. 
In terms of non-diversifiable risks as measured by Beta, the individual stocks 
identified as having shown a greater variability after liberalisation are those of the 
MCB, MDIT and MCFT and the implications regarding diversification whenever 
such stocks are held in a portfolio have been discussed. There is also an indication 
that private companies have gone public for fiscal reasons and that their familY-based 
tradition prevents them from diluting ownership beyond the minimum requirements 
as per the listing regulations. 
In so far as stock prices are concerned, there is evidence that they have been 
following a random walk both before and after liberalisation but test on the weak 
forin of efficient market hypothesis reveals a weaker position after liberalisation. 
Further, the stock market has been marked by three crises, the most important 
episode started in December 2001 and lasted eighteen months when price declined 
by nearly 12%. No crash as such has been identified 
The research will now move its final stage with the studying of the financial 
deepening process in Mauritius and its impact on both growth of listed firms and 
economic growth. 
-271- 
Chapter 8 
MODELLING SOME IMPACT OF FINANCIAL 
LIBERALISATION IN MAURITIUS 
8.1 Introduction 
During the last fifteen years governments in the Southern and Eastern African 
region have all adopted a policy of financial liberalisation with a view to achieve 
sustainable growth. In this chapter the empirical relevance of the theory of financial 
liberalisation is further being examined mainly for the Mauritian economy but some 
reference is also made to the region. In all these economies the formal financial 
sector is largely dominated by banks and this justifies the use of banking 
development variables as a measure of financial development. Three different 
aspects of the theory of financial liberalisation (Chapters 2 and 3) that will be 
examined are: 
1. Financial Deepening and Interest Rate Liberalisation. 
2. Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth - (Mauritius only). 
3. Liberalisation and Corporate Sector Financing Strategy - (Mauritius 
only). 
8.2 Financial Deepening - Mauritius and the Region 
This section of the thesis investigates empirically whether financial 
liberalisation has led to higher demand for bank assets as per the McKinnon and 
Shaw hypothesis. With higher deposit interest rate, the demand for real money 
balances is expected to increase via two channels, namely: 
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1. A shift towards a portfolio comprising less of real assets 290 and more of 
financial assets. 
2. An increase in the holding of domestic financial assets relative to foreign 
assets held by nationals. The assumption is that before liberalisation there was an 
important amount of capital flight since residents preferred investing their wealth 
abroad while after the reforms the domestic environment has improved with financial 
assets enhanced both in terms of return and liquidity. 
The monetization variable broad money to GDP 
M2 is used as a proxy 
(Y) 
for financial deepening in a money equation borrowed from the literature, (Agrawal, 
P. 2001). 
Financial Deepening = 
(Real+GDP, 
Real + Interest Rate, Real + Exchange Rate 
) 
Adopting an open economy framework, the real exchange rate is included in 
the model with a view to capture any wealth effect of currency depreciation on the 
value of the foreign securities held by domestic residents as this could lead to a 
decrease in demand for money as per the currency substitution model, Arango and 
Nadiri (1981) and Girton and Roper (1981). These scholars argue that an expected 
rate of depreciation reduces the value of domestic assets held by foreigners and 
increases the value of foreign assets held by residents and may therefore give rise to 
a shift from domestic currency to foreign currencies, thereby reducing domestic 
290 E. g commodities, gold and land. 
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money demand. A positive relationship can therefore be expected between an 
appreciating exchange rate and financial deepening. 
8.2.1 Financial Deepening in Mauritius 
The financial deepening time series for Mauritius reveals that the 
monetization variable has consistently and considerably improved over the last two 
decades. 
Figure 1.8 
Financial Deepening in Mauritius 
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The line graph indicates a continuous rise in financial deepening to a fairly 
high level. But it also indicates that there could be a structural break reflecting a 
weakening of the financial deepening process as from early 1990s. A Chow test of 
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stability is therefore run with 1991 as a break point and the results appearing in table 
1.8 reject the null hypothesis of the same coefficient before and after liberalisation. 
Table 1.8 
Test for Structural Stability: Null Hypothesis of No Structural Change 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 1991 
F-statistic 8.257161 Probability 0.002430 
Log likelihood ratio 14.44734 Probability 0.000729 
Equality tests of variances and means before and after liberalisation are run to 
make inferences about the population before and after liberalisation. 
H0 Nariance in both subgroups are equal 
H, : Variance in both subgroups are different 
H0 : Mean in both subgroups are equal 
H I: Mean in both subgroups are different 
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Table 2.8 
Tests of Equality of variances before/after liberalisation (1979-90; 1991-2002) 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series 
Date: 05/17/04 Time: 09: 36 
Sample: 1 12 
Included observations: 12 
Method df Value Probability 
F4est (11,11) 3.492979 0.0490 
Siegel-Tukey (1,22) 0.000000 1.0000 
Bartlett 1 3.871816 0.0491 
Levene (1,22) 9.685325 0.0051 
Brown-Forsythe (1,22) 5.771005 0.0252 
Category Statistics 
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
BEFORELIB 12 0.088438 0.077507 0.076560 12.50000 
AFTERLIB 12 0.047320 0.038130 0.038025 12.50000 
All 24 0.149629 0.057818 0.057293 12.50000 
Bartlett weig hted standard deviation: 0.070924 
The test re . ects the null hypothesis Ho of equal variances at 5% significance 
but not at 1% level. 
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Table 3.8 
Tests of Equality of Means Before/After Liberalisation (1979-90; 1991-2002) 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series 
Date: 05/17/04 Time: 09: 37 
Sample: 1 12 
Included observations: 12 
Method df Value Probability 
West 22 8.964839 0.0000 
Anova F-statistic (1,22) 80.36834 0.0000 
Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between 
Within 
1 
22 
0.404274 
0.110666 
0.404274 
0.005030 
Total 23 0.514940 0.022389 
Cateqorv Statistics 
Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
BEFORELIB 12 0.495983 0.088438 0.025530 
AFTERLIB 12 0.755558 0.047320 0.013660 
All 24 0.625771 0.149629 0.030543 
Equality of means before and after liberalisation is rejected at both at 5% and 
1% significance levels. 
The various equality tests therefore confirm that, at population level, financial 
deepening is higher after liberalisation although the rate of increase in deepening 
seems to have weakened during the last decade. This is likely to be due to satiation 
resulting in declining "marginal deepening" as the monetization variable exceeds 
65%. The variables of the money equation are plotted below for a first glance. 
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FINDEEP f (REALGDP , REALINT, REER 
FINDEEP = Financial deepening ratio E2) (y 
REALGDP = Real GDP 
REALINT = Real Deposit Interest Rate 
REER = Real Effective Exchange Rate Index 
Figure 2.8 
Line Graph of Money Equation Variables 
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The real interest rate 291 was exceptionally low in 1980. That is due to high 
imported inflation caused by a sharp devaluation of the currency. The real GDP 
appears to be the variable that better explains the changes in financial deepening and 
"" Real interest rates used here vary slightly from the one used in chapter 6, table 5.6. Table 5.6 
refers to financial year data while here we deal with calendar year and the main difference is due to 
different inflation rates. 
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this is confirmed by the regression results below where the equation is estimated 
using the Ordinary Least Squares estimator. 
FINDEEP = flo + fil REALGDP + fl, REALINT + 83 REER ) 
Table 4.8 
Money Equation Output - Mauritius (LIN-LIN Model) 
Dependent Variable: FINDEEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/11/04 Time: 14: 06 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.620871 0.031746 19.55764 0.0000 
REALGDP 5.02E-06 4.43E-07 11.34030 0.0000 
REALINT -0.000304 0.001348 -0.225665 0.8238 
REER -0.002941 0.000540 -5.448903 0.0000 
R-squared 0.912780 Mean dependent var 0.625771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.899697 S. D. dependent var 0.149629 
S. E. of regression 0.047388 Akaike info criterion -3.109873 
Sum squared resid 0.044913 Schwarz criterion -2.913530 
Log likelihood 41.31847 F-statistic 69.76863 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.681791 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
FINDEEP = 0.6208711447 + 5.018892698e-06*REALGDP 
0.0003041529841 *REALINT - 0.002941268465 *REER 
The fit in the above regression is reasonably tight with an adjusted R-Square 
of 0.89. 
The results show that REALGDP is the only factor having a positive link 
with financial deepening. This relationship is in line with what general economic 
theory would have predicted and the estimated coefficient from our sample suggests 
that for every Rs3bn increase in real GDP the financial deepening ratio increases by 
0.015 (Le 1.5%). 
The coefficient of real interest looks very weak and is surprisingly negative. 
Further it is not statistically significant and a 100% increase in deposit rate seems to 
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predict a drop by 3.7% in financial deepening. Sample evidence here contradicts the 
theory of McKinnon & Shaw (1973). An absence of gain in financial deepening 
coming from interest policy is probably due to the fact that before interest rate 
liberalisation the economy was already highly monetized with a well-established 
banking system and a quasi-inexistent unofficial money market. The policy of 
interest liberalisation has therefore not been effective at increasing financial depth. 
The Coefficient of REER is significant but is unexpectedly a negative value. 
Figure 2.8 reveals that the real effective exchange rate exhibits opposing trends, with 
a depreciating trend for the longer and earlier sub-period. Yet during the earlier 
period financial deepening was faster than in recent years. This suggests that 
economic agents might not have adjusted the share of domestic holding in the assets 
portfolio in response to exchange rate movements. The currency substitution channel 
did not work in Mauritius. 
The results show that it is very unlikely that at population level there exists a 
positive relationship between real interest rate and financial deepening. The fact that 
, 
82is not significant and is negative suggests that the empirical evidence in Mauritius 
for the period 1979 to 2002 shows that the policy of interest rate liberalisation has 
not accelerated the financial deepening process and it has therefore not been 
consistent with the prediction of McKinnon and Shaw (1973). 
A specification error test (Ramsey Reset Test) is run using an augmented 
A2A3 
regression by adding FINDEEp FINDEEP as proxies for any possible 
omitted variable. 
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Table 5.8 
Specification Test 
Ramsey RESET Test: 
F-statistic 7.692115 Probability 0.003851 
Log likelihood ratio_ 14.82508 Probability 0.000604 
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: FINDEEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/17104 Time: 12: 24 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -2.457385 1.308538 -1.877962 0.0767 REALGDP -2-85E-05 1.56E-05 -1.826895 0.0843 REALINT 0.001429 0.001600 0.893135 0.3836 
REER 0.017388 0.009105 1.909778 0.0722 
FITTEDA2 12.67012 5.043973 2.511932 0.0218 
FITTEDA3 -7-653262 2.683527 -2.851941 0.0106 
R-squared 0.952973 Mean dependent var 0.625771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.939910 S. D. dependent var 0.149629 
S. E. of regression 0.036679 Akaike info criterion -3.560918 Sum squared resid 0.024216 Schwarz criterion -3.266404 Log likelihood 48.73101 F-statistic 72.95200 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.321602 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
The overall fit of this augmented equation is not significantly different from 
the previous one, indicating that the initial equation was not misspecified. 
As far as detecting multicollinearity is concerned the Pearson correlation 
matrix shown below reveals that the only correlation coefficient to exceed 0.8 is 
between REER and REAL GDP. 
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Table 6.8 
Person Correlation Matrix 
FINDEEP c REALGDP REALINT REER 
FINDEEP 1 0.6875761642 0.1312291602 0.6334600088 
54 83 19 
c 
REALGDP 0.6875761642 1 0.2062536755 0.9510189725 
54 38 58 
REALINT 0.1312291602 0.20625367551 0.2594849988 
83 38 
REER 0.6334600088 0.9510189725 0.25948499881 
19 58 
Although it appears that multicollinearity is present between REALGDP & 
REER, the square of this simple correlation coefficient (0.9512 = 0.904), does not 
exceed the unadjusted W (0.912), suggesting that there is actually no severe 
multicollinearity. Running the regression without RISER actually deteriorates the fit 
and the Durbin Watson statistic as shown below. 
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Table 7.8 
Redundant Variable Test 
Redundant Variables: REER 
F-statistic 29.69054 Probability 0.000025 
Log likelihood ratio 21.84198 Probability 0.000003 
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: FINDEEP 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/15/04 Time: 10: 38 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.470511 0.024143 19.48884 0.0000 
REALGDP 3.04E-06 3.90E-07 7.798807 0.0000 
REALINT 0.002131 0.001956 1.089254 0.2884 
R-squared 0.783300 Mean dependent var 0.625771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.762662 S. D. dependent var 0.149629 
S. E. of regression 0.072895 Akaike info criterion -2.283123 Sum squared resid 0.111587 Schwarz criterion -2.135867 Log likelihood 30.39748 F-statistic 37.95412 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.562967 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
The other classical assumptions are now examined through the residual tests. 
Normality test 
The Jarque-Bera (JB) statistic measures the difference of skewness and 
kurtosis of the series from the normal distribution and is distributed as chi-squared 
with 2 d. f. 
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Figure 3.8 
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4 
2 
0 
The Jarque-Bera test of normality for residuals 
8 
Ho: JB =0 
Series: Fbsiduals 
Sample 1979 2002 
Cbservations 24 
Mean -1.34E-16 
Median 0.003907 
Maximum 0.070461 
Minimum -0.105837 
Std. Dev. 0.044190 
Skemness -0.344848 
Kirtosis 2.732330 
Jarque-Bera 0.547329 
Probability 0.760587 
The high probability (0.76) that a JB statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the 
observed value under the HO of a normal distribution suggests that the normality test 
is passed. 
0 Serial Correlation Tests 
The regression output indicates a Durbin Watson statistic of 1.68. From a D- 
W statistic table [No of observations =24; No of explanatory vaTiables = 3] dl = 1.1 
& du= 1.66 
Indetenninant 
Region 
dl du 
1.1 1.66 
2 
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There is a first indication of no serial correlation of order 1. The Breusch- 
Godfrey Tests (order I and 2) are run below in order to get a better judgement about 
serial correlation. 
Table 8.8 
Testing serial correlation of order 1. 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.436422 Probability 0.516785 
Obs*R-squared 0.538891 PLOtRLIlilt 0.462893 
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/17/04 Time: 11: 56 
Presamr)le missino value laaaed residuals set to zero. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.007888 0.034345 -0.229680 0.8208 REALGDP -1.65E-07 5.14E-07 -0.320888 0.7518 REALINT 0.000435 0.001517 0.286479 0.7776 
REER 0.000184 0.000615 0.299926 0.7675 
RESID(A) 0.178357 0.269984 0.660622 0.5168 
R-squared 0.022454 Mean dependent var -1.34E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.183345 S. D. dependentvar 0.044190 S. E. of regression 0.048070 Akaike info criterion -3.049249 
Sum squared resid 0.043904 Schwarz criterion -2.803821 
Log likelihood 41.59099 F-statistic 0.109105 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.976107 Prob(F-statistic) _9.977859 
HO: No serial Correlation. The p-value of the Breush-Godfrey LM statistic 
suggests a non-rejection and this implies that we cannot conclude that there is pure 
serial correlation of order 1. 
-285- 
Table 9.8 
Testing serial correlation of order 2 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.473827 Probability 0.630164 
_Obs*R-squared 
1.200344 Probability 0.548717 
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESID 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/17/04 Time: 11: 59 
Presample missina value laaaed residuals set to zero. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.012859 0.035459 -0-362655 0.7211 REALGDP -2.65E-07 5.38E-07 -0.491543 0.6290 REALINT 0.000702 0.001581 0.443977 0.6624 
REER 0.000300 0.000643 0.467024 0.6461 
RESID(-1) 0.181825 0.273486 0.664842 0.5146 
RESID(-2) 0.179323 0.248150 0.722639 0.4792 
R-squared 0.050014 Mean dependent var -1.34E-16 Adjusted R-squared -0.213871 S. D. dependentvar 0.044190 S. E. of regression 0.048686 Akaike info criterion -2.994514 Sum squared resid 0.042667 Schwarz criterion -2.700001 Log likelihood 41.93417 F-statistic 0.189531 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.911357 Prob(F-statistic) . 962737 
HO: No serial Correlation. A non rejection of the null hypothesis again 
prevents the conclusion that there is pure serial correlation of order 2. The two tests 
allow us to consider that there is very little serial correlation. 
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Table 10.8 
The White Test of Heteroskedasticity 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.891545 Probability 0.522667 
Obs*R-squared 5.744369 Probability 0.452427 
Test Equation: 
Dependent Variable: RESIDA2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/17/04 Time: 12: 01 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Included observations: 24 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.004936 0.005425 -0.909949 0.3756 REALGDP -6.22E-08 6.77E-08 -0.917426 0.3718 REALGDPA 2 5.75E-1 3 6.89E-1 3 0.833589 0.4161 
REALINT 8.42E-05 0.000134 0.627667 0.5386 
REALINTA2 1.23E-07 4.80E-06 0.025706 0.9798 
REER 0.000165 0.000115 1.436338 0.1691 
REERA2 -7.97E-07 6.30E-07 -1.264178 0.2232 
R-squared 0.239349 Mean dependent var 0.001871 
Adjusted R-squared -0.029116 S. D. dependentvar 0.002516 S. E. of regression 0.002552 Akaike info criterion -8.865069 Sum squared resid 0.000111 Schwarz criterion -8.521470 Log likelihood 113.3808 F-statistic 0.891545 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.774634 Prob(F-statistic) 
_P. 
522667 
The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is not rejected. The equation has 
now passed a series of traditional tests and looks acceptable. The results do not 
validate the theory regarding financial deepening. Both the interest channel and the 
currency substitution channel did not work. The important variable to relate to 
financial deepening has been real income. This has policy implications as considered 
in chapter 9. 
The adoption of a direct monetary policy framework in Mauritius has made 
the financial system more complex. Once the monetary authority sends the desired 
signal through the Lombard refinancing rate the forces of competition between the 
banks will determine the interest rate on deposit at the level of each bank without 
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being constrained by a ceiling. The figures reveal that financial deepening has in no 
way been boosted by removal of the interest ceiling and so it can be argued that the 
previous financial repression ftamework did not act as a constraint to financial 
deepening in Mauritius. This observation raises concerns about whether the gains 
from a policy of interest liberalisation in Mauritius are not actually below the 
expectations. 
It appears the point made by Lucas (1988) about the fact that economists 
badly over-stress the role of the financial system could be relevant to the Mauritian 
context. However, the question will be further discussed in section 9.3 by taking into 
account its relation to economic growth. The analysis concerning financial deepening 
is now repeated but at regional level. 
8.2.2 Cross-Country Analysis 
FINDEEP? =f(REALGDP?, REALINT?, REER?, FINDEEP? (-1)), 
where (? ) indicates all the countries in the panel data namely, Botswana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 11.8 
Money Equation: Pooled Series - Common Intercept and Common Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: FINDEEP? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Date: 08/26/04 Time: 20: 01 
Sample: 1986 2000 
Included observations: 15 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 165 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.023682 0.006305 3.755895 0.0002 
REALGDP? 7.86E-1 0 1.38E-09 0.568091 0.5708 
REALINT? 0.000540 5.17E-05 10.43687 0.0000 
REER? 1.32E-05 2.55E-06 5.156138 0.0000 
FINDEEP? (-1) 0.936769 0.017374 53.91651 0.0000 
Weighted Statistics 
Log likelihood 361.3273 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.911406 Mean dependent var 0.391079 
Adjusted R-squared 0.909191 S. D. dependentvar 0.237699 
S. E. of regression 0.071630 Sum squared resid 0.820926 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.920411 
The regression output shows that overall in the region the real GDP does not 
seem to be a significant variable while both real interest rate and real exchange rate 
look significant. The overall regional picture looks different from that of the 
Mauritian case taken separately where real GDP was found to be the most significant 
variable. 
The regional regression is now run with a specific intercept and a specific 
slope coefficient for each country and each explanatory variable and using an 
autoregressive process of order I to try to identify any pattern or any exceptional 
case. 
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Table 12.8 
Money Equation Pooled Series -Specific Intercepts, Specific Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: FINDEEP? 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Date: 06/24/04 Time: 15: 57 
Sample: 1986 2000 
Included observations: 15 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 165 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
BOT- -3.46E-06 1.95E-06 -1.776967 0.0783 REALGDP 
- 
BOT 
_KEN- 
3.57E-08 7.12E-08 0.501960 0.6167 
REALGDP KEN 
_LES- -1.27E-05 
7.81 E-06 -1.629309 0.1061 
REALGDP LES 
MAD- -9.07E-06 5.09E-06 -1.782929 0.0774 REALGDP MAD 
-MAL- -1.42E-06 
4.14E-07 -3.430297 0.0008 
REALGDP MAL 
MAU- 2.86E-06 7.06E-07 4.052504 0.0001 
REALGDP-MAU 
_§AF- -4.01 
E-08 1.71 E-08 -2.351669 0.0205 
REALGDP SAF 
. -ýSWA- -1.82E-05 
4.03E-06 -4.514040 0.0000 
REALGDP-SWA 
TAN- 1.64E-06 4. OOE-06 0.411145 0.6818 
REALGDP TAN 
ZAM- 3.75E-09 2.87E-09 1.309632 0.1930 
REALGDP ZAM 
' 
-ZlM-REAL 
GDP 
- 
ZIM -0.000703 8.01 E-05 -8.777746 0.0000 
-BOT-REALINT BOT-0.000323 - 
0.003513 -0.092045 0.9268 
_KEN-REALINY KEN 0.000654 
0.000635 1.031011 0.3048 
_LES-REALINT-LES 0.000666 
0.001738 0.383313 0.7022 
_MAD- 0.001460 
0.001070 1.364297 0.1753 
REALINT MAD 
-MAL-RITALINT_MAL 0.000408 0.000274 
1.485073 0.1404 
-MAU- -0.002611 
0.001721 -1.517387 0.1320 
REALINT MAU 
-. 
§AF-REFALlNT_SAF 0.003066 0.000541 5.663606 0.0000 
SWA- 0.000167 0.000117 1.431409 0.1551 REALINT SWA 
-TAN-REALINT 
TAN-0.001227 0.001148 -1.068200 0.2878 
-ZAM-REALINfZAIVO. 000301 
9.91 E-05 3.034555 0.0030 
-ZIM-REALINT 
ZIM 0.008937 0.001062 8.415728 0.0000 
- 
-BOT-REER 
BOT 0.099453 0.027795 3.578103 0.0005 
-KEN-REEF; 
FKEN 
-0.001296 0.000998 -1.298331 0.1969 
-LES-REER 
LES 0.019137 0.015355 1.246280 0.2153 
-MAD-REEff 
MAD 7.06E-05 4.27E-05 1.651856 0.1014 
-MAL-REER 
MAL 
- 
0.005830 0.001588 3.670212 0.0004 
_MAU-REEFi 
MAU -0.027094 0.006063 -4.468512 0.0000 
-SAF-REER 
SAF 0.027548 0.005371 5.129187 0.0000 
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SWA-REER SWA 0.019271 0.012526 1.538474 0.1268 
TAN-REER TAN 
- 
6.90E-05 6.25E-05 1.104125 0.2719 
ZAM-REEFf ZAM 
- ' 
2.76E-05 1.76E-05 1.564352 0.1206 
ZIM-REER 21M -0.035151 0.004689 -7.496430 0.0000 
-BOT- 
0.064468 0.134217 0.480325 0.6319 
FINDEEP 
- 
BOT(A) 
KEN- 0.848080 0.173104 4.899258 O. Pooo 
TINDEEP-KEN(A) 
LES-- 0.602321 0.118882 5.066552 0.0000 
TINDEEP 
- 
LES(A) 
MAD-- 0.253557 0.110686 2.290783 0.0239 
TINDEEP 
- 
MAD(A) 
-MAL- 
0.151063 0.210232 0.718554 0.4739 
FINDEEP 
- 
MAL(A) 
MAU-- 0.055896 0.178078 0.313888 0.7542 
TINDEEP 
- 
MAU(-l) 
SAF- 0.532240 0.084068 6.331046 0.0000 
TINDEEP-SAF(A) 
SWA- -0.318179 0.200285 -1.588634 0.1150 TINDEEP-ýSWA(A) 
TAN- 0.541711 0.117950 4.592721 0.0000 
TINDEEP-TAN(A) 
ZAM- 0.992299 0.086479 11.47447 0.0000 
FINDEEP-ZAM(-l) 
-ZIM--FINDEEP-ZIM(. 
1.524167 0.266062 5.728620 0.0000 
1) 
Fixed Effects 
_BOT-C -0.021206 
_KEN-C 
0.127167 
_LES-C 
0.086594 
_MAD--C 
0.523235 
_MAL-C 
0.125445 
_MAU--C 
1.016880 
_. ýSAF-C 
0.127942 
_SWA-C 
0.383918 
_TAN-C 
0.044674 
_ZAM-C -0.022434 zim-C 1.366172 
Weighted Statistics 
Log likelihood 457.7602 
. 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.947600 Mean dependent var 0.391079 
Adjusted R-squared 0.921876 S. D. dependentvar 0.237699 
S. E. of regression 0.066438 Sum squared resid 0.485547 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.839719 
The estimated equations for each country are represented below as a 
summary. 
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FINDEEP-BOT = -0.02120607539 - 3.464287887e-06*REALGDP-BOT - 
0.0003233435756*REALINT_BOT + 0.09945345781*REER_BOT + 
0.06446789533*FINDEEP-BOT(-l) 
FINDEEP_KEN = 0.1271666332 + 3.574295814e-08*REALGDP_KEN + 
0.0006544992983*REALINT KEN - 0.001295719546*REER_KEN + 0.848079535*FINDEEP-KEiý(-I) 
FINDEEP-LES = 0.08659439036 - 1.272575703e-05*REALGDP-LES + 0.0006661207249*REALINT_LES + 0.01913653468*REER_LES + 
0.6023214434*FINDEEP-LES(-l) 
FINDEEP_MAD = 0.5232347699 - 9.071030604e-06*REALGDP - 
MAD + 
0.001460271219*REALINT MAD+ 7.061488397e-05*REER_MAD + 
0.2535570324*FINDEEP-hTAD(-l) 
FINDEEP_MAL = 0.1254448796 - 1.420520003e-06*REALGDP - 
MAL + 
0.0004075792537*REALINT_MAL + 0.005830066763*REER_MAL + 
0.1 51062816*FINDEEP-MAL(-l) 
FINDEEP MAU = 1.016880235 + 2.860133464e-06*REALGDP_MAU - 
0.002610882938*REALINT MAU - 0.02709354514*REER_MAU + 0.05589633072*FINDEEP JýAU(-l) 
FINDEEP_SAF = 0.1279417818 - 4.011959706e-08*REALGDP_SAF + 
0.003066153199*REALINT SAF + 0.02754837058*REER-SAF + 
0.532240472*FINDEEP_SkF(-I) 
FINDEEP SWA = 0.3839184165 - 1.818225418e-05*REALGDP-SWA + 0.000167211837EFREALINT 
- 
SWA + 0.01927052889*REER. SWA - 
0.3181791195*FINDEEP-SWA(-l) 
FINDEEP TAN = 0.04467432734 + 1.644896185e-06*REALGDP-TAN - 
0.001226811501*REALINT TAN+ 6.902479504e-05*REER_TAN + 
0.5417110949*FINDEEP-I: A-N(-l) 
FINDEEP ZAM = -0.02243374116 + 3.753230981 e-09*REALGDP-ZAM 0.000300668187*REALINT ZAM + 2.756734347e-05*REER_ZAM + 
0.9922985753*FINDEEP-fAM(-l) 
FINDEEP ZIM = 1.36617183 - 0.0007030595901*REALGDP ZIM + 0.008936874365*REALINT ZIM - 0.03515133188*REER-ZIM + 1.524167421TINDEEP-ZO(A) 
From the pooled regression it appears that the significance of the coefficients 
can be summarised in the table below. 
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Table 13.8 
Significant Coefficients by Country 
Significant 
Coefficients 
Countries 
Real GDP Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Real Interest Rate South Africa, Zambia 
Real Exchange Rate 
I 
Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, I 
Zambia 
The pooled series analysis shows that there is generally little empirical 
evidence in the region in favour of the MacKinnon & Shaw hypothesis except for 
South Africa and Zambia. The value of the coefficients and their statistical 
significance in the pooled regression suggest that in the southern and eastern African 
region, the interest channel has worked only in S. Africa and Zambia while the 
currency substitution channel has worked only in Botswana and South Africa. There 
is then no common pattern for the region and this suggests that the policy of regional 
integration might well be retarded because of lack of convergence in the transmission 
of liberalization policies. 
8.3 Financial Deepening and Growth 
In Chapters 2 and 3 the finance growth connection was discussed. Any causality 
between these two economic variables has important policy implication for long- 
term growth and therefore an empirical analysis is undertaken at the level of 
Mauritius over a two-decade period. Two different approaches are adopted for this 
study. One takes a banking intermediation index as the explanatory variable and uses 
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the GMM estimator while the other one compares the effects of both macroeconomic 
real and financial variables using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 
The first analytical framework is based on the growth finance equation from Levine, 
Loayza and Beck (2000). 
Growth a+ fi Finance, +y[ Conditioning Set + e, 
where, 
(a) Growth is change in real per capita GDP. 
(b) Finance is an index of four indicators of the banking intermediary sector 
development. 
(c) The conditioning set is a vector of conditioning infonnation that controls for 
other factors associated with growth. 
The chosen predetermined variables that are likely to be correlated with 
growth are annual population growth, secondary education enrolment as a measure 
of human capital, government size, investment ratio, openness of the economy and 
initial real per capita GDP. 
In the growth equation the finance variable is determined by constructing an 
index of financial development based on Gurley and Shaw (1955) who measure 
financial development according to an intermediation approach but more precisely 
based on King and Levine (1993) who take four indicators of financial development 
namely: DEPTH, BANK, PRIVATE and PRIVY. 
(1) DEPTH: DEPTH is a good indicator of the size of the 
financial sector. Depth measures liquid liabilities as a share of the GDP 
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DEPTH = 
Currency + Demand and interest bearing liabilities 
- 
M2 
GDP GDP 
(2) Although the size of the financial sector is positively related 
to the provision of financial services, DEPTH does accurately reflect 
provision of such services that are provided by commercial banks rather than 
by central banks. A better indicator of increased financial services is 
BANK. 
BANK = 
Commercial Bank Assets 
Commercial Bank Assets + Central Bank Domestic Assets 
IA higher BANK corresponds to 
increased provision of financial services 
by commercial banks. 
(3) With price and allocation of credit being market determined, 
it is expected that the flow of credit to the private sector will increase. 
PRIVATE measures where there is a greater redistribution of credit towards 
private firms. 
PRIVATE = 
Credit to Pr ivate Non - Financial Institutions 
Credit to Public Sector + Credit to Pr ivate & Public Enterprise 
A higher PRIVATE means a greater distribution of credit from public to 
private firms. 
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(4) The fourth indicator of financial development measures 
whether more credit is being channeled to the private sector as a share of the 
GDP; Le a measure of financial activity in the banking sector. 
PRIVY = 
Credit Issued to Pr ivate Enterprises 
GDP 
Although other scholars, namely Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Levine, Loayza and 
Beck (2000) have been including the legal framework292 and accounting standards in 
the measure of financial development in cross country analysis, these variables have 
not been retained for the present analysis because this is not a cross-country one 
where differences in such variables could influence financial intermediation and 
ultimately growth differently. Further, the changes have taken place only in recent 
years and the amendments of the Companies' Act in relation to bankruptcy 
procedures are currently under study. A revision is likely to impact on creditor rights. 
The introduction of a dummy variable to account for changes in these parameters is 
not Possible as the post -reform series would be too short for a regression exercise. 
292 E. g creditor rights and enforcement quality 
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Table 14.8 
Growth Regression Results (1) 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(RGDP)) 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 09/15104 Time: 01: 10 
Sample(adjusted): 1980 2002 
Included observations: 23 after adjusting end points 
Prewhitening 
Bandwidth: Fixed (2) 
Kernel: Bartlett 
Convergence achieved after: 19 weight matricies, 20 total coef 
iterations 
Instrument list: C D(LOG(ANPOPGRO)) D(LOG(SECENRO)) 
D(LOG(GOVSIZE)) D(LOG(INVRAT)) D(LOG(OPEN)) 
D(LOG(INITIALRGDP)) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 
D(LOG(FINANCED 
0.129749 
0.400423 
0.004447 29.17639 
0.052360 7.647425 
0.0000 
0.0000 
R-squared -0.025754 Mean dependent var 0.130514 Adjusted R-squared -0.074600 S. D. dependentvar 0.055081 S. E. of regression 0.057099 Sum squared resid 0.068466 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.097526 J-statistic 0.266712 
The r-square value does not have any interpretation here since OLS is not being 
used. In this equation six instruments were used to estimate one parameter and so the 
number of overidentifying restrictions is 6-1=5. 
The Hansen's J-statistics is obtained by multiplying the Eviews software J -statistic 
by the number of observations in the sample. 
J=0.266712 *(24) = 6.134376 
If the equation is properly specified with the overidentifying restrictions as valid, the 
J-statistic has a chi-square distribution with five... degrees of freedom. Here the J- 
statistic is less than 11.07, the critical value for a Chi-square distribution with five 
293 Equal to the number of restrictions 
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degrees of freedom. We can not therefore reject the null hypothesis of correct 
specification. 
The estimated equation is: 
D(LOG(RGDP)) = 0.1297485079 + 0.4004229263*D(LOG(FINANCE)) 
The results then show a positive relationship between the finance index and growth. 
Changing the explanatory variable from an overall financial index to a financial 
deepening ratio gives a similar result as shown below. 
TabIe 15.8 
Growth Regression Results (2) 
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(RGDP)) 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 09/15/04 Time: 01: 19 
Sample(adjusted): 1980 2002 
Included observations: 23 after adjusting endpoints 
Prewhitening 
Bandwidth: Fixed (2) 
Kernel: Bartlett 
Convergence achieved after: 36 weight matricies, 37 total coef 
iterations 
Instrument list: C D(LOG(ANPOPGRO)) D(LOG(SECENRO)) 
D(LOG(GOVSIZE)) D(LOG(INVRAT)) D(LOG(OPEN)) 
D(LOG(INITIALRGDP)) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.113154 0.003824 29.58955 0.0000 
D(LOG(FINDEEP)) 0.317720 0.079757 3.983588 0.0007 
R-squared -0.073915 Mean dependent var 0.130514 Adjusted R-squared -0.125054 S. D. dependent var 0.055081 S. E. of regression 0.058424 Sum squared resid 0.071681 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.303865 J-statistic 0.317287 
D(LOG(RGDP» = 0.113153826 + 0.3177199365*D(LOG(FINDEEP» 
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A different approach is now adopted with a view to compare the causal effect of 
some macroeconomic real variables and some banking development variables on 
economic growth. In the literature various studies (Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) to name a few) show evidence 
of finance leading growth. These studies, however, have certain inferential 
weaknesses: 
1. They are cross-sectional in nature. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) suggest that 
cross-sectional analysis implicitly assumes that the countries concerned have similar 
economic structure, population and technology. Further, it must be remembered that 
causality patterns may vary across countries. 
2. They tested causality from finance to economic growth but did not examine the 
possible feedback effects between the two variables. Gujarati (1995) highlights that 
whenever bidirectional causality exists, ignoring it could introduce simultaneous- 
equation bias and render models statistically inconsistent. In such cases vector 
autoregression (VAR) models can be more reliable than single equation models. 
Sims (1980) developed the VAR time series model as an alternative to structural 
systems of simultaneous equations models. The VAR model makes use of the 
interaction among the different variables and models economic relations without 
unnecessary assumptions. This makes a VAR model acceptable to people from 
different schools of thought who usually have different sets of assumptions. 
A VAR model is therefore used to test the hypotheses pertaining to causality running 
in both directions between financial development and economic growth. Given that 
financial development is not the only likely variable to have an impact on economic 
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growth, some controlling variables are included in the model. The use of a 
multivariate model rather than a bivariate one minimizes the risk of misleading 
causality inferences from bias resulting from omitted variables (Lutkepohl, 1982). 
The three macroeconomic endogenous variables chosen are real GDP, 
openness ratio, investment ratio while the selected banking sector variable is private 
sector credit ratio to GDP as in the previous GMM equation. 
Exports and investments are the traditional macroeconomic injections while private 
sector credit as a proxy to finance is introduced to find out about the supply leading 
hypothesis discussed in chapter 2. 
Every endogenous variable listed above is modeled in a system as a function of 
the lagged values of itself and of every other endogenous variable. On the basis of 
the Akaike Information Criteria a lag structure of I through 3 was initially chosen as 
the optimal one. However, with three lags the Eviews software identified insufficient 
number of observations to run the Johansen test"' probably due to depletion of 
degrees of freedom. This constraint imposed a final selection of two lags. The four- 
variable VAR model is a system of equations as shown below with a constant as the 
only exogenous variable: 
Log(RGDP), = C, +a,. Log(RGDP), -, + a,. 2Log(EXPO), -, 
+ a,. 3Log(INV), -, + 
aIALog(PRIVY), -, + 
fl,., Log(RGDP)t-2 + A. 2 Log(EXPO)t-2 + fl,. 3Log(fNV)t-2 
+ AALog(PR'IýY)t-2 
Log(EXPO)t"ýC2+a2., Log(RGDP)t-, +a Log(EXPO)t-, +a Log(INV)t-, + 2.2 2.3 
a2.4Log(PRIVY)t-l + . 
82., Log(RGDP)t-2 + 6,2Log(EXPO), 
-2 
+ A. Pg(INVA-2 
+ 8,4Log(PRIVYA-2 
294 The Eviews software implements the VAR-based cointegration test using Johansen's 
methodology. 
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Log(INV), --ý C3+a3., Log(RGDP), 
-, + a3.2Log(EXPO), -, 
+ a3.3Log(INV), -, + 
a3.4Log(PRIVY), -, + 
P3., Log(RGDP), 
-2 
+ 63.2Log(EXPO)t-2 + fl3.3Log(INV)t-2 
+ fl3.4Log(PRIVY)t-2 
Log(PRIVY),: "--C4+a4. Log(RGDP), -, + 
a4.2 Log(EY. PO), 
-, + a4.3Log(INV), -, + 
a4.4Log(PRIVY), -, +)64. 
Log(RGDP)t-2 + )64.2Log(EXPO)t-2 
+ )64.3Log(INV)t-2 
P4.4Log(PRIVY)t-2 
The VAR is estimated and the results are displayed below. 
Table 16.8 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 09/21/04 Time: 13: 51 
Sample(adjusted): 19812002 
Included observations: 22 after adjusting endpoints 
Standard errors & t-statistics in r)arentheses 
LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(LNV) LOG( 
LOG(RGDP(-I)) 0.393961 0.984829 -0.013490 -0.224918 
(0.14589) (0.56777) (0.71992) (0.35519) 
(2.70034) (1.73456) (-0.01874) (-0.63324) 
LOG(RGDP(-2)) 0.154064 -0.710420 -0.381629 0.583259 
(0.10782) (0.41962) (0.53206) (0.26250) 
(1.42886) (-1.69303) (-0.71726) (2.22192) 
LOG(EXPO(-I)) 0.184445 1.027014 1.452461 -0.062625 
(0.06523) (0.25387) (0.32191) (0.15882) 
(2.82739) (4.04537) (4.51205) (-0.39432) 
LOG(EXPO(-2)) 0.055096 -0.115435 -0.455214 -0.095117 
(0.11096) (0.43181) (0.54752) (0.27013) 
(0.49656) (-0.26733) (-0.83140) (-0.35212) 
LOG(INV(-l)) 0.048152 -0.147874 0.215696 0.177637 
(0.04900) (0.19069) (0.24179) (0.11929) 
(0.98271) (-0.77547) (0.89207) (1.48909) 
LOG(INV(-2)) 0.000597 -0.050474 0.382368 -0.139346 
(0.03814) (0.14845) (0.18823) (0.09286) 
(0.01565) (-0.34002) (2.03142) (-1.50053) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 0.211043 0.575555 0.240501 0.577363 
(0.08924) (0.34728) (0.44035) (0.21725) 
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(2.36498) (1.65732) (0.54616) (2.65758) 
LOG(PRIVY(-2)) 0.052626 -0.524116 -0.925954 -0.193504 
(0.07876) (0.30652) (0.38866) (0.19175) 
(0.66815) (-1.70988) (-2.38240) (-1.00913) 
C 2.326891 
(0.41673) 
(5.5836§j__ 
-0.132422 
(1.62180) 
J-_Oj. 08165) 
-2.879974 
(2.05641) 
(-1.40049) 
-3.072854 
(1.01456) 
(-3.02875) 
R-squared 0.999724 0.996500 0.994496 0.990136 
Adj. R-squared 0.999554 0.994346 0.991109 0.984066 
Sum sq. resids 0.004344 0.065791 0.105777 0.025747 
S. E. equation 0.018280 0.071139 0.090203 0.044503 
F-statistic 5889.228 462.6140 293.6076 163.1179 
Log likelihood 62.61343 32.71888 27.49550 43.03859 
Akaike AIC -4.873949 -2.156262 -1.681409 -3.094418 
Schwarz SC -4.427613 -1.709926 -1.235074 -2.648082 Mean dependent 10.58205 10.12409 9.217410 -0.994284 
S. D. dependent 0.865957 0.946055 0.956623 0.352558 
Determinant Residual 2.28E-12 
Covariance 
Log Likelihood 169.9994 
Akaike Information Criteria -12.18176 Schwarz Criteria -10.39642 
The VAR model with the substituted coefficients is 
LOG(RGDP) = 0.3939606823*LOG(RGDP(-l)) + 0.1540642285*LOG(RGDP(-2)) + 
0.1844445217*LOG(EXPO(-l)) + 0.05509643035*LOG(EXPO(-2)) + 
0.04815236577*LOG(INV(-l)) + 0.0005968712716*LOG(INV(-2)) + 
0.2110425956*LOG(PRIVY(-l)) + 0.05262574558*LOG(PRIVY(-2)) + 2.326891377 
LOG(EXPO) = 0.9848290735*LOG(RGDP(-I)) - 0.710419761*LOG(RGDP(-2)) + 1.027013814*LOG(EXPO(-I)) - 0.1 154353343*LOG(EXPO(-2)) - 0.14787401*LOG(INV(- 1)) - 0.05047399622*LOG(INV(-2)) + 0.5755549526*LOG(PRIVY(-I)) 
0.5241159276*LOG(PRIVY(-2)) - 0.1324216565 
LOG(INV) =-0.01348993941*LOG(RGDP(-l)) - 0.3816292027*LOG(RGDP(-2)) + 1.45246105*LOG(EXPO(-l)) - 0.4552135735*LOG(EXPO(-2)) + 0.2156961882*LOG(INV(- 1)) + 0.3823681424*LOG(INV(-2)) + 0.240501242*LOG(PRIVY(-l)) - 0.9259539566*LOG(PRIVY(-2)) - 2.879974305 
LOG(PRIVY) =-0.2249178232*LOG(RGDP(-1» + 0.5832590757*LOG(RGDP(-2» - 
0.06262508648*LOG(EXPO(-1» - 0.0951170951 1*LOG(EXPO(-2» + 0.1776371394*LOG(INV(-1» - 0.1393461258*LOG(INV(-2» + 0.5773627048*LOG(PRIVY(- 1» - 0.1 93504003*LOG(PRIVY(-2» - 3.072853981 
From the above it appears that both lag(l) and lag(2) values of PRIVY are positively 
related to RGDP. 
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Before running the test of no-causality there is a need to ensure that the series are 
stationary. If not, spurious results are obtained (Granger and Newbold, 1974)295 .A 
regression between two I(l) variables is possible only if they both share the same 
source of 'I (I)ness' and they move together in the long-run 296 .A visual examination 
of the correlograms gives a first indication that all the series are non-stationary. 
Figure 4.8 
Correlograms of growth variables 
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295 Granger and Newbold show that when estimating equations with non-stationary variables we 
often find good fit and statistically significant relationships between variables when none actually 
exists. 
2% Le they are cointegrated variables. 
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Formal unit root tests are now run to seek confirmation as to whether the series 
behave as non-stationary random walks. Only the upper sections of the regression 
results are reproduced hereunder. 
Table 17.8 
Unit Root Tests 
Phillips-Perron Test: Log(RGDP)_Ievel 
PIP Test Statistic 0.103113 1% Critical Value* -4.4167 
5% Critical Value -3.6219 
10% Critical Value -3.2474 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log (RGDP)_I" difference 
PP Test Statistic -6.583497 1% Critical Value* -4.4415 
5% Critical Value -3.6330 
10% Critical Value -3.2535 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(EXPO)jevel 
PP Test Statistic -0.961379 1% CriticalValue* -4.4167 
5% Critical Value -3.6219 
10% Critical Value -3.2474 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(EXPO)_I" difference 
PP Test Statistic -4.975889 1% Critical Value* -4.4415 
5% Critical Value -3.6330 
10% Critical Value -3.2535 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(INV)_Level 
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PP Test Statistic -1.199070 1% Critical Value* -4.4167 
5% Critical Value -3.6219 
10% Critical Value -3.2474 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(INV)_I" Difference 
PP Test Statistic -4.681287 1% Critical Value* -4.4415 
5% Critical Value -3.6330 
10% Critical Value -3.2535 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(PRIVY)_Level 
PP Test Statistic -3.296480 1% Critical Value* -4.4167 
5% Critical Value -3.6219 
10% Critical Value -3.2474 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron Test: log(PRIVY)_I" Difference 
PP Test Statistic -4.057032 1% Critical Value* -4.4415 
5% Critical Value -3.6330 
10% Critical Value -3.2535 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
These tests reveal that that the series contain a unit root and are integrated of order 
one [-I(I)]. 
The two options that are now available to avoid spurious regression from the non- 
stationarity nature of the variables are: 
1. Run the Granger causality test on the first difference of the variables to make 
them stationary. 
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2. Find out whether a linear combination of any two variables is integrated of 
order zero 297 . The variables are then cointegrated. There is a long run relationship 
between them with residuals fluctuating around zero. OLS is super-consistent since 
the estimates approach their true parameters at a faster rate than in the case of 
stationary variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
Both options are presented below: 
Option One: Granger causality test on the first difference. The disadvantage of 
adopting this option is that when [-I(I)] forms of the variables are constructed this 
can filter out information about long-run behaviour of the variables and implicitly 
only the short-run is being analysed. Inferences are then biased. Further economic 
relations link levels of variable rather than differences. So while it deals with the 
statistical problem, the economic interpretation remains problematical. 
Table 18.8 
Granger Causality test-1st set 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 09/23/04 Time: 12.23 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic P[Rtýý 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 21 8.16603 0.00360 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 1.08735 0.36076 
_D(LOG(EXPO)) D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 21 2.74706 0.09428 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.57874 0.57192 
D(LOG(INV)) 
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Y, =CL+PX+e 
If x, -I(I)andy, - I(l), then generally, y, - Px~I(l). However, if &~1(0) then 
Y, -p xt - 1(0) 
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D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 21 2.14695 0.14929 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.91783 0.41942 
_D(LOG(PRIVY)) D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause2l 1.08178 0.36254 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 9.50452 0.00190 
_D(LOG(ItM) D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.79902 0.46692 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 0.32532 0.72697 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.20438 0.81725 
D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 0.77651 0.47659 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
The results show unidirectional causality from exports to real GDP but that credit to 
private sector does not Granger-cause real GDP. Option one contrasts with the 
results obtained for finance using the GMM estimator. 
Option two is a preferred one because as per Granger's representation theorem, 
(Engle and Granger, 1987), the unrestricted VAR is appropriate only when there are 
no cointegrating relations. Whenever variables are cointegrated (they are non- 
stationary but share a common stochastic drift) there is the possibility of constructing 
a dynamic vector error correction (VEQ model to test for significance of long-run 
information in a model that is otherwise short-run. In such cases the VEC model 
improves the standard Granger-causality tests by adding a regressor as an error 
correction term in each equation in the system. This regressor is a lagged error from 
a regression of the 1 (0) variables. This prevents errors in the long run relationships to 
be larger. A first glance at the graphical display of the four variables suggests that 
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they share some common stochastic trend and they could move together over the 
long run 298 (Le there could be some cointegration relationship among them). 
Figure 5.8 
Line Charts of Growth Equation Variables 
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A formal test of cointegration is run below using the Johansen technique, Johansen 
(1991,1995) to determine whether the non-stationary series are cointegrated and if 
so to identify the cointegrating (long-run requilibrium) relationships. 
29' There is a sort of equilibrium relationship between the variables. 
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Table 19.8 
Johansen Cointegration Test 
Date: 09/22/04 Time: 10: 02 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Included observations: 21 
Test 
assumption: 
Linear 
deterministic 
trend in the 
data 
Series: LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(INV) LOG(PRIVY) 
Exogenous series: C 
Warning: Critical values were derived assumin g no exogenous series 
Lags interval: 1 to 2 
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
0.901430 137.0790 62.99 70.05 None ** 
0.854849 88.42229 42.44 48.45 At most 1 
0.824987 47.89265 25.32 30.45 At most 2 
0.415914 11.29186 12.25 16.26 At most 3 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(l%) significance level 
L. R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
Unnormalized Cointearatina Coefficients: 
LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(INV) LOG(PRIVY) @TREND(80) 
-9.074141 1.517298 2.918715 1.383830 0.504123 
-5.066716 -7.001902 6.099015 -10.87690 1.425029 
2.509400 -6.315740 1.900771 -2.406543 0.512409 3.887737 -2.222757 0.295503 -10.16099 0.377670 
Normalized Cointearatina Coefficients: 1 Cointegrating Equation(s 
LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(INV) LOG(PRIVY) @TREND(80) C 
1.000000 -0.167211 -0.321652 -0.152503 -0.055556 -5.325653 
(0.07931) (0.04582) (0.12927) (0.01212) 
Log likelihood 173.3440 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 2 Cointegrating Equation(s) 
LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(INV) LOG(PRIVY) @TREND(80) C 
1.000000 0.000000 -0.416862 0.095671 -0.079917 -5.567041 
(0.01245) (0.08853) (0.00540) 
0.000000 1.000000 -0.569401 1.484192 -0.145691 -1.443615 
(0.02128) (0.15125) (0.00922) 
Log likelihood 193.6088 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 3 Cointegrating Equation(s) 
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LOG(RGDP) LOG(EXPO) LOG(INV) 
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 
LOG(PRIVY) @TREND(80) C 
-4.222972 0.053094 -15.50594 
(1.86668) (0.09215) 
-4.414739 0.035992 -15.01938 
(2.32900) (0.11497) 
-10.35988 0.319076 -23.84218 
(4.37262) (0.21585) 
Log likelihood 211.9092 
The upper section of the table shows the test for the number of cointegrating 
relations. In the first row, the null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. The 
second row is testing at most one cointegration relation, the third row tests for at 
most two cointegrating relations while the last row tests the null hypothesis of at 
most three cointegrating relations. In all four cases the alternative hypothesis is that 
all the series in the VAR are stationary. The test shows three cointegrating relations 
and from the lower section of the table the three cointegrating relations are: 
1. Log(RGDP) -4.22log(PRIVY) -15.5 
2. Log(EXPO) -4.4 1 Log(PRIVY) - 15.0 
3. Log(INV) -4.37-Log(PRIVY)-23.8 
It is not appropriate here to run the standard Granger causality test. The original 
unrestricted VAR did not assume the presence of cointegration. Cointegration 
restrictions are now imposed among the variables in the VAR and a VEC Model is 
obtained as below. 
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Table 20.8 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Date: 09/22/04 Time: 10: 48 
Sample(adjusted): 1982 2002 
Included observations: 21 after adjusting endpoints 
Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses 
Cointegrating Eq: CointE91 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 1.000000 
LOG(EXPO(-1)) -0.167211 
(0.07931) 
(-2.10839) 
LOG(INV(-l)) -0.321652 
(0.04582) 
(-7.02046) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) -0.152503 
(0.12927) 
(-1.17968) 
@TREND(79) -0.055556 
(0.01212) 
(-4.58251) 
c -5.325653 
Error Correction: D(LOG(RGD D(LOG(EXP D(LOG(INV)) D(LOG(PRIV 
P» 0» Y» 
CointEql -0.005704 2.129047 0.832254 1.103188 
(0.20376) (0.38996) (1.01305) (0.44707) 
(-0.02799) (5.45971) (0.82153) (2.46760) 
D(LOG(RGDP(- 0.171958 0.548682 -0.264032 -0.340391 1») 
(0.14600) (0.27941) (0.72586) (0.32033) 
(1.17782) (1.96372) (-0.36375) (-l. 06262) 
D(LOG(RGDP(- 0.067054 -0.921751 0.155474 -0.082749 2») 
(0.14922) (0.28557) (0.74188) (0.32740) 
(0.44936) (-3.22770) (0.20957) (-0.25274) 
D(LOG(EXPO(- 0.141808 0.187430 1.272664 -0.121473 1») 
(0-08355) (0.15990) (0.41540) (0.18332) 
(1.69723) (1.17215) (3.06368) (-0.66262) 
D(LOG(EXPO(- 0.244001 0.132121 0.536761 -0.254073 2») 
(0-11332) (0.21688) (0.56342) (0.24864) 
(2.15314) (0.60920) (0.95269) (-l. 02184) 
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D(LOG(INV(-l))) -0.020126 0.295754 -0.232969 0.486008 
(0.06843) (0.13096) (0.34023) (0.15015) 
(-0.29411) (2.25827) (-0.68475) (3.23690) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) -0.014589 0.375457 0.224177 0.151346 
(0.05323) (0.10187) (0.26463) (0.11678) 
(-0.27409) (3.68582) (0.84713) (1.29594) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(- 0.135356 0.163823 0.449239 -0.085952 
1))) 
(0.11015) (0.21081) (0.54766) (0.24169) 
(1.22879) (0.77710) (0.82029) (-0.35563) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(- 0.171591 0.092454 0.091234 -0.287555 
2))) 
(0.10919) (0.20897) (0.54287) (0.23957) 
(1.57149) (0.44243) (0.16806) (-1.20028) 
C 0.028973 
(0.02904) 
(0.99783) 
0.048450 
(0.05557) 
(0.87189) 
-0.145769 
(0.14436) 
(-1.00977) 
0.095869 
(0.06371) 
(1.50483) 
R-squared 0.734309 0.841568 0.648759 0.578639 
Adj. R-squared 0.516926 0.711942 0.361380 0.233890 
Sum sq. resids 0.005547 0.020315 0.137101 0.026701 
S. E. equation 0.022455 0.042974 0.111641 0.049269 
F-statistic 3.377944 6.492280 2.257502 1.678435 
Log likelihood 56.71288 43.08204 23.03363 40.21175 
Akaike AIC -4-448846 -3.150670 -1.241298 -2.877310 Schwarz SC -3.951454 -2.653278 -0.743907 -2.379918 
Mean dependent 0.128264 0.141053 0.125683 0.046699 
S. D. dependent 0.032308 0.080070 0.139702 0.056289 
Determinant Residual 7.95E-13 
Covariance 
Log Likelihood 173.3440 
Akaike Information Criteria -12.22324 
Schwarz Criteria -9.984977 
The model with its substituted coefficient is: 
D(LOG(RGDP» =-0.0057040815*(LOG(RGDP(-1» - 0.167211207*LOG(EXPO(-1» - 
0.3216519065*LOG(I NV(-1» - 0.1 525025279*LOG(PRIVY(-1» - 0.05555599808*(@TREND(79» - 5.325652748) + 0.1719580789*D(LOG(RGDP(-1») 0.06705350665*D(LOG(RGDP(-2») + 0.1418077125*D(LOG(EXPO(-1») + 
0.2440008044*D(LOG(EXPO(-2») - 0.02012637232*D(LOG(INV(-1») - 0.01458918694*D(LOG(INV(-2») + 0.1353560618*D(LOG(PRIVY(-1») + 
0.1715908651*D(LOG(PRIVY(-2») + 0.02897268687 
D(LOG(EXPO)) = 2.12904732*(LOG(RGDP(-l)) - 0.167211207*LOG(EXPO(-l)) - 
0.3216519065*LOG(INV(-l)) - 0.1525025279*LOG(PRIVY(-l)) - 0.05555599808*(@TREND(79)) - 5.325652748) + 0.5486816129-D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) - 0.9217510186*D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) + 0.1874304283*D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) + 
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0.1321213189*D(LOG(EXPO(-2») + 0.2957541118*D(LOG(INV(-1») + 
0.3754565895*D(LOG(INV(-2») + 0.1638226958*D(LOG(PRIVY(-1») + 
0.09245402612*D(LOG(PRIVY(-2») + 0.04844989989 
D(LOG(INV» = 0.8322540331 *( LOG(RGDP(-1» - 0.1 67211207*LOG(EXPO(-1» - 0.3216519065*LOG(INV(-1» - 0.1525025279*LOG(PRIVY(-1» - 0.05555599808*(@TREND(79» - 5.325652748) - 0.2640318318*D(LOG(RGDP(-1») + 0.1554736096*D(LOG(RGDP(-2») + 1.272664416*D(LOG(EXPO(-1») + 
0.5367614408*D(LOG(EXPO(-2») - 0.2329690258*D(LOG(INV(-1») + 0.2241772313*D(LOG(INV(-2») + 0.4492387265*D(LOG(PRIVY(-1») + 
0.09123398691*D(LOG(PRIVY(-2») - 0.1457686084 
D(LOG(PRIVY» = 1.103188336*(LOG(RGDP(-1» - 0.167211207*LOG(EXPO(-1» - 0.3216519065*LOG(INV(-1» - 0.1525025279*LOG(PRIVY(-1» - 0.05555599808*(@TREND(79» - 5.325652748) - 0.3403911722*D(LOG(RGDP(-1») - 0.08274882831*D(LOG(RGDP(-2») - 0.1214726179*D(LOG(EXPO(-1») - 0.2540729771*D(LOG(EXPO(-2») + 0.486007618*D(LOG(INV(-1») + 
0.1 513458015*D(LOG(INV(-2») - 0.08595231499*D(LOG(PRivy(-1») - 0.2875551141*D(LOG(PRIVY(-2») + 0.09586873433 
Using the VEC model to measure precedence the Granger test is run on the 
following: 
d(Log(RGDP)) Log(RGDP(-I)) Log(EXPO(-I)) log(INV(-I)) log(PRIVY(-I)) 
d(log(RGDP(-1))) d(log(RGDP(-2))) d(log(EXPO(-1))) d(log(EXPO(-2))) 
d(log(INV(-I))) d(log(INV(-2))) d(Log(PRIVY(-I))) d(log(PRIVY(-2))) 
d(log(Expo)) d(log(INV)) d(log(PRIVY)) 
Table 21.8 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 09/22/04 Time: 11: 14 
Sample: 1979 2002 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 21 NA NA 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
_LOG(RGDP(-l)) LOG(EXPO(-I)) does not Granger Cause 21 5.49390 0.01526 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 1.48127 0.25691 
LOG(EXPO(-1)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 21 3.87271 0.04249 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
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D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.46807 0.63452 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause2l 6.12976 0.01056 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 1.94522 0.17531 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger20 NA NA 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.20674 0.81567 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause l. 7E+30 0.00000 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does nt Granger 20 2.53155 0.11290 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.09977 0.90564 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.56873 0.57880 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 3.53632 0.05713 
_D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 1.14334 0.34502 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 5.91107 0.01279 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.56460 0.24363 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 4.67492 0.02786 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 0.72515 0.50047 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 2.20902 0.14426 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 3.97962 0.04281 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.88275 0.43545 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause2l 8.16603 0.00360 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 1.08735 0.36076 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOGONV)) does not Granger Cause 21 2.74706 0.09428 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.57874 0.57192 
D(LOG(INýý) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 2.14695 0.14929 
D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) does not Granger Cause 0.91783 0.41942 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
I r)rwr: yprv-1 i% rir,, -c n^t r. ronmor r-l le- 21 12.2406 0.00060 
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LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 2.44755 0.11820 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause2l 5.02961 0.02020 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.90208 0.42539 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause2l 2.31708 0.13070 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 9.20832 0.00218 
_LOG(PRIVY(-l)) D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger20 NA NA 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger 19 2.25513 0.14158 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-I)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 2.5E+22 0.00000 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger20 7.34591 0.00597 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.74313 0.49234 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger19 3.37264 0.06375 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.52240 0.25220 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 3.94232 0.04208 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.56092 0.24220 
_D(LOG(INV(-ML _ D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 2.66411 0.10460 
LOG(RGDP(-I)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 2.85439 0.09126 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 3.26253 0.06662 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 2.01763 0.16749 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 2.27800 0.13916 
Cause LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.25543 0.77811 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 21 3.13863 0.07081 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 3.75182 0.04612 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 21 1.50426 0.25198 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.66836 0.52629 
D(LOG(INV)) 
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D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 21 0.54023 0.59287 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-I)) does not Granger Cause 0.24500 0.78558 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 21 4.10402 0.03642 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 10-8058 0.00107 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause 21 1.55838 0.24079 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 3.00028 0.07825 
_LOG(PRIVY(-l)) D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger20 . 01850 0.07912 Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 5.54559 0.01574 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger 19 4.62662 0.02868 
Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.41966 0.27455 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger 20 NA NA 
Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.39539 0.68071 
Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 4.5E+22 0.00000 
. 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 0.64756 0.53735 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 9.98171 0.00175 
D(LOG(INV(-11)L 
_ D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.85645 0.19269 
LOG(EXPO(-I)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.45707 0.64226 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 0.89587 0.42901 
Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-I)) does not Granger Cause 0.46845 0.63483 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger19 0.98776 0.39693 
Cause LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.22441 0.80181 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 21 NA NA 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(EXPOD_ 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 21 1.14631 0.34257 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause _0.54065 _0.59264 
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_D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 21 1.66254 0.22080 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.18152 0.83569 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.26692 0.76908 
LOG(INV(-I)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.71052 0.21222 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger20 0.87815 0.43586 
Cause LOG(INV(-I)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 4.36020 0.03216 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.04345 0.95761 
Cause LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 5.98935 0.01320 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-I))) does not Granger20 10.2555 0.00156 
Cause LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-I)) does not Granger Cause 1.59411 0.23564 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 1.67759 0.22228 
Cause LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.94228 0.18011 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 NA NA 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(IW(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
_D(LOG(INV(-l))) D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.72464 0.21402 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.1 E+24 0.00000 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 0.70732 0.50869 
Cause LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.68300 0.52014 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-I))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.48353 0.62653 
Cause LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.37018 0.69717 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 21 -- 6.50705 0.00855 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 3.28001 0.06401 
_D(LOG(EXPOý_ D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 21 NA NA 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(IýM) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.37176 0.69532 
LOG(INV(-l)) 
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LOG(INV(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.11312 0.89375 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-I))) does not Granger20 2.06755 0.16105 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause 2.16482 0.14928 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.66932 0.52770 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause 0.80391 0.46720 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger 20 0.25892 0.77527 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.34921 0.28918 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.08026 0.92329 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-I)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause 1.01022 0.38920 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 0.66029 0.53109 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.53037 0.59902 
DýLOG(INV(A)D 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.39273 0.28078 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause 0.45381 0.64422 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 NA NA 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
. 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 2.28125 0.13882 
Cause LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause 1.6E+26 0.00000 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 21 0.20867 0.81383 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause 1.75684 0.20429 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 21 0.60389 0.55868 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) does not Granger Cause 1.07601 0.36439 
D(LOG(IND) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 21 NA NA 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger19 NA NA 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
nii t)r. t;: Ypr)t-l m rim,. * nr%t r. ronmar 20 8.62315 0.00321 
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Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 1.38959 0.27948 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 2.32530 0.13429 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.37228 0.69578 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 2.51424 0.11437 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.58412 0.56979 
D(LOGQNV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.05517 0.37425 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 5.49538 0.01732 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 2.00769 0.16881 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-I))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 1.76001 0.20577 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.71772 0.50497 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 2.13432 0.15522 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 20 4.39920 0.03137 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.35038 0.71004 
DLýOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 20 10.8658 0.00121 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.18945 0.82936 
D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.56410 0.58048 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.39874 0.67807 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
. D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger 19 4.16485 0.03808 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.93685 0.41510 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 6.49358 0.01011 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.26622 0.31228 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 19 10.0715 0.00195 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.16862 0.84652 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 2.57537 0.11158 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.49072 0.62233 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
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D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 19 0.21838 0.80651 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.45085 0.64602 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 1.30461 0.30231 
Cause D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 2.02677 0.16864 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 19 1.81482 0.19916 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.86594 0.44201 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 19 6.69145 0.00913 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.02567 0.97470 
D(LOG(IND) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 19 0.01240 0.98769 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.94844 0.17925 
_D(LOG(PRIVY)) D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger 19 NA NA 
Cause D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 20 0.85673 0.44431 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause 10.6575 0.00132 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 1.98824 0.17377 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause 8.85434 0.00327 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-I))) does not Granger 20 0.78622 0.47346 
Cause D(LOG(EXPO(-J))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.77250 0.47938 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.25344 0.77961 
Cause D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.57405 0.57595 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 20 NA NA 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.74719 0.49053 
D(LOG(EXPO(-J))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause 2.09422 0.15772 
D(LOGQNýQ) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.85161 0.44636 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) does not Granger Cause _0.07984 
0.92366 
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D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 19 0.58246 0.57150 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.91216 0.18442 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 0.59214 0.56642 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 9.30643 0.00269 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger19 1.22526 0.32333 
Cause D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.02981 0.97069 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger19 1.21294 0.32673 
Cause D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.91038 0.42492 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 19 3.2E+31 0.00000 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.49233 0.25852 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 19 6.64135 0.00937 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.78916 0.20326 
D(LOGQNýO) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 19 0.14466 0.86659 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.67896 0.52308 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 19 NA NA 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(INV(-2ý)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger 20 0.18538 0.83266 
Cause D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.79395 0.47016 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.02642 0.97397 
Cause D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.60706 0.55868 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 20 10.0055 0.00173 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 2.93415 0.08405 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 20 NA NA 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.22916 0.79793 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
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D(LOG(INV(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.74028 0.49362 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger19 0.19324 0.82644 
Cause D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.92634 0.41897 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger 19 0.12062 0.88728 
Cause D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.55228 0.58768 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 19 0.47530 0.63137 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 2.60923 0.10886 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 19 9.9E+31 0.00000 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.88331 0.43524 
D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 19 1.23197 0.32148 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.94581 0.41183 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger19 NA NA 
Cause D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.82416 0.45752 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger Cause 0.14253 0.86832 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 20 0.83528 0.45296 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-I))) does not Granger Cause 0.03578 0.96493 
D(LOG(INýO) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 20 NA NA 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-l))) does not Granger Cause NA NA 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 19 1.55507 0.24554 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.65912 0.53264 
_D(LOG(EXPOD 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 19 0.16166 0.85229 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger Cause 0.07338 0.92961 
D(LOG(ILhM 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause 19 1.1 E+32 0.00000 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) does not Granger Cause 1.32698 0.29667 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
mi rv-zimm nnt r. ronnar r-oll-- 21 1.08178 0.36254 
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D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(INV)) 
does not Granger Cause 9.50452 0.00190 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.79902 0.46692 
D(LOG(EXPO)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) does not Granger Cause 0.32532 0.72697 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) does not Granger Cause2l 0.20438 0.81725 
D(LOG(INV)) 
D(LOG(INV)) does not Granger Cause 0.77651 0.47659 
D(LOG(PRIVY)) 
A summary showing the variables that granger causes realGDP or its differences is 
displayed below: 
LOG(EXPO(-1)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
LOG(PRIVY(-l)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) Granger Causes D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP)) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
D(LOG(INV)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP)) 
LOG(EXPO(-I)) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(INV(-I)) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) Granger Causes LOG(PRIVY(-l)) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes LOG(RGDP(-l)) 
LOG(RGDP(-l)) Granger Causes D(LOG(EXPO)) 
LOG(INV(-l)) Granger Causes LOG(EXPO(-l)) 
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LOG(EXPO(-1)) Granger Causes LOG(INV(-l)) 
LOG(EXPO(-1)) Granger Causes LOG(PRIVY(-I)) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) Granger Causes LOG(EXPO(-1)) 
LOG(EXPO(-I)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) Granger Causes LOG(EXPO(-1)) 
LOG(EXPO(-1)) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
LOG(INV(-l)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
LOG(INV(-l)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes LOG(INV(-l)) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-l))) 
D(LOG(INV)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-I))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV)) Granger Causes D(LOG(RGDP(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-l))) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-2))) 
D(LOG(INV)) Granger Causes D(LOG(EXPO(-2))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV(-l))) 
D(LOG(EXPO)) Granger Causes D(LOG(INV)) 
These results are not much different from the first Granger causality tests run on the 
difference of the variables as per the first option discussed earlier. 
The GMM Model presented earlier revealed a positive relationship between financial 
deepening ratio or more broadly between a finance index and growth. The VAR 
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model shows a positive relationship between finance (proxied by private sector 
credit) and growth: 
[ (1) LOG(PRIVY(-I)) Granger causes D(LOG(RGDP)); (2) D(LOG(PRIVY(-2))) 
Granger causes D(LOG(RGDP)); (3) LOG(RGDP(-I)) Granger causes 
LOG(PRIVY(-I)) ] 
The results therefore give confidence in the models and the data and additionally the 
VAR model highlights bi-directional causality between the two variables. 
8.4 Liberalisation and Corporate Sector Financing Strategy 
Financial liberalisation is expected to allow a greater flow of debt finance to 
the corporate sector. The financial structure and financing options of eleven selected 
listed companies have been examined below in order to study the impact of 
deregulation of interest rates on corporate financing strategy and to test the 
prediction of "pecking order" theory of financial gearing according to which firms 
prefer internal to external finance and whenever the latter is taken the preference 
goes for debt while equity finance remains a last resort (Myers, 1984). The theory 
suggests that this is so because market imperfections make external financing more 
costly. Further the market for equity is more subject to adverse selection that the debt 
market. 
The interest rate liberalisation process started in 1991 and was completed in 
1995. A debt equity index is constructed for comparison between the pre- 
liberalisation period (1984-1993) and post-liberalisation period (1993- 2003). 
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Figure 6.8 
Debt-Equity Index of Selected Firms Before and After Interest Rate 
Liberalisation 
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The index shows very clearly that while during the period before 
liberalisation the companies in the sample were relying more heavily on internal 
financing, after liberalisation financial leverage has been consistently higher. 
A test of equality between the two series is run below for inferences about 
differences in the population means of the debt equity profile before and after 
liberalisation and the results are shown below. 
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Table 22.8 
Equality Tests 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series 
Date: 09/08/04 Time: 12: 12 
Sample: 1 10 
Included observations: 10 
Method df Value Probability 
West 17 1.975472 0.0647 
Anova F-statistic (1,17) 3.902488 0.0647 
This two-sided test with a p-value below 0.05 does not allow the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of equality of the means at 5% significance level but we remain 
confident that at 10% significance that the population means are not equal before and 
after liberalisation. 
Higher long-term debt is not necessarily connected with internal growth of 
firms through the acquisition of fixed physical assets. Companies sometimes acquire 
long-term financing for financial investment or for external growth purposes. To 
obtain a deeper insight about whether companies have preferred debt financing to 
equity financing for the purpose of acquisition of physical investment, the section 
below presents an econometric analysis of corporate financing and tries to establish 
whether there is a link between interest rate liberalisation and the financial strategy 
of firms in relation to internal growth. 
Firms commit funds to long-term assets whenever there exists opportunities 
of earning higher profits. An investment equation is considered below on a similar 
basis to the one used by Ornole and Falokun (1999) for Nigeria. 
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Assumption: 
Investment can be financed in one or more of the following ways: 
I. Retained Profit (Internal Financing - Cash Flow) 
2. Equity Finance 
3. Debt Finance 
li't 
= ao +cc, 
li't-I it-I 
)+ 
i-t-I 
) 
1. 
-t 
yi 
+ Ct3 Ki. t-l Ei, t-l 
+ Vi't 
( 
-) + CC 2 
(-'ý 
1) 
+ ý' 4 (x 5 RIJ-2 Ki. t-l 
Where, 
I1.1 == firm gross physical investment at time t 
Kj,, = firms pecific fixed capital at time t 
A Y,., = (Y,,, - Y,., -, 
) firm specific increase in turnover at time t 
P= firm specific gross profit at time t 0 
Dj. 
t = 
firm specific stock of debt at time t 
E,., = firm specific equity at time t 
To capture the effects of liberalisation, the coefficient of internal finance and 
those of the two leverage ratios are made to reflect the situation before and after 
liberalisation by introducing three additional dummy variables: 
+a, 
(DumPi) 
+a 
(DumDi, 
t-l DumDi, t-l 
KO-l ) 7( Ki. t- I 
These dummy variables are assumed to be zero pre-liberalisation and equal to 
the original value post liberalisation. The dummy variables are introduced in a 
multiplicative way hence influencing the partial slopes. 
The revised equation is: 
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Liberalisation of interest rates was gradual over the period 1991-1995 and 
1993 is taken as a reasonable break date for the end of the pre-liberalisation period. 
Table 23.8 
Investment Regression Output 
Dependent Variable: 1? /K? (-l) 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Date: 09108/04 Time: 13: 37 
Sample: 1986 2003 
Included observations: 18 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total Panel (unbalanced) observations: 194 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.002867 0.002819 1.017263 0.3104 
1? (-l)/K? (-2) 0.367439 0.049822 7.374985 0.0000 
D(Y? )/K? (-2) 0.018558 0.006894 2.691798 0.0078 
P? /K? (-l) 0.237380 0.034800 6.821342 0.0000 
DE? (-l)/K? (-l) 0.403157 0.665714 0.605601 0.5455 
DE? (-l)/EQ? (-l) 0.158923 0.530876 0.299359 0.7650 
DUM? *P? /K? (-l) -0.029428 0.043793 -0.671989 0.5024 DUM? *DE? (-l)/K? (-l* -0.292441 0.673904 -0.433950 0.6648 DUM? *DE? (-l)/EQ? (. -0.201565 0.535662 -0.376291 0.7071 1) 
Wei2hted Statistics 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.392422 Mean dependent var 0.098389 
Adjusted R-squared 0.366148 S. D. dependentvar 0.150237 
S. E. of regression 0.119611 Sum squared resid 2.646755 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.384498 
I/K(-l) = f(l(-I)/K(-2), D(Y)/K(-2), P/K(-I), DE(-I)/K(-l), DE(-I)/EQ(-I), DUM*P/K(-I) 
DUM*DE(-I)/K(-I), DUM*DE(-I)/EQ(-I)) 
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This is a regression result for the pre and post liberalisation periods 
combined. It appears that only lagged investment ratio 1(-l)/K(-2), turnover ratio 
D(Y)/K(-2) and cash flow ratio P? /K? (-l) seem significant. Unfortunately, the series is 
not long enough to allow the software to split it in the two defined periods 1984 to 
1993 and 1994 and 2003 respectively for comparison. It has therefore been necessary 
to consider two slightly overlapping periods (1986 299 to 1995 and 1993 to 2003) to 
get sufficient number of observations for both periods. This a priori poses some 
problems of accuracy of the comparative analysis but the degree of distortion due to 
that adjustment should not be a major one since interest rate liberalisation started in 
1991 and was completed by 1995. The years 1993 to 1995 actually fall in the 
transition period and are not years that can be classified categorically as pre or post- 
liberalisation ones. 
299 Refer to the related comments in the chapter on methodology. 
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Table 24.8 
Regression Results before Liberalisation 
Dependent Variable: 1? /K? (-l) 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Date: 09/08/04 Time: 14: 13 
Sample: 1986 1995 
Included observations: 10 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalancedl observations: 109 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003351 0.002073 1.616833 0.1091 
1? (-l)/K? (-2) 0.450564 0.043836 10.27850 0.0000 
D(Y? )/K? (-2) 0.024160 0.005020 4.812696 0.0000 
P? /K? (-l) 0.188920 0.019144 9.868529 0.0000 
DE? (-l)/K? (-l) 0.507565 0.293641 1.728523 0.0870 
DE? (-l)/EQ? (-l) -0.019615 0.229584 -0.085437 0.9321 
DUM? *P? /K? (-l) -0.053725 0.046328 -1.159683 0.2489 DUM? *DE? (-l)/K? (-I) 1.810301 0.873419 2.072660 0.0408 
DUM? *DE? (-l)/EQ? (- -1.721466 0.654428 -2.630489 0.0099 1) 
Weighted Statistics 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.577935 Mean dependent var 0.122971 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544170 S. D. dependentvar 0.154409 
S. E. of regression 0.104250 Sum squ ared resid 1.086799 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.205684 
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Table 25.8 
Regression Results after liberalisation 
Dependent Variable: 1? /K? (-l) 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Date: 09/08/04 Time: 14: 14 
Sample: 1993 2003 
Included observations: 11 
Number of cross-sections used: 11 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 118 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.004565 0.002301 1.983957 0.0498 
1? (-l)/K? (-2) 0.114688 0.033359 3.438012 0.0008 
D(Y? )/K? (-2) 0.024413 0.007183 3.398765 0.0009 
P? /K? (-l) 1.400723 0.145728 9.611893 0.0000 
DE? (-l)/K? (-l) -11.14410 1.111128 -10.02954 0.0000 DE? (-l)/EQ? (-l) 8.769636 1.000674 8.763726 0.0000 
DUM? *P? /K? (-l) -1.085361 0.146047 -7.431584 0.0000 DUM? *DE? (-l)/K? (-l) 11.25950 1.113206 10.11448 0.0000 
DUM? *DE? (-l)/EQ? (- -8.707398 1.001690 -8.692703 0.0000 
-1) Weighted Statistics 
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.285611 Mean dependent var 0.073058 
Adjusted R-squared 0.233179 S. D. dependentvar 0.135852 
S. E. of regression 0.118963 Sum squared resid 1.542593 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.184673 
The results suggest that before liberalisation firms relied more heavily on 
their internal financing position for their strategy regarding the acquisition of land 
and plant and- machinery while external finance has become a more significant 
variable after liberalisation. The empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction 
of the "pecking order " theory of financial gearing However, there is a need to carry 
out further research in this area in order to determine whether small and medium 
enterprise in Mauritius adopt the same behaviour and also to investigate inter-firm 
and inter-industry differences. A clarification of these issues will allow the adoption 
of a more effective strategy on the supply side of the financial market. 
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8.5 Liberalisation and Banking Spread 
In Chapter 6 the spread was calculated as the weighted average of lending rate less 
that of deposit rate for the overall banking sector. It was found that after 
liberalisation spread initially widened before starting to narrow in the recent years. 
The thesis now attempts to consider the determinants of spread and the causality 
issue. Due to unavailability of data regarding some suggested determinants for the 
overall sector, it is proposed that the two biggest banks, MCB and SBM, be jointly 
considered as a proxy for the banking sector. This is a reasonable assumption given 
that these two banks jointly hold around 70% of the banking deposit. 
Given that the raw figures available for the calculation of spread for these individual 
banks are not the same as those made available by the BOM for the calculation of 
spread for the whole sector, a different methodology is employed. Spread is defined 
as: 
Spread = 
Interest on Loans and Advances less Interest on Deposits 
Loans and Advances Deposits 
The results exhibited in figure 7.8 shows that the date for the start of the decline is 
between 1995 and 1996, that is a few year after liberalisation of interest date. This 
date does not coincide with the date identified in Chapter 6 because of different 
methodology employed, but the pattern is the same. It also shows that spread is 
consistently lower at the level of MCB, the biggest bank. 
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Figure 7.8 
Interest Spread at the Two Biggest Banks (1994-2004) 
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A three variable VAR model with two lags is used to test causality between spread, 
market share and the cost of acquiring fund. Market share is measured by share of 
deposit. Considering demand deposit as funds acquired at the lowest cost, the cost of 
DemandDeposits 
acquiring fund is measured by the ratio Loan 
Since the larger the amount of deposit, the smaller is the cost of acquiring funds for 
loans, the inverse of the ratio is used instead, namely 
Loan 
Demand Deposits * 
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Where, 
SPREAD = Banking Spread 
MKTSHARE = Market Share of deposits 
FUNDCOST = Cost of acquiring fund 
Table 26.8 
VAR Estimates (Interest Spread, MCB & SMB) 
Date: 05/09/05 Time: 18: 04 
Sample(adjusted): 4 22 
Included observations: 19 after adjusting endpoints 
Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses 
SPREAD MKTSHARE FUNDCOST 
SPREAD(-l) 0.720184 0.013905 -0.008919 
(0.19602) (0.01149) (0.03144) 
(3.67406) (1.21002) (-0.28366) 
SPREAD(-2) -0.355767 0.000447 -0.065997 
(0.22646) (0.01328) (0.03633) 
(-1.57096) (0.03370) (-1.81674) 
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SPREAD(-3) -0.027234 0.010056 0.001911 
(0.18473) (0.01083) (0.02963) 
(-0.14742) (0.92852) (0.06449) 
MKTSHARE(-1) -5.438967 1.083472 0.915240 
(6.24205) (0.36593) (1.00129) 
(-0.87134) (2.96090) (0.91406) 
MKTSHARE(-2) -21.97128 0.015576 -0.756286 
(7.72219) (0.45270) (1.23872) 
(-2.84521) (0.03441) (-0.61054) 
MKTSHARE(-3) 21.90276 0.555686 -2.677673 
(6.83603) (0.40075) (1.09657) 
(3.20402) (1.38663) (-2.44186) 
FUNDCOST(A) -1.341306 0.232199 0.245321 
(1.90518) (0.11169) (0.30561) 
(-0.70403) (2.07902) (0.80272) 
FUNDCOST(-2) -3.446699 0.108540 0.022357 (1.72340) (0.10103) (0.27645) 
(-1.99995) (1.07433) (0.08087) 
FUNDCOST(-3) 1.713296 0.033406 -0.911523 
(2.01806) (0.11830) (0.32372) 
(0.84898) (0.28237) (-2.81580) 
C 7.119348 -0.626595 2.411180 
(4.44780) (0.26074) (0.71347) 
(1.60065) (-2.40312) (3. 
R-squared 0.926534 0.927911 0.826342 
Adj. R-squared 0.853068 0.855822 0.652683 
Sum sq. resids 3.147603 0.010817 0.080992 
S. E. equation 0.591383 0.034668 0.094864 
F-statistic 12.61175 12.87173 4.758434 
Log likelihood -9.880751 44.01527 24.88964 Akaike AIC 2.092711 -3.580554 -1.567331 Schwarz SC 2.589784 -3.083481 -1.070258 Mean dependent 4.906138 0.342808 0.697546 
S. D. dependent 1.542804 0.091303 0.160967 
Determinant Resid ual 1.1 6E-07 
Covariance 
Log Likelihood 70.83981 
Akaike Information Criteria -4.298927 
Schwarz Criteria -2.807708 
SPREAD 0.720184388*SPREAD(-l) - 0.3557667119*SPREAD(-2) - 0.02723428471*SPREAD(-3) - 5. 438967073 *MKTSHARE(-l) - 21.97128445*MKTSHARE(- 2) + 21.9027581 *MKTSHARE(-3) - 1.341306342*FUNDCOST(-l) - 3.446699125*FUNDCOST(-2) + 1.71329608 *FUNDCOST(-3) + 7.119348332 
MKTSHARE = 0.01390454035*S PREAD(-l) + 0.000447367589*SPREAD(-2) + 
0.01005559512*SPREAD(-3) +1 . 083471888*MKTSHARE(-l )+ 
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0.01557554697*MKTSHARE(-2) + 0.5556855138*MKTSHARE(-3) 
0.2321993338*FUNDCOST(-I) + 0.1085400311*FUNDCOST(-2) + 
0.03340580231*FUNDCOST(-3) - 0.6265946774 
FUNDCOST =-0.008919221055*SPREAD(-l) - 0.06599705096*SPREAD(-2) 
0.001910964564*SPREAD(-3) + 0.9152395914*MKTSHARE(-l) - 
0.7562863585*MKTSHARE(-2) - 2.677672796*MKTSHARE(-3) + 0.2453206844*FUNDCOST(-l) + 0.02235726965*FUNDCOST(-2) - 
0.9115232967*FUNDCOST(-3) + 2.411180277 
Before proceeding with the Granger test of no-causality, the four series are verified 
for stationarity using the Phillips-Perron Test. 
Table 27.8 
Unit Root Tests on SPREAD, MKTSHARE, and FUNDCOST 
Phillips-Perron test on SPREAD 
PP Test Statistic -2.272022 1% Critical Value* -3.7856 
5% Critical Value -3.0114 
10% Critical Value -2.6457 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron test on D(SPREAD) 
PIP Test Statistic -3.960483 1% Critical Value* -3.8067 
5% Critical Value -3.0199 
10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron test on MKTSHARE 
PIP Test Statistic -0.459132 1% Critical Value* -3.7856 
5% Critical Value -3.0114 
10% Critical Value -2.6457 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
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Phillips-Perron test on D(MKTSHARE) 
PIP Test Statistic -4.239096 1% Critical Value* -3.8067 
5% Critical Value -3.0199 
10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron test on FUNDCOST 
PP Test Statistic -2.130803 1% Critical Value* -3.7856 
5% Critical Value -3.0114 
10% Critical Value -2.6457 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Phillips-Perron test on D(FUNDCOST) 
PP Test Statistic -6.694501 1% Critical Value* -3.8067 
5% Critical Value -3.0199 
10% Critical Value -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
The series are integrated of order one. 
The Johansen test of cointegration is now run to detect whether some of the original 
series are cointegrated. 
Table 28.8 
Johansen Test (Spread) 
Date: 05/09/05 Time: 18: 23 
Sample: 122 
Included observations: 20 
Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data 
Series: SPREAD MKTSHARE FUNDCOST 
Lags interval: 1 to I 
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized 
. 
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
0.581834 23.51417 29.68 35.65 None 
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0.208648 6.076617 15.41 20.04 At most 1 
0.067436 1.396358 3.76 6.65 At most 2 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(l %) significance level 
L. R. rejects any cointegration at 5% significance level 
Unnormalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
SPREAD MKTSHARE FUNDCOST 
0.228311 5.102417 2.639552 
0.099490 -0.992240 -1.456295 
0.012691 2.655079 -0.168385 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: I Cointegrating Eq uation(S) 
SPREAD MKTSHARE FUNDCOST C 
1.000000 22.34857 11.56123 -20.80149 
(3.31751) (2.17995) 
Log likelihood 41.29225 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 2 Cointegrating Eq uation(s) 
SPREAD MKTSHARE FUNDCOST C 
1.000000 0.000000 -6.553648 -0.435356 
(6.79538) 
0.000000 1.000000 0.810561 -0.911295 
(0.30838) 
Log likelihood 43.63238 
There is no cointegration between the variables. The Granger no causality test is therefore 
run on the first difference of the series 
Table 29.8 
Granger No Causality Test (Spread) 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/09105 Time: 17: 58 
Sample: 122 
Laas: 2 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
D(MKTSHARE) does not Granger Cause 19 3.96832 0.04312 
D(SPREAD) 
D(SPREAD) does not Granger Cause 0.18579 0.83247 
D(MKTSHARE) 
D(FUNDCOST) does not Granger Cause 19 0.05915 0.94280 
D(SPREAD) 
D(SPREAD) does not Granger Cause _0.83897 
0.45276 
-339- 
D(FUNDCOST) 
D(FUNDCOST) does not Granger Cause 19 1.28515 0.30732 
D(MKTSHARE) 
D(MKTSHARE) does not Granger Cause 0.11926 0.88847 
D(FUNDCOST) 
From the above table it can be seen that there is unidirectional ganger causality 
from market share of deposits to banking spread. 
8.6 Summary of Findings 
Financial deepening has improved fast in Mauritius in early 1980s. However, 
there has been a structural break over the last decade with a slow down as the 
monetization variable 
M2 
exceeded 65%. There is also reduced variability in the Y 
deepening process in the recent years. In Chapter 6 (Table 6.7) it was noted that real 
interest rate has not been higher after liberalisation. This chapter has shown that 
financial depth is not positively related with real interest rate in Mauritius. Countries 
in the region taken separately do not equally show a positive relationship between 
interest rate and financial deepening except in the case of South Africa and Zambia. 
There are probably specific conditions in these two countries that made the 
hypothesis valid. Identification of these specific conditions could constitute new 
areas for research in future. As for interest spread, it is definitely narrowing down 
and this is influenced by the Treasury Bill rate. 
Although the evidence does not support the McKinnon and Shaw predictions 
concerning interest rate and mobilization of savings, yet there has been freer access 
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to credit after liberalisation and the study has shown that private sector credit as a 
share of GDP is positively related to economic growth and there is bidirectional 
causality between them. 
In so far as corporate financing is concerned with liberalisation firms now get 
easier access to credit and the study shows that the behaviour of listed firms is 
consistent with the pecking order theory of finance and that the level of financial 
leverage is higher as the listed companies have now become more sensitive to 
external financing for the acquisition of physical investment, in relation to their 
intemal growth strategy. 
Banking spread which has started to narrow after initially widening and is 
explained by market share though surprisingly a negative relationship is observed 
between the two variables. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has examined the theoretical backing to the growth promoting financial 
liberalisation process. The cost of the policy of financial liberalisation in terms of 
financial instability and its subsequent adverse impact on economic activity has also 
been discussed. 
In the case of Mauritius it has been observed that the shift from a financial 
repression model to a financially liberalized one has been relatively smooth. The 
reform from direct to market-oriented monetary policy has been conducted 
successfully as a series of gradual steps. Although the most recent prescription in 
the literature is about a sequenced internal and external liberalisation, these two 
dimensions have been undertaken almost concurrently in Mauritius. It did not lead 
to a destabilization of the currency rate, of the domestic banking sector and of the 
stock market albeit some minor crises, not important enough to cause an economic 
downturn, were detected. This is an indication that there is no such thing as a 
correct sequencing for financial liberalization. What probably matters more is the 
gradual but consistent approach to allow the economy time to adapt and respond to 
the changes. This suggests that any shift to a more market oriented approach should 
be a managed one. 
The findings concerning banking crises are limited in so far as we do not 
know whether the banking sector as a whole was facing a crisis or whether during 
the crises some specific banks were unaffected. However, the identification and 
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measurement of the mini banking crises opens new avenues of research for 
identifying whether these were due to bad banking or caused by unfavourable 
macroeconomic conditions. Taking into account that the phased liberalisation of 
interest rate ended in 1995 and that the phasing out of high reserve requirement was 
fully achieved in 1998 it can be concluded that the situation in the banking sector has 
been more calm after liberalization than it was before and during the transition 
period. Future research is now needed to find out about the connections with other 
asset markets and identify which assets people consider as good substitutes to bank 
deposits and to securities in periods of crises and to study the transmission of these 
crises to the real economy. 
At the level of the stock market the trading process has improved but there is 
evidence of a weak form of market efficiency with a weaker position after 
liberalisation. Information cost has been improved in recent years with enhanced 
disclosure requirements but transaction costs remain an area where it is 
recommended that Government intervenes in favour of a lowering of such costs to 
help correcting misalignment of asset prices and hence sending more accurate signals 
for a more efficient investment. 
External liberalisation did not have a negative feedback effect on internal 
liberalisation because the freeing of the capital account of the balance of payments 
has not yet given rise to a massive flow of "hot-money" via either the stock market 
channel or the bank channel. Although foreign loans and advances constitute now a 
regular activity, these are still at a very low level as compared to the massive build 
up of such flows in South East Asia before the crisis. Here again, the results point 
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towards gradualism as a recommended approach in so far as the opening of the 
economy to short term capital is concerned. Vulnerability due to exposure to such 
volatile flows will inevitably increase in future. This is because the Treasury Bill 
has now been listed on the SEM and becomes available to foreign buyers and the 
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy through the external channel 
transmission is likely to improve over time as the domestic financial instruments 
become more attractive and the domestic financial institutions become more visible 
in the international financial markets. Adoption of a liberalisation policy and 
maintenance of some government interference in the financial sector are not 
mutually exclusive. So far government has a declared policy of limiting its role to 
that of introducing prudential regulations and setting up a system of supervision. In 
line with the framework discussed in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of the thesis it is 
considered that government should go beyond this. As a vigilant approach to 
minimize the impact of a potential "Minskian" crisis in an open economic context it 
is proposed that an observation crisis post be set up for the close monitoring of 
credit boom, short-term capital inflows and outflows, especially the short-term 
bank-to-bank foreign lending/borrowing and equally any worsening of current 
account deficit as a proportion of GDP. The monitoring of the short-term loans is 
really crucial since the Basel Capital weights (see Chapter 3) favour short-term 
lending over medium/long-terms lending for riskiness reasons but without making 
the important distinction between domestic and international short-term lending. 
Ex-ante detection of financial fragility would allow the appropriate authorities to 
take timely political decisions regarding the opportunity of temporary control 
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aiming at dampening any band-wagon behaviour. A decision to slow down the 
short-term flows while maintaining the freedom of long-term flows can limit the 
magnitude of an economic downturn and should not be neglected just because of 
ideological reasons. This can be done fairly rapidly as the legislation regarding 
exchange control has not been repealed but simply suspended. 
In so far as the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is concerned the evidence in 
Mauritius points towards mixed results. The economy was already highly monetized 
before the start of financial liberalisation. Financial deepening has kept on 
increasing but since the beginning of the 1990s this has consistently been at a 
slower pace. The evidence indicates that in an island economy which is relatively 
open and not fragmented by the coexistence of a traditional indigenous economy 
and a modem sector prior to liberalisation it is wrong to blame financial repression 
for insufficient financial deepening and low saving rate. The fact that many African 
countries still have a low monetization ratio after many years of financial 
liberalisation reinforces the proposition made above. This sets out new directions 
for future research to test the proposition in similar island economies like Seychelles 
with a view to consider some possible general isations. 
Neither the liberalisation of the interest rate (through the domestic channel as well 
as through the currency substitution cannel) nor the liberalisation of the capital 
account has led to an improvement of savings in Mauritius. While in LDCs savings 
have been interest inelastic, in Mauritius it has been found that savings was 
sensitive to real interest rates but the Mckinnon hypothesis has been proved wrong. 
This is so either because of interest rigidity on deposits (which could be linked with 
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a credit rationing equilibrium) following liberalisation or perhaps more 
fundamentally the question that crops up is whether the interest ceiling on deposits 
prior to liberalization was far from the competitive equilibrium level. It also raises a 
fundamental question namely why should it be assumed that in a policy of access to 
cheap money governments in developing countries have been fixing the ceiling on 
deposits at a big differential from the competitive equilibrium? It could well be that 
the deviation from equilibrium comes mostly from the lending rate side. That could 
explain why spread widened just after liberalization but has subsequently narrowed 
because of increased competition due to the entry of new banks in the industry. 
The spread has been found to be explained by market share of deposit of the 
two big banks. The negative coefficient in the VAR suggests that the larger is the 
share the smaller is the spread. The finding is supported by the observation made in 
figure 7.8 which shows that the MCB which is the top bank in terms of deposits has 
a lower spread than SBM, the number two bank. This is an unconventional result 
from the policy of liberalisation. However, until now the two big banks have hardly 
been challenged by competitors and it is somewhat early to make a comprehensive 
judgment regarding the final outcome of the liberalisation policy on spread. The fact 
that new important potential competitors have appeared on the scene only recently 
must not be neglected. The effect of the recent appearance of the Mauritius Post and 
Co-operative bank as well as foreign players like Caisse D'Epargne and the State 
bank of India in the country as mentioned in Chapter 5 will only be felt in the next 
five years to come when these banks and possibly other new entrants gather 
momentum and acquire their stable share of the market. There is a possibility that 
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with such changes banks behaviour change over time. Therefore a more 
comprehensive analysis of banking spread in Mauritius would be possible in around 
five years from now. Finally, the fact that the spread is still higher than its pre- 
liberalisation level does not necessarily imply that the policy of liberalisation has 
failed. It has to be taken into account that the spread before liberalisation was only 
artificially low and that what matters more is that it is now following a downward 
trend. It is also recommended that while structural deregulation is both facillitating 
the entry of new banks and exercising a threat to entry on incumbent banks, there is 
a need for the authorities to refrain from allowing a proliferation of banks in 
Mauritius so as to ensure that the banking sector does not lose economies of scale 
and does not engage in ruinous competition. That is a precondition to be fulfilled if 
Mauritius wants to become a regional leader as set out in the wider strategy of 
regional economic cooperation through SADC and COMESA. In the same logic, 
the market discipline of banks needs some consolidation. This can be achieved by 
adopting the New Zealand path through requesting banks to regularly publish 
statements in a format readable by the general public and that allows industry 
comparison as well as comparison over time. That implies the eventual development 
of a banking index which would serve as a benchmark. 
It appears that we are expecting too much from a liberalization of the 
interest rate and that so far this channel has not transmitted a positive impact on 
savings. It could perhaps be more important to accelerate the listing of government 
securities on the stock market and to ensure that small savers are not penalized by 
being excluded by some minimum size of transactions. This will stimulate the 
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debentures market on the SEM. There is also scope for research to be conducted to 
assess the difficulties met by the collective saving schemes in the mobilization of 
savings, to identify the causes of low share ownership as well as the impediments to 
further deepening in the insurance sector and to recommend policy measures 
towards a change. 
Although financial liberalization has not met the expectations concerning 
mobilization of savings through the interest rate channel still it has brought about 
some financial development in terms of a greater supply of credit and liquidity in the 
economy from the banking system following elimination of high reserves 
requirement and from access to foreign savings following external liberalisation. The 
result of this is that although the behaviour of firms is still consistent with the 
pecking order theory of financial leverage it has now been established that the listed 
firms have now become more sensitive to external financing for the acquisition of 
physical investment in relation to their internal growth strategy. This can only have a 
positive effect on capital formation and ultimately on growth. However, it would be 
good in future to deepen the research to find out whether the same pattern can be 
established at the level of small and medium enterprises that are gaining importance 
in the economy on account of their higher capacity to create jobs at the moment. 
Given that the regression results also show a bi-directional link existing between 
finance and real GDP, and that export Granger causes investment and real GDP, 
there is a need to ensure a sustainable economic growth by increasing efforts in the 
direction of trade policies. This will create a self-reinforcing dynamic on growth 
through the finance connection. Therefore, the efforts made by the authorities to 
-348- 
promote the development of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries with a 
view to sustain economic growth were fully warranted although the prima jacia 
empirical evidence and the models reject the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. 
In so far as financial deepening is concerned in the region, the results have 
shown a lack of convergence in the transmission of the liberalisation policies and this 
can only retard any higher level of regional integration in future. 
-349- 
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Appendix 1 
List of Companies 
1. Harel FrkNres Limited 
2. Mon Ddsert Alma Ltd 
3. Mauritius Oil Refineries Ltd 
4. The Mount Sugar Estates Co Ltd 
5. Maurutius Stationary Manufacturers Ltd 
6. Mon Trdsor Mon Ddsert Ltd 
7. Rogers and Co Ltd 
8. The Savannah S. E Co Ltd 
9. Swan Insurance Co Ltd 
10. The United Basalt Product Ltd 
xxxiii 
Appendix 2 
Tablel. 2 
Summary of Macroprudential Indicators 
Aggregated Microprudential Indicators Macroeconomic indicators 
Capital adequacy Economic growth 
Aggregate capital ratios Aggregate growth rates 
Frequency distribution of capital ratios Sectoral slumps 
Asset quality Balance of payments 
Lending institution Current account deficit 
Sectoral credit concentration Foreign exchange reserve adequacy 
Foreign currency denominated lending External debt (including maturity structure) 
Nonperforming loans and provisions Terms of trade 
Loans to loss-making public sector entities Composition and maturity of flows 
Risk profiles of assets Inflation 
Connected lending Volatility of inflation 
Leverage ratios Interest and exchange rates 
Borrowing entities Volatility in interest and exchange rates 
Debt-equity ratios level of domestic real interest rates 
Corporate profitability Exchange rate sustainability 
Other indicators of corporate conditions Exchange rate guarantees 
Household indebtedness Lending and asset price booms 
Management soundness lending booms 
Expense ratios Asset price booms 
Earnings per employees Contagion effects 
Growth in number of financial transactions Trade spillovers; 
Earnings and profitability Financial market correlation 
Return on assets Other factors 
Return on equity Directed lending and investment 
Income and expense ratios Government recourse to the banking 
Structural profitability indicators system 
Liquidity Arrears in the economy 
Central bank credit to financial institution 
Segmentation of interbank rates 
Deposits in relation to monetary aggregates 
Loans-to-deposit ratios 
Maturity structure of assets and liabilities (liquid asset ratios) 
Measures of secondary market liquidity 
Sensitivity to market risk 
Foreign exchange risk 
Interest rate risk 
Equity price risk 
Commodity price risk 
Market-based indicators 
Market prices of financial instruments, including equity 
Indicators of excess yields 
Credit ratings 
Sovereign yield spreads 
Source: IMF Occasional Paper No 192, April 2000 
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Appendix 3 
Summary of Empirical Literature 
Theme Observation /Findings Author 
I Savings and LDCs response to higher interest rate Giovannnni 
Interest rate policy is either insignificant or too small (1985) 
for policy relevance 
2 Savings and Changes in interest rate can either increase Deaton (1989) 
Interest rate or decrease the current consumption and 
hence saving depends on the balance 
between the income and substitution effect. 
3 Savings and In LDCs where households must first Ogagri, Ostry and 
Interest rate achieve subsistence consumption (and Reinhart (1995) 
savings), intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and interest ate sensitivity of 
saving is for some time almost zero. 
4 Savings and High interest rate policy can result in lower Akyuz and Kotte 
Interest rate aggregate savings when the effect of (1991) 
income distribution, tax treatment of 
interest payment and corporate financial 
distress are taken into account 
5 Interest rate Real deposit rate did not change Turtleboom 
movement in significantly in several African countries (1981) 
Africa after liberalisation 
6 Interest and I-Egh interest rate policy can result in lower Akyuz and Kotte 
Savings aggregate savings when the effect of (1991) 
income distribution, tax treatment of 
interest payment and corporate financial 
distress are taken into account 
7 Capital Market The desire for liquidity works against the Jappellini and 
Liquidity and propensity to save Pagano (1984) 
Savings 
8 Stock Market Greater stock market liquidity is associated Levine (1996, 
and Capital with faster rate of capital accumulation 2001) 
Formation 
9 Stock Market Stock Market liquidity is a robust predictor Levine and Zervos 
and Capital of real per capita GDP growth (1998) 
Formation 
10 Stockmarket Bank-based financial systems such as Arestis, 
Development Germany, Japan and to some extent France Demetriades and 
and Banking are more capable of promoting long-term Luintel (1999) 
System growth than in the market-based Anglo- 
Saxon system. 
xxxvi 
II Financial Better financial systems improve the King and Levine 
Systems and profitability of successful innovation and (1993) 
Innovation thus accelerate growth. 
12 Liberalisation Growth tends to be higher if reforms Fuch-Schdride and 
and pertaining to property rights and contract Funke (2001) 
Institutional enforceability precede stock market 
Dimensions liberalisation 
13 Technology Technology enhances intermediation and Rousseau(1998) 
and Finance financial deepening 
King and Levine 
(1998) 
14 Causality Issue The development of financial Levine, Loayza, 
intermediaries exert a large causal impact andBeck(2000) 
on economic growth. 
15 Causality Issue There is no evidence of one way causality Shan, Morris and 
from financial development to economic Sun (2001) 
growth in China, Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, UK and USA 
16 Law and Countries that efficiently impose Levine, Loayza, 
Financial compliance with laws tend to have better I and Beck (2000) 
xxxvii 
Development developed financial intermediaries. 
Countries where corporations publish 
relatively comprehensive and accurate 
financial statements have better developed 
financial intermediaries 
17 Regulations Regulation does not work satisfactorily in Demirgac-Kunt 
many developing countries because of high and Detragiache 
level of corruption and poor institutional (2002) 
quality. 
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Appendix 4 
The South East Asian Crisis 
In S. E Asian countries, overvalued pegged exchange rates deteriorated the 
terms of trade. Current account deficit were being financed by massive inflows of 
short-term foreign capital in a context of capital account liberalisation and the BOP 
did not appear to be in difficulty. The ratio short-term debt' to international reserves 
in East Asia and Pacific increased from 124% in 1990 to 214% in 1997 - (World 
Bank, Global Development Finance 2000). Rodrik and Velasco (1999) show 
evidence of high levels of short-term debt systematically increasing the risks of a 
financial crisis. Short-term bank-to-bank lending 2 was the main contributor to the 
rapid flow of "hot-money" in S. E Asia. Short-term interest dropped in OECD 
countries in the 1990s and global liquidity increased. Interest differential in favour of 
East Asian economies throughout 1990-1996 provided arbitrage opportunities to 
finance current account deficits and acted as a push factor encouraging international 
financial intermediation. Low interest in Japan due to the weakness of the economy 
encouraged Japanese banks to lend to the S. E. Asian Tigers at higher rates. Domestic 
banks found it profitable to borrow short-term foreign exchange in the US and Japan 
for long-term lending in the domestic market at higher rate after currency conversion 
and also to buy government debt at higher rates. The ex-ante foreign exchange risks 3 
looked non-existent because of pegged exchange rates. Such behaviour related to the 
1 Maturity less than I year. 2 It must be observed that short-term loans are less risky. The Basel Capital weights favour short- 
term lending over medium/long-terms lending and makes no distinction between domestic and 
international short-term lending. 
3 Ex post risks were associated with exposure to currency devaluation, mismatch in maturity of assets 
and liability, deterioration of firm performance with the deterioration of the economy. 
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peg was also present in the Latin American and the Turkish crisis. However, pegged 
rates do become misaligned and if maintained unchanged for too long can, in a world 
of capital mobility, lead to currency crisis. International capital inflows intermediated 
in the banking sector can be expected to stabilise as the increase the supply of credit 
drives interest rate down at parity to foreign interest rate 4. However, capital inflows 
perpetuated in S. E Asia because of increased demand for investment and bank credit 
arising out of the private sector's belief that with economic liberalisation the 
economy would grow still faster, (Bird and Rajan, 1999). This coupled with an 
uncompetitive banking market structure prevented convergence with international 
interest rate as per parity theory. Adverse selection occurred since firms of good 
repute could borrow abroad directly and so banking intermediation was for the 
relatively less efficient firms. When foreign loans got in the real estate sector5 it did 
not generate foreign earnings for loan repayment as the productive sector would from 
Debt servicing not offset by higher export earnings exacerbated the current account 
deficit. Additionally, asset prices boomed and when they subsequently collapsed 
borrowers could not repay the domestic banks whose balance sheets were weakened 
with high proportions of non-performing loans. Asymmetry of information prevented 
foreign investors from identifying the degradation of banks assets and the inflows 
continued financing the current account deficit. Current account deficit in Tbailand 
rose from 5.7% to 8.4% GDP in 1995. In Korea the change was from 1.5% in 1994 
to 4.6% in 1996. In Malaysia current account deficit reached 8.8% GDP in 1995. 
When much later current account deficits were perceived as unsustainable with 
4 After allowing for expected currency weakening and risk premia. 5 Especially in Malaysia. 
xl 
relatively low foreign reserves to defend the exchange rate this triggered a 
speculative currency attack. Some reversal of private capital flows of around 109 
billion US$ has been observed in S. E. Asia between 1996 and 1997, (Institute for 
International Finance, 1998). With massive outflows the peg collapsed and banks 
faced increased foreign currency debt creating a twin crisis, banking-cum-currency, a 
phenomenon that has been found to be very common in financially liberalised 
emerging economics, (Glick and Hutchinson 1999). The South East Asian crisis can 
actually be considered "Minskian" (see Chapter 4) in nature. 
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Appendix 5 
Short History of Banking Development before Liberalisation 
Soon after the British had captured the island from the French in 1810, 
Governor Robert Farquhar gave support to the creation of the first bank in 
Mauritius. The "Colonial Bank of Mauritius, Bourbon and Dependencies" was 
created by the people of French origin but it was forced to close down in September 
1813 because of the absence of prior authorisation from the Secretary of State 
(Patureau, 1988). Within a couple of months some of its shareholders followed all 
required procedures and set up "La Banque de I'lle Maurice ,6 in December of the 
same year. However, a major fire ravaged the island in 1816 and led to liquidity 
problems in spite of financial assistance from the colonial government. Liquidation 
processes started in 1819 and ended in 1826. Meanwhile the Eastern Commission of 
Enquiry 7 (1826-28) recommended, interallia, the creation of a Bank. 
Subsequently in 1831 the "Banque de Maurice" was founded by a group of 
Franco-Mauritians with the financial support of people in London. The Mauritius 
Commercial Bank (MCB8) was founded by British businessmen jointly with another 
group of French settlers to foster some competition. The 1847 financial crisis in 
London led to the stoppage of operations of the "Banque de Maurice" in 1848, 
leaving the MCB as a monopoly banking institution. From 1852 to the end of the 
6A commercial bank. It was also known as la banque Gaillardon. Gaillardon being one of the 
shareholders. 
7A Royal Commission appointed in 1822 to look into economic and administrative problems in 
Mauritius and other British colonies in the region. 
8 MCB is still in operation. 
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19th century the MCB faced very little and sporadic competition from several banks 
joining the industry but subsequently leaving. 
- Oriental Bank Corporation, 1852-85 
- Nouvelle Banque Orientale, 1886-92 
- Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, 1859-65 
- Banque Franco-Egyptienne, 1881-89 
With the quasi-monopoly power of the MCB over almost half a century, the 
Franco-Mauritian sugar producers holding economic power gradually constituted its 
captive market. It is only towards the end of the 1800s and early 1900s that the 
MCB faced stable, though relatively weak, competition. Competition for market 
share came from both foreign banks having local branches as well as locally 
incorporated banks. The presence of the few foreign banks9 in the economy even 
before financial liberalisation has contributed to establishing a minimum standard of 
good banking practices in Mauritius but the highly dominant position of the MCB 
persisted until entry of the State Bank of Mauritius (SBM) in the industry in 1973. 
That constituted a major event both in terms redistribution of market power in the 
industry and in terms of financial deepening. Through innovation SBM set forth to 
become a real challenger to MCB and in the process it significantly improved the 
intermediation process over the island. Unlike the other banks, which had their main 
activities at their head quarters in Port Louis, supported by three or four branches in 
the main towns, SBM set out to attract depositors in all regions by innovation 
through the introduction of branches in remote areas. It also used TV advertisinglo 
9 E. g Barclays Bank, HSBC 
10 Never in the past had banks advertised on radio/T. V 
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as a marketing instrument in the process. Small savers from low-income groups and 
people from remote areas had hitherto been ignored to a certain extent and they 
found in SBM a more attractive proposition. Apart from bringing new depositors 
into the banking sector, SBM also captured part of the market from other existing 
institutions. Many small savers who were customers at the Post Office Saving Bank 
switched over to SBM which provided them with extra servicesl I such as a variety 
of deposit instruments and giro transfer for salary being paid direct to their accounts 
as well as loan facilities. The SBM also proved to be very flexible regarding 
personal loans as compared to other banks. In that respect it has also contributed to 
weaken the thin unofficial money market. The bank has also been an important 
public sector partner facilitating debt management of public finance via acquisition 
of Treasury bills. 
11 Deposits are accepted at all branches of the POSB, while withdrawal is limited to MUR 2000 at 
branches. Customers can apply for larger sums at branches by giving notice of withdrawal 3 days in 
advance. Any amount can be withdrawn on demand only at the Central Office in Port Louis. 
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Appendix 6 
Methodology Employed for Calculation of Total Return Index 
Step 1: XD Adjustment 
Daily announced dividend is transposed into index points on the ex-dividend date. 
XDAdjustment= i-I X100 
(I 
iý"dg -iW 
i 
Where, 
gi = Announced dividend per share of the ith company 
wi = Number of ordinary shares issued by the ith company 
d= Divisor (base market capitalization) of the underlying capital index, SEMDEX 
Step 2: Total Return Index (SEMTRI) Calculation 
Assumption: Reinvestment of Dividends 
SEMTRI t= SEMTRI t-, 
SEMDEXt+XD, ) (I 
SEMDEX, 
-, 
Where, 
SEMTRIt = Total Return Index Value Today 
SEMTRI t-1 = Total Return Index Value Yesterday 
SEMDEXt = Underlying Capital Index Today 
SEMDEX t-1 = Underlying Capital Index Yesterday 
XDt = XD adjustment to underlying Capital Index Today 
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Appendix 7 
Chronology of Liberalisation in the Mauritian Monetary Sector 
Event Date 
I Gradual elimination of directed credit programme 1991 
15'phase of open market operations 1991 
(Treasury Bills in the Primary Market) 
3 Interest rate liberalisation 1991-1995 
4 Accommodation policy reviewed so that banks having 1992 
liquidity deficit seek reserves from the interbank market 
before seeking refinancing from the central bank. 
5 Phasing out of high reserve requirement 1996-1998 
6 Creation of secondary market in treasury bills through OTC 1998 
sales of Treasury Bills (TBs) to non-bank institutions and to 
individuals 
2 nd phase of open market operations with the introduction of 1999 
repo transactions to allow the central bank influence the 
liquidity of the banking sector 
8 Final stage of development of secondary market in TBs via 2003 
the trading of TBs on the Stock exchange of Mauritius 
9 Removal of exchange control on current account 1987-1992 
10 Liberalisation of capital account 1991-1994 
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Appendix 8 
List of Guidelines Issued by the BOM (Undated) 
1. Guideline on Public Disclosure of Information 
2. Guideline on Related Party Transactions 
3. Guideline on Liquidity 
4. Guideline on Credit Concentration Limits 
5. Guideline on Corporate Governance 
6. Guidance Note on General Principles for Maintenance of Accounting and 
Other Records and Internal Control Systems 
7. Guidelines for Calculation and Reporting of Foreign Exchange 
Exposures of Banks 
8. Guideline on Internet Banking 
9. Guidance Notes on Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio 
10. Guideline on Transactions or Conditions respecting Well-being of a 
Financial Institution Reportable by the External Auditor To the Bank of 
Mauritius 
11. Guideline on Credit Impairment Measurement and Income Recognition 
12. Guidance Notes on Credit Risk Nlanagement 
13. Guidance Notes on Fit and Proper Person Criteria 
Appendix to Fit and Proper Person Questionnaire 
14. Guidance Notes on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism for Banks and Cash Dealers 
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Appendix 9 
Basel Provision Regarding Capital Base 
In line with the Basel provision the minimum capital base is in different 
components: - 
(i) At least 50% of the capital base should compose a core element (tier 
12 1) representing equity capital and retained earnings. 
(ii) Supplementary capital (tier 2) representing revaluation reserves, 
general provisions/general loan loss reserves, hybrid 13 capital instruments and 
subordinated term debts 
14 
. 
Tier 3 capital comprising subordinated debt of at least two years' maturity as 
amended in 1996 by the Basel capital accord of 1988 is not yet considered in 
Mauritius because banks are not heavily involved in securities trading which involve 
market risks. 
12 Paid ordinary shares and non-cumulative preference shares 
13 debt/equity - cumulative preference shares. 14 Created against the possibility of future losses and are not intended to deal with specific assets. 
However where provisions have been created against identified losses/deterioration of value of any 
asset or group of assets they do not represent the characteristic of capital and are not included in 
capital base. This represents an amendment made in 1996 to the 1988 Basel capital accord. 
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Appendix 10 
Loan Classification & Provisions in Mauritius 
1. Standard Credit: This refers to performing credit with adequate sources of 
repayments and collateral. 
2. Substandard Credit: This refers to current performing credit but where 
there exists doubts about the borrower's ability to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the credit. Further, whenever a non-performing loan 15 is past 
due between 90 and 180 days, it is automatically classified as substandard. 
3. Doubtful credit includes: 
(a) Loans where the collection of debt has become highly improbable 
(b) Non-performing loans that are past due for a period exceeding 180 
days but less than one year. 
4. Irrecoverable loan (Loss) refers to credit considered as uncollectable. This 
category also comprises non-performing loans that are past due for a period longer 
than one year. Banks are requested to write-off irrecoverable loans even if there 
might be some recovery in the long-term. This prevents any attempts at rolling over 
loans. The aim is to reduce the ratio below 4 percent by carrying out revival plans of 
large debtors in the second fiscal half. 
The amount of non-performing loans is now compiled by each bank and the figures 
reported to the central bank 16 . Banks are expected to set a general provision of a 
minimum I% of their standard advances as a cushion for credit loss. They also need 
" In case the principal or interest on past due accounts are due and unpaid for 90 days or more a loan 
is defined as non-performing. 
16 No record is available about non-performing loans for years preceeding 1996. 
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to ensure that 20% of their substandard credit, 50% of doubtful credit and 100% of 
irrecoverable credit are treated as provision for bad debt to avoid overstating existing 
loans and swelling profits and making excessive dividend payments 17 . 
17 Banks are not allowed to declare any dividend or issue bonus shares Out of Profit until the adequate 
provision has been made to the satisfaction of the BOM in respect of bad or doubtful debts. 
